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2 Framework and General Introduction 
1. Introduction 
One main research objective of sociology has always been to study social inequalities 
and identify their causes. Security is a basic human need (Maslow, 1943), and work is an 
important area of life. Employment provides not only financial resources but also social 
status and social interactions. The unequal distribution of this central resource – security – 
in an important domain of life – work – can be seen as a significant dimension of social 
inequality. Job insecurity is defined as the perceived probability of the employees to 
involuntarily lose their current job (e.g. Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). This perception has 
a huge effect on the individuals' overall well-being (Buffel et al., 2015; Dawson et al., 2017) 
their families’ well-being and mental health (e.g. Bubonya et al., 2017). Research has also 
shown that job insecurity impairs individuals’ ability to plan ahead and make long term 
commitments such as marriage, buying residential property, or having children (Lozza et al., 
2013). Also, for sociological research on mobility and inequality, job insecurity is a crucial 
factor. Research considers the occupation and the associated prestige and income, together 
with education to be the central determinants of socioeconomic status. This is reflected in 
existing sociological stratification measures such as the ISEI (International Socio-Economic 
Index of Occupational Status), ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations), 
and the EGP (Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero) typology. In this context, job insecurity can 
be seen as potential mobility initiated or forced upon the employee by the employer.  
When looking at causes for social inequality, the impact of institutions has always 
been a focus of sociological research (see, e.g. Kalleberg, 2009). One such societal 
institution is employment protection legislation (EPL), which is a central focus of this 
dissertation. The term EPL subsumes several independent sub-dimensions: On the one hand, 
EPL contains employment protection (against dismissal) for regular employees (EPLreg) 
and, on the other hand, regulations that determine the conditions under which temporary 
employment is permitted (OECD, 2014b). These regulations are made by the legislature, 
reflect influences from different stakeholders within society, and usually includes a clear 
path dependence (Emmenegger, 2011). On the one hand, contingency on previous policy 
decisions and, on the other hand, on the structure of other institutions, such as the education 
system. 
This dissertation focusses on the causes of the unequal distribution of job security in a 
comparative perspective with a strong focus on the institutional setting of EPL and the 
consequences of insecurity connected to the labor market in terms of turnover intentions. 
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In general, in the last decade, job insecurity increased due to the pressure of 
globalization. However, there are huge country-differences regarding the distribution of job 
insecurity within the country. Many countries have implemented partial or targeted reforms 
simplifying the use of temporary contracts while leaving employment protection for 
permanent employees intact (Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005), this strategy increased the 
share of temporary employment in these countries. Having a fixed-term employment 
contract that automatically ends at a certain date is one of the main factors causing job 
insecurity (e.g. Erlinghagen, 2008). Research has pointed out that not only the fixed-term 
employment risk overall but also the risk between certain groups differ between societies 
(e.g. Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). In some countries, such as the UK, the rate of fixed-term 
employment was below 6% in 2012, while in Spain it was 25% (OECD, 2014a). When 
looking at the risks of specific groups – while the temporary employment risk for new hires 
was about 25% in the UK, in Spain it was almost 90% (OECD, 2014a), indicating a strong 
inequality between labor market entrants and older employees.  
And also the consequences of fixed-term employment are expected to differ (e.g. 
Scherer, 2009) since both aspects – risk and consequences – depend on institutional settings 
at the national level. Here again, we have the example of Spain where the sharp rise in the 
unemployment rate in the wake of the 2008 recession was mainly due to the reduction of 
temporary jobs (OECD, 2014a), which highlights the transfer of entrepreneurial risk towards 
fixed-term employees, while permanent employees were far less affected. Also, the 
transition rates from temporary to permanent employment differs vastly – while it was only 
about 20% in Spain (within three years), it was about 50% in the UK. 
But how can these differences be explained? Here, EPL is expected to be one of the 
decisive factors (e.g. Berglund, 2015; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Gebel and Giesecke, 
2016; Scherer, 2009). EPL has a wide-ranging impact on societal inequality due to its impact 
on the distribution of jobs and job security and is frequently discussed as a cause of inequality 
for example due to contributing to the spread of temporary employment (Gash and 
McGinnity, 2007). Strict protection against dismissal is regarded as one of the main causes 
for the dualisation of the labor market into well-placed, protected insiders and unprotected 
poorly placed outsiders (see, e.g. Chung and Mau, 2014; OECD, 2014a).  
Therefore, the previously mentioned partial reform strategy or asymmetric 
liberalization (OECD, 2014a) drove a wedge between the two segments of the labor market. 
It has been especially detrimental for labor market entrants, as it disproportionally increased 
youth unemployment and temporary employment risk (e.g. Breen, 2005; Gebel and 
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Giesecke, 2016), while employees, who were already established in the labor market were 
far less affected. Therefore, it can be regarded as a cohort or generational inequality. There 
has been some call for debate to relieve this labor market duality (e.g. OECD, 2014a). 
However, a wide societal debate is so far missing. 
Scientific research and debate on the effects of EPL are therefore essential, given its 
expected impact on inequality within society on the one hand and on the other hand the fact 
that it can be directly changed by the legislature (in contrast to the unemployment rate for 
example). 
In this dissertation, several open issues within this research field are addressed: 
Substantively this dissertation focusses on questions surrounding job insecurity. Study 1 
looks at one central consequence of job insecurity – turnover intentions – and investigates 
the question of how job insecurity, employability and irreplaceability affect this outcome 
and also how they interact. It can be shown that both job insecurity and employability 
increase turnover intentions, indicating that flexible labor markets might also lead to high 
turnover initiated by employees. 
Additionally, open questions on the distribution of security in the labor market and 
the role of EPL will be tackled. More specifically, this dissertation focusses on the unequal 
distribution of perceived job security between temporary and permanent employees in a 
cross-national perspective and examines the specific role of EPL as a cause for this gap 
(Study 2, Study 3), a question where previous research has come to contradicting results 
(Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Chung, 2016). It can be shown that the difference between 
temporary and permanent employees increases with both dimensions of EPL (EPLreg and 
EPLtemp). For the effect of EPL on the distribution of objective job insecurity, its effect on 
the fixed-term employment risk of labor market entrants is examined (Study 3). Here we 
find – as the hypotheses suggest, that as expected – strict EPLreg increases the temporary 
employment risk of temporary employees and also a short trial period increases temporary 
employment risk. 
Methodological, these two studies (Study 2 and 3) also address the question of how 
to measure EPL and argue, why the most commonly used EPL-measure, the Index proposed 
by the OECD (OECD, 2014b), is invalid and develop a theory-driven new indicator to 
measure EPLreg and also to validate this new index, an endeavor that previous research has 
yet failed to do. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: The following chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the area of research to place the three studies of the dissertation into a common 
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framework. To this end, the connections between the central concepts of the dissertation are 
presented, and it is shown how the three studies of the dissertation fit into this context. 
Subsequently, the central concepts within the research project will be discussed to provide 
an overview. Following this introduction to the central constructs, in Chapter 3, the three 
studies, their relation to the general research framework and the results are summarized. 
Chapter 4 contains the conclusion. After that, the three studies will follow in the published 
form (Study 1 and 2) or the submitted form (Study 3). 
 
2. Overview of the Research Program and the Link between the Studies 
In my dissertation, I focus on the perceived job insecurity as the key construct, in 
other words, the subjective assessment of the probability of losing the current job involuntary 
(Anderson and Pontusson, 2007: 4). This subjective assessment of job security is influenced 
by various factors at the individual, company and macro-level (e.g. Anderson and Pontusson, 
2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). In this context, I focus on fixed-term 
employment as a key factor determining perceived job insecurity at the individual level 
(Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). The most 
important factor on the macro level is employment protection legislation (EPL), which 
indicates the legal framework for the dismissal of permanent employees and also the 
framework for the use of temporary contracts (OECD, 2014b). EPL, therefore, affects both 
the temporary employment risk and the perceived job insecurity. Moreover, protection 
against dismissal is also expected to moderate the effect of temporary employment on 
perceived job security (Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Chung, 2016). However, empirical 
evidence is inconclusive.  
As one example of the consequences of perceived job insecurity, I study turnover 
intentions, which are the intention to leave the current employer (Berntson et al., 2010). 
Within this framework, there are several gaps in the literature, which the studies of 
this dissertation close. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the frame of reference of the dissertation. Within 
this framework, it becomes clear how the articles and the central constructs are connected. 
Furthermore, the context of the dissertation is presented.  
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Figure 1. Framework of the dissertation and connection of the studies to the framework 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the key constructs of the dissertation are connected to each 
other. The horizontal axis represents the position of the concepts within the process. The 
vertical axis is used to indicate on which level the constructs are located – either on the 
individual level or the macro-level (context). Additionally, the figure displays which 
constructs and connections are studied within the studies and where the studies can be found 
in the framework.  
Perceived job insecurity is at the center of the figure and my research. This perceived 
job insecurity is the evaluation of objective factors on the individual level (influenced, e.g. 
by temporary employment) as well as on the context level (e.g. EPL). Due to this subjective 
evaluation, the objective aspects have consequences for individuals. In my work, I look at 
turnover intentions as one example. 
The three studies examine different aspects within this research framework: The first 
study focuses strictly on the micro-level, examining the consequences of perceived job 
insecurity. In this context, the consequences of job insecurity on turnover intentions and the 
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influence of employability and irreplaceability - the perceived company-specific human 
capital - are analyzed (Study 1). This study closes a research gap by analysing the interaction 
effects between job insecurity and employability and irreplaceability. Additionally, the 
methodological approach - that is, the estimation of separate models for each country in 
comparison to previous studies, which were limited to individual countries - allows an 
assessment of the robustness of the results. 
Study 2 and 3 focus on the influence of EPL in a comparative cross-country 
perspective. First, the influence of protection against dismissal on the temporary 
employment risk of new hires is examined in cross-country comparisons. In other words, the 
role of EPL on the distribution of objective job insecurity (Study 3). Secondly, the role of 
EPL regarding its moderating effect on the link between objective insecurity (temporary 
employment) and perceived job insecurity (Study 2) is examined.  
Thirdly, the operationalization of EPL - one key construct of this dissertation and 
also in labor market research in general, is not only critically examined (Study 2 and Study 
3) but also a theory-driven improved measurement is developed and validated (Study 3).  
In the following, the key concepts within the frame of reference are presented in 
order to integrate the studies into previous research and to define the gaps in the literature. 
The first three sections deal with the individual level, namely with (1) perceived job 
insecurity, (2) turnover intentions, (3) fixed-term employment. Subsequently, section (4) 
presents EPL as a key context variable. 
 
2.1. Subjective evaluation: Perceived job insecurity 
Perceived job insecurity is the central concept of the dissertation – it is examined as 
a central independent variable in study 1 and as the dependent variable in studies 2 and 3. 
According to previous research, not objective job insecurity itself (such as fixed-term 
employment for example), but rather the subjective evaluation in the form of perceived job 
insecurity causes the detrimental effects on the individual (e.g. Golsch, 2003). Therefore, 
this subjective assessment is so crucial. In the following, the different facets of job insecurity 
will be discussed and where the evaluation comes from. 
There are different types of subjective insecurity in relation to the labor market. 
These can be distinguished by (1) whether they refer to job loss or its consequences and (2) 
whether they represent a cognitive or affective assessment. 
Perceived job insecurity is the estimated probability of losing one' s job (Anderson 
and Pontusson, 2007: 4). This cognitive assessment related to job loss is the focus of this 
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dissertation. Labour market security or employability, on the other hand, is crucial for the 
estimated consequences of job loss. Employability refers to the perceived chances of re-
employment in the event of job loss (see Berntson et al., 2010: 225). This cognitive 
evaluation referring to the consequences is explored in study 1 as an independent variable. 
For the affective evaluation - which is measured by the intensity of anxiety or worry 
caused by this potential job loss (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007: 4) - both the probability of 
job loss and its consequences are taken into account. This evaluation is, therefore, much 
broader and is not the focus of the dissertation. 
Perceived job security is a subjective assessment by the individual, in which 
individual attributes, the characteristics of the company and also factors in the national 
context have an influence (e.g. Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 
2012). In my dissertation, I am assuming that both sides presume that the other side is acting 
rationally by maximizing the expected utility, i.e. the perceived job insecurity is based on 
the employee's assessment of what the employer will do to maximize profit - given the 
individual characteristics of the employee, the characteristics of the company and the 
particular national context. In previous research, this assumption is rarely explicitly stated, 
but it is in line with previous findings: 
On the individual level, firm-specific human capital, for example, is a factor that 
reduces perceived job insecurity (Erlinghagen, 2008; Green et al., 2000). This can be 
explained by the fact that employees with firm-specific human capital – knowledge that can 
only be acquired in the company (Becker, 1975) – are difficult and expensive to replace. 
One of the most significant factors increasing perceived job insecurity is having a fixed-term 
contract (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and 
Olsen, 2012). This is in line with rational cost-benefit assessments, as the dismissal costs of 
permanent employees are higher than those of temporary employees, whose contract 
automatically ends. 
The framework of rational choice also explains the effects on perceived job 
insecurity connected to the firm and country attributes. These factors also influence the cost-
benefit assessment of companies in relation to possible dismissals. Perceived job insecurity 
is, for example, higher in smaller firms, in certain industries and when the companies have 
financial difficulties (e.g. Erlinghagen, 2008). On the country level, especially a high 
unemployment rate is increases perceived job insecurity (e.g. Erlinghagen, 2008). These 
factors make it more likely that companies will lean towards dismissals, which seems to be 
reflected in the subjective assessments of the employees. 
Framework and General Introduction 9 
 
Even though perceived job insecurity is subjective, also influenced by personality 
and past experiences, and seemingly somewhat exaggerated - studies found that even among 
those who were absolutely sure to lose their job only 40% actually did (Dickerson and Green, 
2012) - the assessment still mirrors the real situation and has considerable negative 
consequences. Research clearly shows that perceived job insecurity has a significant impact 
on both the employee himself and on his social environment. The negative impact of job 
insecurity is not limited to work-related outcomes such as job satisfaction (Cuyper and De 
Witte, 2007; Zeytinoglu et al., 2013). Through spillover-effects, which are the across-
domain transmission of strain from one area of life to another (Bakker and Demerouti, 2013: 
3), the negative consequences of job insecurity affect a number of areas of the person's life. 
Job insecurity reduces psychological health (Buffel et al., 2015; Chirumbolo and Areni, 
2010; De Witte, 1999), and psychological well-being (Dawson et al., 2017), life satisfaction 
(De Cuyper and De Witte, 2007) as well as marital satisfaction (Cheng et al., 2014). 
Additionally, job insecurity does also shape life decisions: especially long-term 
commitments such as marriage, having children, or purchasing residential property are often 
delayed (Lozza et al., 2013). 
With people living together in households, the negative consequences of job 
insecurity spread to other family members via crossover effects (Bakker and Demerouti, 
2013). In studies, negative effects on the mental health of children and partners, for instance, 
have been shown (e.g. Bubonya et al., 2017).  
 
2.2. Turnover intentions 
As can be seen in figure 1, subjective evaluations have consequences. "If men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). This 
also applies to perceived job insecurity. As discussed in the previous section, perceived job 
insecurity has many negative consequences. Turnover intentions can be understood as a 
problem-focused coping strategy when faced with job insecurity: Turnover intentions are the 
intention of employees to leave their current employer. This strategy is aimed at changing 
or eliminating the source of stress (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). In my dissertation, the 
relationship between job insecurity and turnover intentions is discussed in Study 1. 
The expectation or even fear of losing one’s job is devastating and therefore, people 
want to escape that situation. There are different coping strategies to do so: they can either 
change the situation or change their feeling about it (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). As a 
reaction to job insecurity, often used coping strategies are voice, exit and neglect (Berntson 
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et al., 2010). If employees have enough workplace bargaining power, in the form of valuable 
knowledge and skills (Wright, 2000), they may choose “voice”, speak up and ask for a more 
secure job within the current company. However, often the most promising option is often 
“exit”, to leave and find a more secure job somewhere else. Consequently, job insecurity has 
been shown consistently to increase turnover intentions (Berntson et al., 2010; Furaker and 
Berglund, 2014; Sverke and Goslinga, 2003), which is a strong predictor of actual turnover 
(Allen et al., 2005). 
The third possible coping strategy “neglect”, - emotionally disengage from one’s job 
(Berntson et al., 2010), is empirically also an often used strategy, and job insecurity, 
therefore, leads to a decrease in work attitudes, such as commitment to and trust in the 
company and a regression in work-related behavior like performance (for an overview, see 
Cheng and Chan, 2008; Sverke et al., 2002). One main function of temporary employment 
is its use as an effort-eliciting-tool (Güell, 2000; Polavieja, 2003). However, the notion that 
that perceived job insecurity causes people to fight and work harder does not hold, when 
looking at the empirical finding concerning the three coping strategies. 
Even though flexibility makes companies more competitive, it also has negative 
consequences for companies: Job insecurity increases turnover, which is costly due to the 
expensive search for and training of replacements (who need to acquire company-specific 
skills and knowledge). This is one reason why turnover rates have been shown to negatively 
affect productivity and the financial performance of companies (Hancock et al., 2013). 
Usually, one way to relieve the negative consequences of job insecurity is to increase 
the general employability level (Flexicurity). However, not only job insecurity but also 
employability increases turnover intentions (Berntson et al., 2010), which might be quite 
damaging when thinking about the firm-specific human capital, which is lost. This turnover 
seems damaging for both sides and ultimately should reduce productivity at the macro level. 
 
2.3. Temporary employment 
Temporary employment refers to an employment contract that automatically ends 
after a fixed term, without requiring termination by the employee or employer. This fixed-
term employment is one of the most influential attributes in terms of perceived job security 
(e.g. Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012) and one of the main 
causes for inequality concerning actual and perceived job security.  
In my dissertation, fixed-term employment is examined in Study 2 and Study 3.  
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For a broader understanding, in the following, I will address, which functions fixed-
term contracts have for companies, which consequences fixed-term employment has for 
employees and how the fixed-term employment risk is distributed between different groups. 
Since fixed-term contracts expire automatically and the decision as to whether the 
employee should remain with the company can be made over and over again, it is one 
possibility for companies to manage their labor demand in a flexible way.  
In this context, according to previous research, fixed-term contracts have three main 
functions: (1) they allow for numerical flexibility, i.e. they allow companies to react flexibly 
to fluctuations in demand and adapt the size of their workforce accordingly (Giesecke and 
Schindler, 2008: 284). (2) fixed-term contracts are used by companies as an extended 
probationary period to assess the productivity of employees (Korpi and Levin, 2001) to 
minimize the risk of hiring inefficient employees on a permanent contract. (3) Similarly, for 
project work, it is attractive for enterprises to use fixed-term contracts (Giesecke and 
Schindler, 2008: 284) because their need for manpower is limited in time (both in terms of 
the number and skills of the employee). 
While for companies fixed-term contracts offer clear advantages, in scientific 
research, their impact on employees is controversial. 
The effects on employees' careers are still to be determined. It is not clear whether 
fixed-term contracts tend to be “traps” or “stepping stones”. Some findings suggest that 
fixed-term employment increase the likelihood of continuous fixed-term contracts and 
unstable employment patterns (Giesecke and Groß, 2003) and can, therefore, be considered 
a trap. On the other hand, most temporary employees find their way into permanent 
employment (Gash, 2008) and the probability of transitioning into permanent employment 
within is higher for temporary employees than for unemployed (OECD, 2014a) which 
supports the notion of "stepping stone" empirically.  
Despite the above-mentioned advantages of accepting fixed-term contracts (as 
opposed to staying in unemployment), they are clearly disadvantageous (compared to 
permanent employment). Most importantly, fixed-term contracts increase the likelihood of 
losing one's job (e.g., OECD, 2006), even when other possible factors are controlled 
(Giesecke and Groß, 2003; Gash and McGinnity, 2007). The most common reason for 
accepting a temporary job is that a permanent job could not be found (OECD, 2014a:151), 
which indicates that for employees, they are clearly inferior. 
Fixed-term employees are also less likely to undergo training than permanent 
employees (e.g. OECD, 2014a). It is rational for companies to invest preferentially in 
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employees who are likely to stay longer with the company. Additionally, it might also seem 
unprofitable for employees to invest in training. In addition to lower training opportunities, 
wages and career advancement opportunities for fixed-term employees are generally lower 
and empirical evidence suggests, that accepting a temporary contract may lead to permanent 
wage penalties (Booth et al., 2002).  
Previous research most likely does not come to a consensus, since the effects of 
temporary employment are not homogeneous and therefore very difficult to quantify. The 
effects on career prospects and wage vary by the successive number of FTC, by gender, age 
and education and also between countries (for an overview see OECD, 2014a). 
The risk of receiving a fixed-term contract varies considerably between different 
groups of the population. There are studies on education groups, gender and migrant status; 
however, results are mixed. In some countries, high education groups have the highest FTC-
risk, while in other countries, the lowest education groups have the highest FTC-risk (e.g. 
Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). Gender differences are neither uniform nor pronounced (e.g. 
OECD, 2014a).  
However, one finding seems to be consensus: Especially, labor market entrants have 
an immensely increased risk of entering temporary employment, in Spain – as the most 
extreme case - the probability was almost 90% in 2012 (OECD, 2014a). For an overview 
(also of the country variation) see also figure 7 in study 3. 
Because of the differences in the national context, however, (1) the fixed-term 
employment risk varies considerably from one country to another, due to different incentives 
and regulations; (2) the consequences of fixed-term employment are significantly different; 
and (3) the composition of temporary employees across different population groups differ 
considerably. Particularly EPL plays an essential role, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
2.4. Employment protection legislation  
For both actual and perceived job security, employment protection legislation (EPL) 
is one of the most important factors on the context level. By (1) setting the regulatory 
framework under which dismissals are permitted and (2) defining the legal basis for fixed-
term employment, governments have a major impact on job allocation and the distribution 
of job security. 
EPL is examined in study 2 and 3: First, the comparative studies 2 and 3 deal with 
the operationalization of this construct. Secondly, the effects of EPL on the temporary 
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employment risk of new hires are studied and, thirdly, the influence of EPL on the perceived 
job insecurity of permanent and temporary employees are examined. 
The effect of EPL on both actual and perceived job security is quite complex and has 
many different facets. Therefore, it is not surprising that it is highly debated and so far, 
between countries, there are huge differences in the way EPL is defined. To provide a 
broader understanding, the following section, therefore, examines what the key construct of 
EPL is, which EPL regimes exist, and how EPL affects the distribution of job security across 
countries - both objectively and subjectively.  
The construct EPL is multidimensional and includes a variety of regulations that can 
be separated into three independent theoretical sub-dimensions: (1) Protection of regular 
workers against individual dismissal, (2) specific requirements for collective dismissals, and 
(3) regulations on temporary employment (OECD, 2014b: 1). Research usually focuses on 
the EPL for permanent employees (EPR or EPLreg) and the EPL for temporary employees 
(EPT or EPLtemp). While EPLreg refers to the protection of permanent employees against 
dismissal, EPLtemp refers to the regulations on fixed-term contracts.  
The connection between the two dimensions is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Employment protection regimes 
 
The two dimensions, EPLreg and EPLtemp, are orthogonal to each other and thus 
form a two-dimensional policy spectrum. By dichotomizing EPLreg and EPLtemp in high 
and low, three EPL-regimes can be identified:  
(1) regulated labor markets, with both strict regulations regarding the dismissal of permanent 
workers and strict regulations regarding the use of fixed-term contracts.  
EPL (temporary) 
EPL (regular) 
(1) regulated  
labor markets 
(2) partially  
deregulated  
labor markets 
(3) flexible labor 
markets 
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(2) partially deregulated labor markets, with strict regulations preventing the dismissal of 
permanent workers but weak regulation of the use of fixed-term contracts and  
(3) flexible labor markets with relatively little protection of permanent workers against 
dismissal. In this case, the strictness of the regulations on fixed-term employment is of little 
importance (cf. Study 2, Online Appendix). Therefore, no additional distinction is made as 
to whether or not fixed-term employment is regulated.  
The measurement of institutional regulations is challenging. They are often complex, 
multidimensional, and in addition often not clearly defined and therefore difficult to 
operationalize. This is also true for the measurement of EPL. To this point, the only existing 
comparative measurement for EPL are the three Indices by the OECD. These Indices were 
combined to an EPL-Index and published under the name "Overall strictness of protection 
against dismissals" in the June 1999 Employment Outlook (OECD, 2004). The OECD-EPL-
Index consists of weighted additive indices, including different aspects related to regulations 
of the dismissal process (EPLreg) and weighted additive indices related to the use of fixed-
term contracts (EPLtemp). This operationalization, however, was never discussed in detail, 
which I will do in study 2 and 3. Additionally, no validation studies exist, a gap, that will 
also be closed in study 3. 
In the following, the effects of EPL on unemployment rates and on temporary 
employment rate will be discussed. Secondly, the gaps or permeability between the three 
labor market states - temporary - permanent - and unemployed will be discussed. For this, 
knowledge about the transition probabilities between the three states will be looked at. Third, 
I discuss the influence of EPL for different population groups, based on the current state of 
research. This shows, firstly, how complex the impact of protection against dismissal is and, 
secondly, also how many gaps still exist in this field. 
With regard to the effect of EPL on the unemployment rate, theory predicts two 
opposite effects: on the one hand, EPLreg prevents dismissals and, on the other hand, it can 
also prevent further hiring (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). As a result, both the expected effect 
of EPLreg on the unemployment rate and the empirical findings are ambiguous. While some 
studies find that strict EPLreg increases the unemployment rate (Holt et al., 2017; Lazear, 
1990), other studies find no such effect (Addison and Grosso, 1996; Addison, Teixeira, and 
Grosso, 2000; OECD, 2004; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001, for an overview 
see: Addison and Teixeira 2003). A decrease, however, seems unlikely. Additionally, low 
EPLreg causes economic fluctuations to affect the employment rate more directly (Sala et 
al., 2012), since firms are able to respond more flexibly and adjust their labor demand more 
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quickly. There are two sides to this: on the one hand, the entrepreneurial risk in these labor 
markets is passed on to the employees unfiltered. On the other hand, the opportunities for 
economic growth will have a direct impact on workers in the form of more employment. 
When it comes to the effect of EPLreg on the temporary employment rate, 
expectations are relatively consistent: EPLreg increases the incentive for companies to 
employ on a fixed-term contract in order to build a buffer stock (Polavieja, 2003), allowing 
them to adjust their labor demand to the economic situation without laying off permanent 
employees. Strict regulations on fixed-term employment (EPLtemp), on the other hand, 
reduce the fixed-term employment rate (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). Additionally, an 
interaction effect is likely - temporary employment risk should increase particularly when 
permanent employees are strongly protected, and regulations on temporary employment are 
less strict. In this case, there is a possibility and also the incentive to use temporary contracts. 
To summarize, while EPL has little influence on the unemployment rate, strict EPLreg does 
increases the share of fixed-term employees, while strict EPLtemp indeed decreases the 
share.  
In addition to the impact of EPL on the group size of the unemployed, temporary and 
permanent employed, the question also arises as to how EPL influences the transition 
probabilities between those groups and to what extent EPL has an impact on the 
consequences associated these three states. These two aspects provide insights into how EPL 
affects inequality and labor market segregation. Looking at the theoretical expectations and 
the current state of research on the impact of employment protection legislation on the 
probability to make the transition between the three labour market states - fixed-term 
employment, permanent employment and unemployment - the following becomes clear: 
EPLreg has a particularly strong influence on the chance of changing from temporary to 
permanent employment: The evidence for the effect of strict EPLreg on the difficulty to 
transition from a temporary job to a permanent job however are rather convincing (Centeno 
and Novo, 2012). If EPLreg is strict and a successive temporary contract with the current 
employee is not possible (strict EPLtemp), employers will rather hire a new temporary 
employee, replacing the old one than turning the temporary contract into a permanent one 
(Centeno and Novo, 2012). In other words, strict EPLreg increases the unemployment risk 
of fixed-term employees (Blachard and Landier, 2002) and at the same time reduces their 
likelihood of moving into permanent employment.  
As described above, EPL is a crucial determinant of the probabilities for the 
transition between states. Depending on the starting conditions, the effects of EPL on 
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individuals are therefore fundamentally different. EPLreg lowers the threshold below which 
an employee's productivity must drop in order to make it profitable for the company to 
replace him with a new employee. In other words, EPLreg is biasing competition in favor of 
insiders. Therefore, labor market insiders, i.e. those in permanent employment, benefit 
greatly from a high level of protection against dismissal and only experience disadvantages 
when trying to change jobs, labor market outsiders, i.e. unemployed individuals, temporary 
employees and labor market newcomers, are mainly confronted with disadvantages.  
These theoretical expectations of the negative effects of EPLreg on labour market outsiders 
(e.g. Breen, 2005; Gebel and Giesecke., 2016; Noelke, 2016) are confirmed by empirical 
findings on the impact of EPLreg on labour market entrants as it increases both youth 
unemployment (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Heckman and Page´s-Serra, 2000; Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004; OECD, 2004, 2006; Breen, 2005; Boeri and van Ours, 2013) and 
temporary employment risk (Lange et al., 2014, Gebel and Giesecke, 2016).  
These findings can be summarized as follows: Firstly, the size of the group 
(unemployed, and the proportion of employees with limited or unlimited term contracts) is 
influenced by employment protection legislation. Second, the "gaps" or probabilities of 
transition between the three states - unemployed, temporary and permanent employed - are 
strongly influenced by employment protection legislation. Third, also the composition of the 
groups within the three states is influenced by EPL. This is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3. EPL regimes, size of the groups and distances between them. 
Source: own representation 
 
The figure illustrates the different groups: permanent employees, fixed-term 
employees and unemployed. The size of the boxes symbolizes the size of the group; the 
distance between the boxes represents the distance between the groups with regard to the 
probability of transition between the states. The vertical grey shadowed area within the boxes 
symbolizes the proportion of labor market entrants within the groups. 
According to previous research, the number of unemployed is independent of the 
EPL regime. The share of temporary workers is lowest in flexible labor markets (as 
companies have little incentive to use fixed-term contracts) and the share of permanent 
workers is highest. Typical representatives of this type are, for example, the United Kingdom 
or the USA. The gap between permanent and temporary employees is highest in countries 
with partially deregulated labor markets and lowest in flexible labor markets. Additionally, 
youth temporary employment and youth unemployment is expected to be higher in partially 
deregulated and regulated labor markets compared to flexible labor markets. 
As already indicated in the introduction, there are different questions within the 
previously presented research frame that previous research has neglected so far and that this 
dissertation contributes to. After the overview of the key concepts within the research 
agenda, in the following, I will provide an overview of the three studies, their connection to 
the research agenda of the dissertation and their results and contribution to previous research. 
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3. Methods, Results and Contribution to the Literature of the three 
Studies 
In this section, I will provide a summary of the studies, including their research 
questions, hypotheses and results.  
 
3.1. Study 1: Always looking for something better? The impact of job insecurity on 
turnover intentions1 
The first study of this dissertation deals with one of the consequences of job 
insecurity – turnover intentions. It additionally examines the consequences of further aspects 
of insecurity – employability and irreplaceability. 
This study contributes to the current research on the effect of job insecurity on 
turnover intentions by examining how employees react in terms of turnover intentions when 
job security is replaced with employment security. For this, the study analyzes whether 
perceived employability and irreplaceability (a) increase or decrease turnover intentions and 
also looks at the interaction effects to study, whether employability and irreplaceability (b) 
buffer or intensify the negative effects of job insecurity on turnover intentions. For this, 
hypotheses are derived using rational choice considerations and equity theory. 
The hypotheses are empirically tested using international data from the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The substantive focus is on a connection at the micro-
level. However, the use of the cross-national-data allows assessing the generalizability of 
the results, since separate regression models were run for each of the countries datasets. 
The findings show that perceived job insecurity increases turnover intentions in all 
countries. In addition, perceived employability increases turnover intentions in most 
countries, whereas weak evidence suggests that employees who feel irreplaceable are less 
likely to have turnover intentions.  
The results on the question about whether employees who feel employable or 
irreplaceable react differently to job insecurity – with respect to turnover intentions – vary 
widely between countries, and so a general conclusion about buffering effects cannot be 
drawn.  
                                                 
1 Balz, A. and Schuller, K. (2018). Always looking for something better? The impact of job insecurity on 
turnover intentions: Do employables and irreplaceables react differently? Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, Online first. 1–18. doi: 10.1177/0143831X18757058. 
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In this context, it is particularly noteworthy the frequently recommended 
flexibilization strategy - flexicurity instead of partial deregulation (European Commission, 
2007) –  has unintended consequences as well.  This strategy promotes the decrease of 
individual job security to be counteracted by an increase in individual employability. 
However, both job insecurity and employability increase turnover intentions. At the macro 
level, this leads may lead to an ‘excess turnover’ (Centeno and Novo, 2012) in a flexicure 
labor market. In other words, this flexibilization strategy also has negative consequences. 
 
3.2. Study 2: Cross-national variations in the security gap: Perceived job insecurity 
among temporary and permanent employees and employment protection 
legislation2 
Substantially, the second study focuses on temporary employment as the most 
important cause of job insecurity on the individual level, and on the influence of the context 
factor employment protection legislation in the assessment of perceived job insecurity.  
In previous research, it is often shown that temporary employees generally perceive 
their job insecurity to be higher than permanent employees (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; 
Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). However, substantial variations in this perceived 
job security gap exist between countries. This article engages with this knowledge and adds 
to it by focusing on these country variations and asking what role the strength of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) has both on the size of the job security gap and in explaining 
country differences. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, EPL consists of two orthogonal dimensions – employment 
protection legislation for regular employees (EPLreg) or job security provisions and 
regulations on the use of temporary contracts (EPLtemp). While EPLreg limits employers’ 
possibilities to dismiss employees, EPLtemp limit the number and duration of successive 
temporary contracts. 
Drawing from rational choice considerations of the employers, I derive two 
hypotheses, suggest that the two components of EPL will increase the gap between 
permanent and temporary employees: (H1) EPLreg or job security provisions, indicating the 
‘protection gap’ between permanent and temporary employees will increase the difference 
in perceived job insecurity between permanent and temporary employees, since high 
                                                 
2 Balz, A. (2017). Cross-National Variations in the Security Gap. Perceived Job Insecurity among Temporary 
and Permanent Employees and Employment Protection Legislation. European Sociological Review, 33, 675–
692. 
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dismissal costs will lead employers to choose not renewing temporary contracts instead of 
dismissing permanent employees if the need to adapt the size of the workforce emerges. (H2) 
Also, strict EPLtemp or regulations on the use of temporary contracts will increase the job 
security gap, since if these regulations are strict, employers face the decision to either turn 
the temporary contract into a permanent one or let the temporary employee go. Since this 
decision also often ends in job loss, strict regulations should also make temporary employees 
feel more insecure compared to permanent ones. 
These two hypotheses are tested using micro-data from the European Social Survey 
for 2004 and 2010 and country-level-data on employment regulations from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). I used a multilevel model with a 
random slope and random intercept due to the hierarchical structure of the data and the focus 
on the cross-level interaction.  
Compared to existing studies, this article offers a more detailed look at the 
operationalization of EPLreg (job security provisions) and EPLtemp (regulations on 
temporary employment)—proposing an alternative measurement which is more closely 
related to the theoretical arguments. By using this more elaborate operationalization, we can 
confirm our hypotheses, which previous studies failed to find: The multilevel model shows 
that the gap in perceived job security between temporary and permanent employees 
systematically increases with respect to the EPLreg and EPLtemp. 
In other words, the study shows that employment protection legislation moderates 
the influence of temporary employment on perceived job insecurity. The difference in 
subjective uncertainty between temporary and permanent employees is all the more 
pronounced, the stronger the employment protection is.  
Within the research framework, the study has two functions: (1) It examines the 
relationship between objective and perceived job insecurity and shows that strict EPLreg 
and EPLtemp increases the difference between fixed-term and permanent employees and 
thus leads to greater subjective inequality in job security. (2) In addition, this study takes a 
critical look at the central variable within the research framework - Employment Protection 
Legislation. Thereby, several operationalizations are discussed and used in the substantive 
analysis: The main model uses the item "definition of unfair dismissal" to measure EPLreg. 
Two other plausible alternatives are discussed and tested as robustness checks in the 
appendix: First, an index that combines "definition of unfair dismissal" with the 
consequences of unfair dismissal, since I assume, that legal restrictions on dismissal will 
only lead to better protection if violations lead to consequences. Furthermore, the Online 
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Appendix implements an institutional approach by constructing an indicator that combines 
both orthogonal dimensions of employment protection Legislation for Regular Employees 
(EPLreg) or job security provisions and regulations on the use of temporary contracts 
(EPLtemp) to three employment protection regimes-regulated labor markets, partially 
deregulated labor markets and flexible labor markets. Substantive results confirm the results 
from the main model: the temporary contract penalty is largest in regulated labor markets 
and smallest in flexible labor markets; in partially deregulated labor markets the size is in 
between. Moreover, these findings are in line with the transition probabilities from figure 2. 
 
3.3. Study 3: Operationalization of employment protection legislation and 
implications for substantive results: Example of perceived job insecurity and 
temporary employment risk3 
In study 2, it was already pointed out that the commonly used measurement for EPL 
and especially for EPLreg (protection against dismissal for regular employees) is 
problematic. However, in study 2, the focus was on the substantive question of the subjective 
dualization of the labor market and the measurement issue was addressed, but not explored 
in depth. This is the objective of study 3.  
The aim of this study is (1) to point out which aspects of the commonly used OECD-
Indicator to measure EPLreg are problematic in terms of the principles of formative index 
construction, (2) to develop a measurement that follows these principles and (3) to 
demonstrate that the choice of measurement has far-reaching consequences for substantive 
results. 
Study 3 shows that the OECD index that measures the employment protection 
legislation of regular employees (EPLreg) is deficient with respect to a theoretical point of 
view (content validity) and to its predicted effects (criterion validity) and that this choice of 
operationalization has important implications for substantive results. We suggest a new 
EPLreg-Index that measures permanent employees’ protection against dismissal, which 
implements a theory-driven choice of items, normalization rules, and aggregation procedure. 
Subsequently, we empirically compare this new index with the OECD index by testing 
relationships with outcome variables indicated in the literature. First, we used a multi-level 
                                                 
3 Balz, A. and Pforr, K. Operationalization of Employment Protection Legislation and Implications for 
Substantive Results: Example of Perceived Job Insecurity and Temporary Employment Risk. Unpublished 
Manuscript. 
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model to predict the perceived job insecurity of temporary and permanent employees that 
depends on the level of EPLreg with cross-national data from the European Social Survey, 
the European Working Condition Survey, and the European Quality of Life Survey. Second, 
we examine the effect of EPLreg on the temporary employment risk of new hires using data 
from the European Labour Force Survey. Whereas the predicted results based on the OECD-
EPLreg-Index significantly contradict the hypotheses in the literature, the predicted results 
using the new EPR-Index confirm the hypotheses in the literature. The new EPLreg-Index 
also reveals the expected effects of related variables that are concealed when using the 
OECD-EPLreg-Index.  
Within the research framework of this dissertation study 3 serves the purpose to look 
closely at the central country-level variable within the framework – EPLreg. Although it is 
a central independent variable in social and economic sciences, and the impact of EPLreg is 
highly debated, the validity of the measurement has not been questioned. However, without 
a valid measurement, substantive research cannot come to valid conclusions. This article, 
therefore, provides a new groundwork for labor market research by identifying a method for 
validly measuring employment protection.  
This improves the empirical basis of the entire research on flexicurity, segmentation 
and insider-outsider labor markets. The article clearly shows that the commonly used 
measurement is deficient, which may have far-reaching implications for previous findings. 
In addition, the substantive results of study 2 can be confirmed with a broader empirical 
basis: strict EPLreg, as well as EPLtemp, leads to a greater gap between temporary and 
permanent employees regarding subjective job insecurity. This can be demonstrated using 
two additional datasets. Thus, the cause of the contradictions in previous empirical research 
can almost certainly be found in the measurement of EPLreg. 
Furthermore, the study indicates that strict EPLreg increases the temporary 
employment risk for new hires. Thus, the study demonstrates that EPL makes it not only 
more likely for outsiders to receive a fixed-term contract, but also that, subjectively the 
distance between fixed-term and permanent employment is larger with strict EPLreg. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
To conclude - my dissertation project contributes to previous research by showing 
that job insecurity increases turnover initiated by employees, and this tendency seems to be 
rather increased than decreased by employability (Study 1). Additionally, this dissertation 
demonstrates, that the level of EPLreg or protection against dismissal plays a crucial role in 
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shaping the distribution of job insecurity, both factual as well as perceived, within a society 
(Study 2 and 3): it can be shown, that both EPLreg and EPLtemp increase the difference in 
perceived job insecurity between temporary employees, indicating that inequality is largest 
in partially deregulated labor markets and lowest in flexible labor markets. Additionally, 
temporary employment risk for new contracts increases when EPLreg is strong and the legal 
trial period for new contracts is short. For EPLtemp, no effect could be found. 
Regarding the methodological aspect (Study 2 and 3), my dissertation project can 
clearly demonstrate that (1) the existing and commonly used measure for EPLreg by the 
OECD (OECD, 2014b) is problematic from a theoretical point of view and (2) the choice of 
measurement influences the substantive results to a large degree. Therefore, it is essential to 
measure the independent variable EPLreg (protection against unfair dismissal) correctly. 
For sociological research, the implications, especially regarding previous research 
on the effects of EPL, are significant: replication of previous results seems necessary to 
ensure, that these results are not caused by the measurement. Especially null-findings can 
possibly be rectified with the improved measurement of EPL.  
For society, the implications of the substantive findings seem of special interest. This 
dissertation could show that strict EPLreg would lead to an increase in temporary 
employment risk for new employees. This implies that EPLreg causes generational 
inequality in terms of security. This finding is troubling, considering that temporary 
employment may lead to unstable careers, and it is yet unknown, how long this unstable 
career path will prevail. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the negative consequences of 
temporary employment are more pronounced in countries with strict EPLreg with regards to 
perceived job insecurity. This indicates that not only causes EPLreg a deeper inequality 
between generations in terms of the occurrence, but also regarding the hardship that is 
connected with temporary employment. 
The most obvious limitation of the three studies is the difficulty to establish causality 
when using cross-sectional data. Even though this objection has a true core to it and has to 
be taken seriously, however, there are conditions under which it is possible to establish 
causality with cross-sectional data reasonably; therefore, I argue that a causal conclusion is 
nevertheless justified. In order to estimate the true and unbiased causal effect with these 
models, strong and by nature, not empirically testable assumptions must be met. However, 
in my studies, I argue that these assumptions are met and causality can be established with 
reasonable certainty. The most important concerns are confounding variables and reverse 
causality. These two are unlikely for theoretical reasons: there is no theoretical argument in 
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previous literature that would call for further control variables on the country level. 
Randomly including control variables without theoretical arguments will just as likely lead 
to biased results.  
Additionally, there are research questions that can only be studied using cross-
national data, and I argue that questions about the effect of EPLreg are such a case. A 
longitudinal design is only possible with variability in the independent variable. With EPL, 
unfortunately, this is not the case, which can be seen in Study 3 (Appendix A2), which 
automatically rules out all endeavors to implement country-fixed effects. Results would be 
unreliable due to the missing variation in the independent variable. 
For further research, the most crucial issue arising from my work stems from the 
introduction of a new and improved measurement for EPLreg. The OECD-
operationalization is used in all comparative studies about the effect of EPLreg, so almost 
the entire body of knowledge (with the exception of some comparative case studies and 
quasi-experiments) rests on this operationalization that I argue to be invalid. Therefore, it is 
essential to study the effects of EPL, especially regarding the sometimes inconclusive 
findings on the youth labor market with the new and improved measure. In this dissertation, 
the focus of study 3 was to develop a valid measurement. Therefore, the substantial 
dimension was only a means to an end. So temporary employment risk of new hires was 
used to validate the measurement because the increasing effect of EPLreg on temporary 
employment risk is well expected. However, the effect of EPLreg on overall unemployment 
and employment rates and on youth unemployment rates is still debated, and further research 
should take a closer look here.  
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Abstract  
This study contributes to the current research on the effect of job insecurity on turnover 
intentions by examining what happens to employees when job security is replaced with 
employment security. It analyzes whether perceived employability and irreplaceability (a) 
increase or decrease turnover intentions, or (b) buffer or intensify the negative effects of job 
insecurity on turnover intentions. The study focuses on an international context by using 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data to assess the generalizability of the 
results. The findings show that perceived job insecurity increases turnover intentions in all 
countries. In addition, perceived employability increases turnover intentions in most 
countries, whereas weak evidence suggests that employees who feel irreplaceable are less 
likely to have turnover intentions. The results on the question about whether employees who 
feel employable or irreplaceable react differently to job insecurity – with respect to turnover 
intentions – vary widely between countries, and so a general conclusion about buffering 
effects cannot be drawn. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization and global competition increasingly demand that organizations must 
be competitive and flexible to survive. This pressure is passed down to employees who are 
confronted by less secure and stable employment relations (e.g., Eichhorst and Marx, 2011; 
Kalleberg, 2000, 2003) and the need for the workforce as a whole to adapt to fluctuations in 
market demand. Consequently, employees are faced with increasing levels of subjective job 
insecurity that has received growing recognition in current research (Cheng and Chan, 2008; 
Sverke et al., 2002).  
Job insecurity, the perception that one’s current job is in danger (Greenhalgh and 
Rosenblatt, 1984; for an overview, see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007), has many adverse 
effects on employees. Numerous studies indicate that for employees, job insecurity has a 
negative effect on job satisfaction (De Cuyper and De Witte, 2007; Zeytinoglu et al., 2013) 
and also spills over into other domains of life. Job insecurity also impairs psychological well-
being (Dawson et al., 2017) and psychological health (Buffel et al., 2015; Chirumbolo and 
Areni, 2010; De Witte, 1999), marital satisfaction (Cheng et al., 2014), and even life 
satisfaction (De Cuyper and De Witte, 2007). Additionally, job insecurity has a significant 
impact on life planning; especially long-term commitments such as marriage, having 
children, or purchasing residential property are often delayed (Lozza et al., 2013).  
Even though flexibility may lead to companies being more competitive, the higher 
levels of job insecurity that accompany this increased competitiveness not only have 
negative effects on employees but may be problematic for companies as well. An empirical 
consensus exists that perceived job insecurity causes a decrease in work attitudes, such as 
commitment to and trust in the company and a regression in work-related behavior like 
performance (for an overview, see Cheng and Chan, 2008; Sverke et al., 2002). Additionally, 
job insecurity has been shown consistently to increase turnover intentions (Berntson et al., 
2010; Furaker and Berglund, 2014; Sverke and Goslinga, 2003), which is problematic since 
turnover intentions are a strong predictor of actual turnover (Allen et al., 2005). Turnover 
can be very costly due to the expensive search for and training of replacements (who need 
to acquire company-specific skills and knowledge) which may be one reason why turnover 
rates have been shown to negatively affect productivity and the financial performance of 
companies (Hancock et al., 2013). Therefore, job insecurity can also be linked to negative 
outcomes for companies.  
In light of the adverse effects of job insecurity, it seems obvious that one would wish 
to counteract or at least buffer them. In recent debates, some have argued that job security 
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could be replaced by employment security, which means instead of providing employees 
with the security of staying long-term with a company, they are provided with the security 
of staying employed (Wilthagen and Tros, 2003). From this perspective, employability—
“the individual’s perception of his or her possibilities to achieve a new job” (Berntson et al., 
2010: 225)—is seen as a substitute for job security at the individual level. At the country 
level, this idea of contractual flexibility combined with employment and income security has 
been promoted under the catchphrase “flexicurity” by policy makers (e.g. European 
Commission, 2007). 
Regarding the individual outcomes of employees, the strategy of replacing job 
security with employment security could work. People who feel employable suffer less from 
burnout (Aybas et al., 2015) and experience fewer negative effects on their well being (Silla 
et al., 2009) and life satisfaction (Green, 2011), which means that the main effects of 
employability and job insecurity pull in opposite directions. Therefore if—within the 
flexicurity framework—job security is reduced and employability is increased, these 
opposing forces could possibly cancel each other out. Additionally to the main effect, an 
interaction effect may occur—in other words, employability seems to buffer the negative 
effects of job insecurity with respect to various outcomes other than turnover intentions 
(Aybas et al., 2015; Green, 2011; Silla et al., 2009). In these instances, very employable 
employees react less strongly to a reduction in job security. However, when looking at the 
relationship between an employee and employer, especially regarding turnover intentions, it 
is unclear whether employability could replace job security or act as a buffer. Instead, 
employability seems to rather increase turnover intentions (e.g., Berntson et al., 2010). If 
this is the case, both job insecurity and employability will increase turnover intentions. 
Additionally, it has been suggested that employees who feel employable respond stronger to 
job insecurity through even higher turnover intentions, compared to employees who feel less 
employable (Berntson et al., 2010), so a buffering effect also seems rather unlikely. This 
phenomenon is problematic for organizations since turnover induces separation and 
replacement costs and additionally causes problems due to loss of knowledge and skills 
(Hancock et al., 2013: 576). With respect to employees, this phenomenon also may have 
adverse effects. 
Even though a turnover intention can be seen as a conscious decision that an 
employee makes when trying to cope actively with an unpleasant situation, turnover 
intentions also inherently imply uncertainty about a future work situation, since the 
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characteristics of a new (not yet found) job are unknown, which makes it difficult to plan 
ahead.  
In addition to employability, perceived irreplaceability, which we define as an 
employee’s perception of having very specific skills that the current organization will have 
difficulty replacing, could also play a role in the framework of the characteristics of coping 
with job insecurity. Whereas employability can be interpreted as the perceived external 
marketability of an employee (in the labor market) (Spurk et al., 2016: 290), irreplaceability 
is the perceived internal marketability (within the organization) (Spurk et al., 2016: 290),  
As far as we know, no empirical study has analyzed the impact of an employee’s 
perceived irreplaceability on turnover intentions or whether this perception might counteract 
or buffer the effect of insecurity on turnover intentions. In addition, since both the main 
effect of employability on turnover intentions (e.g., Berntson et al., 2010; Acikgoz et al., 
2016) and the moderating effect of employability on the connection between job insecurity 
and turnover intentions have been studied only in single countries (Sweden: Berntson et al., 
2010; Turkey: Acikgoz et al., 2016), we do not know whether the specific characteristics of 
the institutional context and labor market cause this effect, or whether the effect also exists 
in other countries and institutional contexts.  
Our study adds to the current knowledge in the literature first by analyzing these 
connections in an international context by asking whether they are generalizable, and second 
by extending the framework of buffering factors between job insecurity and turnover 
intentions with the new concept of irreplaceability. 
 
The research questions of this study are the following: 
 What is the impact of job insecurity on turnover intentions? 
 What is the impact of employability on turnover intentions?  
 Can employability buffer the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions? 
 What is the impact of irreplaceability on turnover intentions? 
 Can irreplaceability buffer the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions? 
In the next section, we derive our hypotheses for our research questions from 
empirical findings and theoretical considerations. 
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2. Empirical Findings and Theoretical Considerations 
2.1. Job insecurity and turnover intentions 
A great deal of previous research has discussed how job insecurity affects job-related 
behavior and attitudes. So far, we know that an increase in job insecurity leads to a decrease 
in job attitudes, such as organizational commitment, trust, and job-related behavior like 
performance (for an overview, see Cheng and Chan, 2008; Sverke et al., 2002).  
Job insecurity and job-related behavior and attitudes are multidimensional concepts 
operationalized in different ways in various studies. Job insecurity usually refers to the 
subjective perception that one’s current job may be lost involuntarily (e.g., Greenhalgh and 
Rosenblatt, 1984: 438; for an overview, see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007: 214). This 
perception can be cognitive or affective (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Borg and Elizur, 
1992; Näswall and De Witte, 2003). The cognitive aspect relates to the cognitive estimation 
of job loss (the perceived probability of job loss), whereas the affective aspect is the 
evaluation of this perception, which refers to the fear, worry, or anxiety associated with job 
loss (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007: 4). We focus on the impact of cognitive job insecurity 
since affective job insecurity includes both cognitive job insecurity, perceived 
employability, and various factors not related to the labor market, such as the income of a 
partner and family responsibilities (see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). 
Job-related behavior and attitudes are conceptualized as organizational 
commitment, which includes several dimensions (Hirschman, 1970; Porter et al., 1974). One 
central dimension is the “definite desire to maintain organizational membership” (Porter et 
al., 1974: 604). Previous research usually has studied the opposite of this desire to stay with 
the company—turnover intentions (Berntson et al., 2010; Furaker and Berglund, 2014; 
Sverke and Goslinga, 2003). Since high turnover rates are costly for an organization because 
replacements have to be found and trained, the present study focuses on turnover intentions, 
which are the reported intentions to look actively for another job.  
Studies have consistently shown that employees’ intentions to leave an organization 
increase with perceived job insecurity (Berntson et al., 2010; Furaker and Berglund, 2014; 
Sverke and Goslinga, 2003; and for meta-analysis results, see Cheng and Chan, 2008; Sverke 
et al., 2002). This phenomenon can be explained by rational choice considerations (for an 
overview, see Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012) and by psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 
1995).  
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Rational choice theory argues that decisions are made by weighing the expected 
utility and probability of the outcome of an action and the expected costs (Kroneberg and 
Kalter, 2012). With high levels of job insecurity, the utility of a finding a new, more secure 
job is high, which explains the higher turnover intentions of employees who feel their job to 
be insecure. Other things being equal, the instant probability of finding an acceptable job 
typically declines by around 20% during the first half-year of a job-search during 
unemployment (Gaure et al., 2012). However, a longer job search period pays off in terms 
of higher expected earnings once a job is obtained (Gaure et al., 2012). Therefore, it seems 
rational to be proactive and try to avoid unemployment and also to prolong available search 
time. 
Psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1995) makes the same prediction but for 
different reasons. Psychological contract theory suggests that an informal contract exists 
between an employer and an employee. The employee offers high productivity, devotion, 
and effort, whereas the employer delivers an adequate wage and a secure job (Rousseau, 
1995). With the perception of job insecurity, this informal psychological contract seems 
violated, and thus, employees react to this violation with an increased probability to actively 
search for a new job. This leads us to our first hypothesis:  
Job insecurity increases turnover intentions (H1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of hypotheses.  
Source: Author of the present study.  
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2.2. Employability and turnover intentions 
A characteristic that is argued to be a substitute for job security, and which has been 
discussed recently in the literature in various contexts is employability (De Cuyper and De 
Witte, 2008; De Cuyper et al., 2008; Silla et al., 2009). Employability is affected by personal 
adaptability, career identity, and the assessment of personal resources, such as social and 
human capital (Fugate et al., 2004).  
Employability has been shown to increase turnover intentions (e.g., Berntson et al., 2010). 
The main reason for this correlation is that employables have more opportunities outside 
their current company, which makes it more likely that they will encounter a more appealing 
offer. Within a rational choice framework (see Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012), this means that 
the costs for searching for a new job can be expected to be considerably lower, and the 
probability of actually getting a more attractive offer is higher. Considering these arguments, 
we assume the following: 
Employable individuals are more likely to have turnover intentions (H2). 
 
2.3. Buffer effect of employability 
Empirical evidence has suggested that employability shapes reactions to job 
insecurity with respect to various outcomes. For example, employability buffers the negative 
effects of job insecurity on individual outcomes such as burnout (Aybas et al., 2015), well 
being (Silla et al., 2009), and life satisfaction (Green, 2011).  
In addition, the Berntson et al. (2010) study also hypothesized that an employee’s 
employability moderates the link between job insecurity and the probability of leaving an 
organization. In this study, the authors found that employability increases the effect of job 
insecurity on turnover intentions. Despite the finding of this study, when asking how 
employable individuals—compared to less employable individuals—would react to job 
insecurity with respect to their turnover intentions, two contradictory predictions seem 
plausible. Arguments for both outcomes can be derived from a rational choice perspective 
(see Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012) and psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1995).  
From a rational choice perspective, the costs for more employable individuals with 
respect to finding a suitable new job is lower than for less employable individuals. At the 
same time, the probability of finding a new job is higher for more employable individuals 
(see also H2). Therefore, employable individuals also perceive that they have more control 
over an insecure job situation and feel less threatened by it (Ganster and Murphy, 2000; 
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Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Anderson and Pontusson (2007) have strengthened this 
argument by showing that individuals who think of themselves as employable are less 
concerned about losing their job. Since they are less concerned, they might also have fewer 
reasons to act when faced with job insecurity. Searching for a new job is costly, which 
explains, for example, why temporary employees make intense search efforts only 6 months 
before the end of their contracts (Kahn, 2012). Job searching demands temporal, 
psychological, and financial resources, even for employable individuals. Therefore, since 
job insecurity usually does not end in job loss, it might be more economical to wait. Even 
though employees’ perceptions of job insecurity helps to predict actual job loss, respondents 
grossly overestimate the probability of job loss (Dickerson and Green, 2012). Even among 
those employees who were absolutely sure they would lose their job, only 40% of them 
actually lost their job (Dickerson and Green, 2012). 
Especially in times of skill shortages, an organization generally provides continuing 
work opportunities for employees with high employability (Spurk et al., 2016). However, 
possibly they don’t communicate their intentions clearly and ahead of time, which leaves the 
employees with feelings of insecurity for an extended length of time. However, only 
employable employees can afford to wait, since they can expect their job loss to be followed 
by short job search periods.  
On the other hand, employees who perceive themselves as less employable might not 
be able to afford to wait for an organization’s decision about whether or not they have a 
continuing job with the organization. Since they anticipate longer job search periods in case 
of job loss, they may be better off to start searching immediately for a new job, when they 
are faced with job insecurity. This scenario implies that employable individuals who 
experience job insecurity are more likely to wait, and less likely to look actively for another 
job.  
From a psychological contract perspective (Rousseau, 1995), an argument can be 
made that for employable employees, job security might not be that important because of 
the reasons previously outlined. Therefore, they may not perceive job insecurity as such a 
severe breach of the informal contract. 
If this line of argument is true, we would expect to observe the following: 
Employability decreases the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions (H3a).  
 
However, psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1995) also can be used to predict 
the opposite outcome. Since employees who perceive their job to be insecure may perceive 
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this insecurity as a breach of the informal contract, they may not feel obligated to fulfill their 
end of the deal. Job insecurity may feel especially unfair to employees who perceive their 
labor market value to be high and thus experience an even stronger reaction to job insecurity 
than individuals who feel less employable.  
In addition, a rational choice argument for this outcome can be made. All employees 
feel uncomfortable when faced with job insecurity. Even though people who are employable 
worry less when faced with job insecurity, they still worry to some degree and have to deal 
with the situation. Employees often use two coping strategies to deal with unsatisfactory 
situations. First, they simply may evaluate the situation in another way to avoid feelings of 
dissatisfaction towards an otherwise unchanged situation (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). 
Since they are less worried about job insecurity, they can try to accept it. This would predict 
H3a to be true. Second, an individual who is dissatisfied with her/his employment situation 
could try to change it (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). The second coping strategy would 
predict that employees who experience job insecurity will try to leave their organization. 
Since the costs to find a new job are lower for employable individuals, and at the same time, 
the probability of a positive job search outcome is higher, the second coping strategy seems 
more attractive to employable individuals than less employable individuals.  
This argument leads to the following assumption:  
Employability increases the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions (H3b).  
 
2.4. Irreplaceability and turnover intentions 
In contrast to employees with high employability, who possess high “marketplace 
bargaining power” (Silver, 2003: 13), employees with high irreplaceability possess high 
“workplace bargaining power” (Silver, 2003: 13), and therefore high “perceived internal 
marketability [which] describes the self-assessed value and employability of individuals for 
their current organization” (Spurk et al., 2016: 290). 
We assume that this employee perception of irreplaceability stems from a personal 
evaluation of one’s “workplace bargaining power.” Therefore, it depends on his/her skills 
and resources, the demand for these skills within the company, and the supply of these skills 
and knowledge on the labor market (Silver, 2003: 13). Since this assessment is a subjective 
evaluation, it probably also includes some feedback from the organization.  
It can be assumed that the perception of being irreplaceable also provides employees 
with a sense of purpose and self-worth, and can be interpreted as an additional utility within 
a rational choice framework (Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012). Therefore, one can expect that 
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employees who feel irreplaceable will be less likely to look for another place to work. From 
a psychological contract theory perspective (Rousseau, 1995), we would predict that this 
perception of irreplaceability further strengthens the employee’s felt obligation towards the 
employer. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
The perception of irreplaceability decreases turnover intentions (H4).  
 
2.5. Buffer effect of irreplaceability 
But how do individuals who think of themselves as irreplaceable react when 
experiencing job insecurity? Generally, as described in the preceding sections, employees 
who have accumulated organization-specific skills can be expected to demand more job 
security as a return on their investments—compared to employees who can be replaced 
easily—since they have accumulated more firm-specific capital that they would lose if they 
changed employers. Therefore, according to psychological contract theory (Rousseau 1995), 
employees who have accumulated organization-specific skills, and thus feel irreplaceable, 
may perceive feelings of job insecurity as especially unfair. This perceived breach of the 
psychological contract can be expected to lead to even greater intentions to leave the 
company.  
Thus, if this is true, we would expect to observe the following: 
Irreplaceability increases the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions (H5a).  
 
However, the story may be quite different when the perception of job insecurity is 
not actively produced by the organization (e.g., by using fixed-term contracts or giving 
ambiguous signals to employees) but rather is due to an external threat for which the 
organization is not responsible for (e.g., a problematic financial situation, difficult economic 
circumstances, drop in demand, high unemployment rate). Based on psychological contract 
theory (Rousseau, 1995), it can be assumed that when an organization makes an employee 
feel valuable, she/he will be even more loyal to the organization as a way to fulfill the 
informal contract mentioned earlier. Moreover, “irreplaceable” employees will be less 
threatened by drops in demand since it can be assumed that they would be the last to be 
dismissed. In addition, individuals who feel irreplaceable usually are well integrated into 
intra-organizational networks and communications, which provide them with better access 
to further opportunities (Spurk et al., 2016). If this is true, we would expect to observe the 
following: 
42 Study I: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Turnover Intentions 
Irreplaceability decreases the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions (H5b).  
 
The following section is an overview of the data and methods used to analyze these 
hypotheses.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
The empirical analyses are based on the 2005 survey of the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 2013).1 The ISSP includes 31 countries: 
Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, France, Portugal, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Flanders, Finland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Cyprus, Russia, Philippines, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, Dominican 
Republic, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Our sample 
includes all employees between the ages of 18 and 69. 
 In total, our target population included 24,811employees. We used list-wise deletion 
since it is most robust to violations of the Missing at Random-Assumption on the 
independent variables (Allison, 2001: 6). Due to missing values on our dependent and 
independent variables, 19,357 cases were available for analyses. Our sample consisted of 
350 to 1085 respondents in each country, with a mean of 628 respondents (for an overview 
of the sample, see Appendix A). 
The dependent variable in our analysis was turnover intentions, which was measured 
on a four-point answering scale (see Table 1). The independent variables— job insecurity, 
employability, and irreplaceability—were measured on a five-point answering scale.2  
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Table 1. Description of Central Variables 
 Mean (SD) Percent 
Turnover intentions 
(How likely is it you will try to find a job within the next 12 months?) 
1.98 (1.01)  
1 Very unlikely   41.18 
2 Unlikely  30.58 
3 Likely   17.66 
4 Very likely  10.57 
Job insecurity 
(My job is secure.) 
2.37 (1.13)  
1 Strongly agree   23.23 
2 Agree  40.62 
3 Neither agree nor disagree   16.5 
4 Disagree  15.09 
5 Strongly disagree  4.56 
Employability 
(Easy or difficult to find a job as good as the current job?) 
2.64 (1.18)  
1 Very difficult   18.24 
2 Fairly difficult   32.66 
3 Neither easy nor difficult   22.95 
4 Fairly easy  19.2 
5 Very easy  6.95 
Irreplaceability 
(Easy or difficult for the firm to replace you?) 
2.75 (1.21)  
1 Very easy  17.32 
2 Fairly easy   28.17 
3 Neither easy nor difficult   25.21 
4 Fairly difficult   20.46 
5 Very difficult  8.85 
Source: ISSP 2005; author of present study’s own calculations.  
Note: N=19,357 respondents 
 
We included two groups of control variables in our models (for an overview, see 
Appendix A). The first group measured structural variables, such as working time (part-time 
vs. full-time), sex, age, and formal education (no formal education, lowest formal education, 
above lowest qualification, higher secondary completed, above higher secondary level, 
university degree completed), which have been shown to affect job insecurity (Berntson et 
al., 2010; Näswall and De Witte, 2003) and turnover intentions (Clark, 2001; Sousa-Poza 
and Sousa-Poza, 2007). 
The second group of control variables accounted for eight important job 
characteristics that can be expected to influence turnover intentions. We used five items to 
measure the valued aspects of a current job (perception that income is high, job is interesting, 
possibility to work independently, possibility to help others, job is useful for society) and 
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four items to measure strains (exhaustion after work, work is physically hard, work is 
stressful, work is dangerous).  
To test our hypotheses, we used a linear OLS regression. Since our substantial 
interest is in interaction effects, we decided against ordinal models, since they make the 
interaction extremely difficult to present and interpret. In addition, since we wanted to see 
whether or not the effects were identical (or similar) across countries in the dataset, we ran 
a separate regression analysis for each country in the data set and examined the coefficients 
across countries. In ordinal models, coefficients are not comparable across samples due to 
heterogeneity on unobserved variables (Mood, 2010), which is the second reason for using 
a linear model.3  
In addition, we calculated the coefficients for geographical regions (with robust 
standard errors) to obtain a larger sample. This strategy served as an additional check for 
cases in which a significant effect could not be found in the countries. Thus, we were able 
to determine whether the non-existence of an effect was due only to a small sample size, and 
the resulting large confidence intervals. However, pooled results were only interpreted this 
way when the effects within a region pointed in the same direction for all included countries.  
 
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the regression analyses. We show the effects of 
job insecurity, employability, and irreplaceability on turnover intentions in three steps. 
Model 1 considers the main effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions. Model 2 adds the 
main effects of employability and irreplaceability on turnover intentions. Model 3 adds the 
interaction effects between employability and job insecurity, and irreplaceability and job 
insecurity. All three models also include control variables. Instead of presenting tables, we 
plotted the predicted linear effects of our central variables on turnover intentions. We also 
included the confidence intervals. For all graphs, we separately plotted the coefficients for 
each country.  
Since the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions is basically identical when 
employability and irreplaceability are included—which is due to the very low correlations 
between the three concepts (correlations between -0.09 and -0.01)—we only present the 
results from Model 2 (Figure 2) and Model 3 (Figure 3). Figure 2 displays the main effects 
of job insecurity, employability, and irreplaceability on turnover intentions in each country 
and region so to analyze how these three factors separately affect turnover intentions. The 
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figures present the point estimates for the predicted linear effects and the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of job insecurity, employability, and irreplaceability on turnover intentions. 
Source: ISSP 2005; estimations from Model 2.  
Note: Predicted linear effects on turnover intention and 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
In accordance with previous research, we found that in most countries, job insecurity 
significantly increases turnover intentions. We found very few exceptions (Bulgaria, Japan, 
Latvia, Taiwan, Dominican Republic, Mexico, South Africa) for which the effects were 
comparatively small and/or statistically not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 can be 
confirmed—job insecurity increases turnover intentions—and this connection seems to be 
rather universal.  
We also found that employability significantly increases turnover intentions in 
almost all countries. Very few exceptions exist for which the effect is not significant 
(Switzerland and Philippines). This finding supports Hypothesis 2. Feeling employable 
seems to make employees more inclined to look for another job.  
With respect to irreplaceability, the effect differs strongly among countries. In many 
countries, although irreplaceability decreases turnover intentions, this effect is significant in 
only a few countries; moreover, in many countries, irreplaceability and turnover intentions 
seem unrelated; and in Canada, irreplaceability appears to rather increase turnover intentions 
(although not significantly). Since a lot of variation exists between countries and also a lot 
of uncertainty (indicated by the confidence intervals), larger samples would be necessary to 
achieve more certain conclusions. This goal can be achieved by pooling, although pooling 
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the data makes sense only when the effects in the various countries are similar. In Western 
Europe and Australia, this is the case, and we can see that in these two regions, feeling 
irreplaceable significantly reduces turnover intentions. However, the evidence for H4 is 
weak, since it could be confirmed only in some countries and two of the regions. Therefore, 
even though the perception of irreplaceability decreases turnover intentions in some 
countries, the effect does not seem to be universal, since it cannot be found in every country.  
The results from Model 3 show the interaction effects of employability and 
irreplaceability and job insecurity on turnover intentions so to analyze whether employability 
and irreplaceability buffer the negative effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions (Figure 
3). Again, the predicted linear effects and the 95 percent confidence intervals are displayed.  
 
 
Figure 3. The moderating effects of employability and irreplaceability on turnover 
intentions.  
Source: ISSP 2005; estimations from Model 3.  
Note: Predicted linear effects on turnover intention and 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
We found a lot of variation among the included countries of our study with respect 
to the two moderators—employability and irreplaceability—and thus, we were not able to 
draw a general conclusion concerning our hypotheses. The interaction terms were not 
significant in most countries. We found some support for hypothesis H3b. The perception of 
employability significantly increased the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions in 
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Germany, USA, Latvia, Cyprus, and Finland, which represent 5 of the 31 analyzed countries. 
The effects for all other countries were not significant in either direction.  
Pooling the data in regions would not make sense in this case since the effects within 
the regions vary quite strongly and also point in opposite directions. However, no statistically 
significant evidence exists to support the hypothesis that the interaction effect could go in 
the other direction. Five countries were identified in which employability significantly 
increased the effects of job insecurity on turnover intentions, but not a single one was found 
in which employability significantly decreased the effects of job insecurity on turnover 
intentions. Therefore, it seems unlikely that H3a would be true. However, to answer our 
question—Does employability increase or decrease the effects of job insecurity?—we don’t 
know for sure. In some countries, it seems to increase the effect, but that effect is neither 
strong nor universal. 
The estimations for the interaction effect of job insecurity and the perception of 
irreplaceability also show a lot of variation and a lot of uncertainty (indicated by the large 
confidence intervals). For example, in Ireland and France, we found statistically significant 
support for hypothesis H5b. In these countries, the perception of irreplaceability decreases 
the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions. However, a clear conclusion cannot be 
drawn. 
Since the effects for the countries point in opposite directions in most regions, 
pooling the data in regions would not make much sense. 
In summary, the moderating effects of employability and irreplaceability vary 
considerably across national contexts.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The present study adds to current knowledge by investigating the effects of job 
insecurity, employability, and irreplaceability on turnover intentions. Additionally, we 
analyzed the impact of employability and irreplaceability on the relationship between job 
insecurity and turnover intentions. We examined whether these effects were universal or 
varied among the countries included in our study. 
We can show that in most countries included in our study, job insecurity increases 
turnover intentions, which confirms the results from previous studies (Berntson et al., 2010; 
Furaker and Berglund, 2014; Sverke and Goslinga, 2003; and for meta-analysis results, see 
Cheng and Chan, 2008; Sverke et al., 2002) and shows that this connection is quite universal. 
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Since turnover intentions are a strong predictor for actual turnover (Allen et al., 2005), our 
results suggest that job insecurity induces “excess worker turnover” (Centeno and Novo, 
2012: 321) initiated by employees, which means both sides change partner, but not labor 
market state – the employee keeps working, and the company maintains the same 
employment level. Since firm-specific human capital is lost when employees change their 
employer, this phenomenon seems damaging for both sides, and ultimately should reduce 
productivity at the macro level.  
In most countries, employees who are employable are more inclined to look actively 
for another job, which suggests that this main effect of employability on turnover 
intentions—that has been found in previous studies (e.g., Berntson et al., 2010)—seems to 
be rather universal.  
The implications of these findings are far-reaching since they raise questions about 
whether employability can be a replacement for job security. This argument, put forward 
and promoted by policymakers, suggests that job security and employability are substitutes: 
if job security is reduced and employability is increased, the outcome remains the same. In 
many contexts, this has been proven to be possible—at least to some degree. Increasing 
employability can counteract the negative effects of decreasing job security, for example, on 
mental health (Green, 2011), psychological distress (Silla et al., 2009), and burnout (Aybas 
et al., 2015), since the main effects of job insecurity and employability pull in opposite 
direction. However, with respect to turnover intentions, this is not the case. Both a reduction 
in job security and a rise in employability increase turnover intentions. This finding indicates 
that in a “flexicure” labor market—promoted by the European Commission (2007)—in 
which job security is low and employability is high, a considerable potential impact exists 
for companies who may experiencing especially high turnover rates. 
The assumption concerning the interaction effect between employability and job 
insecurity—if employability is high enough, the effect of job insecurity is minimized or may 
disappear completely—is even stronger than the assumption about counteracting main 
effects. These buffer effects have been observed with respect to various outcomes other than 
turnover intentions (Aybas et al., 2015; Green, 2011; Silla et al., 2009).  
Regarding turnover intention, a reinforcing interaction effect (rather than a buffer 
effect) has been observed by a previous study (Berntson et al., 2010). This study found that 
employability increased the effect of job insecurity on turnover intentions. In our study, 
however, the interaction effect varied greatly among the countries we included, which leads 
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us conclude that the interaction effect was not very strong or generalizable to all national 
contexts. 
Feeling irreplaceable decreased turnover intentions in some countries, which 
indicates that companies may be able to increase stability by increasing their employees’ 
company-specific human capital, although this main effect could not be established 
universally.  
The results concerning the interaction effect were uncertain in our study. We did not 
find any strong evidence that irreplaceability increases or decreases the effect of insecurity 
on turnover intentions. Therefore, we do not know whether employees who feel irreplaceable 
have a stronger or weaker reaction to an increase in perceived job insecurity. 
In our study, both interaction effects varied considerably. One possible explanation 
is that since we have identified two possible mechanisms that point in opposite directions 
(one predicting a positive and the other a negative interaction effect), both mechanisms 
might be true. Depending on which mechanism is stronger, the interaction effect could go 
either way.  
A possible approach for further research to disentangle these effects would be to 
distinguish between different origins of perceived job insecurity. If these feelings are 
induced by the employer’s use of fixed-term contracts or ambiguous signals, people who 
feel irreplaceable and have accumulated organization-specific skills or have high 
employability and feel very valuable might perceive the job insecurity resulting from these 
employers strategies as especially unfair, and thus would react with increased turnover 
intentions. However, if perceived job insecurity is caused by an external threat for which the 
organization is not responsible (e.g., a problematic financial situation, difficult economic 
circumstances, drop in demand, high unemployment rate), it can be assumed that when an 
organization helps an employee to feel valuable, she/he will be even more loyal to the 
organization as a way to fulfill the informal contract mentioned earlier. In this situation, 
employable employees might also react less strongly to an increase in perceived job 
insecurity, since their psychological contract was not violated, and they can afford to wait.  
In addition, we found considerable country variations with respect to the effects of 
job insecurity, employability, and irreplaceability. Further research should investigate the 
causes of these differences across countries. It would be especially interesting to investigate 
the potential links between the effect sizes and employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
unemployment rates. Indications exist that EPL strongly influences the turnover intentions 
of employees who are not satisfied with their job (Gielen and Tatsiramos, 2012). Therefore, 
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EPL also may affect the turnover intentions of employees who are faced with job insecurity. 
The unemployment rate should make a difference since the effect of job insecurity on 
turnover intentions can be expected to differ, depending on whether job insecurity is induced 
by a company and attractive, more secure alternatives exist; or whether the job insecurity is 
related to an insecure labor market situation. Therefore it would be interesting to evaluate 
the influence of these macro variables on the effects of job insecurity, employability, and 
irreplaceability in further research. 
Our study has some limitations. First, the effects we found cannot be interpreted as 
causal effects due to the methodological limitations of the cross-sectional design. Thus, it 
would be desirable to employ a longitudinal design. Second, unfortunately, we also were not 
able to use multi-item-measures for our independent and dependent variables, which would 
have made our measurements more exact. Although a more exact measurement might 
possibly help to uncover significant interaction effects, this seems rather unlikely 
considering the effects we found pointed in opposite directions.  
 
 
 
Notes  
1) For more information, see: http://www.issp.org/. 
2) The correlations between the three variables were very low. For example, the correlation 
between irreplaceability and job insecurity was -0.09, and the correlation between 
employability and job insecurity was -0.04. The correlation between employability and 
irreplaceability was -0.01. 
3) We decided against using a multilevel model with random slopes. Even though it offers 
the advantage of empirically testing whether coefficients vary across countries in our sample, 
the huge disadvantage is that information is very compressed, and the variation in 
coefficients is difficult to grasp (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016: 20; Bowers and Drake, 2005).  
  
Study I: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Turnover Intentions 51 
 
References  
Acikgoz Y, Sumer HC and Sumer N (2016) Do employees leave just because they can? 
Examining the perceived employability–turnover intentions relationship. The Journal of 
Psychology 150(5): 666–683.  
Allen DG, Weeks KP and Moffitt KR (2005) Turnover intentions and voluntary turnover: 
The moderating roles of self-monitoring, locus of control, proactive personality, and risk 
aversion. The Journal of Applied Psychology 90(5): 980–990.  
Allison PD (2001) Missing Data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Anderson CJ and Pontusson J 
(2007) Workers, worries and welfare states: Social protection and job insecurity in 15 
OECD countries. European Journal of Political Research 46(2): 211–235.  
Aybas M, Elmas S and Dündar G (2015) Job insecurity and burnout: The moderating role 
of employability. European Journal of Business and Management 7(9): 195–202.  
Berntson E, Näswall K and Sverke M (2010) The moderating role of employability in the 
association between job insecurity and exit, voice, loyalty and neglect. Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 31(2): 215–230.  
Borg I and Elizur D (1992) Job insecurity: Correlates, moderators and measurement. 
International Journal of Manpower 13(2): 13–26.  
Bowers J and Drake KW (2005) EDA for HLM: Visualization when probabilistic inference 
fails. Political Analysis 13(4): 301–326.  
Bryan ML and Jenkins SP (2016) Multilevel modelling of country effects: A cautionary tale. 
European Sociological Review 32(1): 3–22.  
Buffel V, Dereuddre R and Bracke P (2015) Medicalization of the uncertainty? An empirical 
study of the relationships between unemployment or job insecurity, professional care 
seeking, and the consumption of antidepressants. European Sociological Review 31(4): 
446–459. 
Centeno M and Novo ÁA (2012) Excess worker turnover and fixed-term contracts: Causal 
evidence in a two-tier system. Labour Economics 19(3): 320–328.  
Cheng GH-L and Chan DK-S (2008) Who suffers more from job insecurity? A meta-analytic 
review. Applied Psychology 57(2): 272–303.  
Cheng T, Mauno S and Lee C (2014) The buffering effect of coping strategies in the 
relationship between job insecurity and employee well-being. Economic and Industrial 
Democracy 35(1): 71–94.  
52 Study I: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Turnover Intentions 
Chirumbolo A and Areni A (2010) Job insecurity influence on job performance and mental 
health: Testing the moderating effect of the need for closure. Economic and Industrial 
Democracy 31(2): 195–214. 
Clark AE (2001) What really matters in a job? Hedonic measurement using quit data. Labour 
Economics 8(2): 223–242.  
Dawson C, Veliziotis M and Hopkins B (2017) Temporary employment, job satisfaction and 
subjective well-being. Economic and Industrial Democracy 38(1): 69–98.  
De Cuyper N and De Witte H (2007) Job insecurity in temporary versus permanent workers: 
Associations with attitudes, well-being, and behaviour. Work and Stress 21(1): 65–84.  
De Cuyper N and De Witte H (2008) Job insecurity and employability among temporary 
workers: A theoretical approach based on the psychological contract. In: Näswall K, 
Hellgren J and Sverke M (eds) The Individual in the Changing Working Life. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 88–107.  
De Cuyper N, Bernhard-Oettel C, Berntson E et al. (2008) Employability and employees’ 
wellbeing: Mediation by job insecurity. Applied Psychology 57(3): 488–509.  
De Witte H (1999) Job insecurity and psychological wellbeing: Review of the literature and 
exploration of some unresolved issues. European Journal of Work and Organizational 
Psychology 8(2): 155–177.  
Dickerson A and Green F (2012) Fears and realisations of employment insecurity. Labour 
Economics 19(2): 198–210. Eichhorst W and Marx P (2011) Reforming German labour 
market institutions: A dual path to flexibility. Journal of European Social Policy 21(1): 
73–87. 
European Commission (2007) Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and Better 
Jobs Through Flexibility and Security. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities.  
Fugate M, Kinicki AJ and Ashforth BE (2004) Employability: A psycho-social construct, its 
dimensions, and applications. Journal of Vocational Behavior 65(1): 14–38.  
Furaker B and Berglund T (2014) Job insecurity and organizational commitment. Revista 
Internacional de Organizaciones 13: 163–186.  
Ganster DC and Murphy LR (2000) Workplace interventions to prevent stress-related 
illness: Lessons from research and practice. In: Cooper CL and Locke EA (eds) I/O 
Psychology: What We Know about Theory and Practice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 
34–51.  
Study I: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Turnover Intentions 53 
 
Gaure S, Røed K and Westlie L (2012) Job search incentives and job match quality. Labour 
Economics 19(3): 438–450.  
Gielen AC and Tatsiramos K (2012) Quit behavior and the role of job protection. Labour 
Economics 19(4): 624–632.  
Green F (2011) Unpacking the misery multiplier: How employability modifies the impacts 
of unemployment and job insecurity on life satisfaction and mental health. Journal of 
Health Economics 30(2): 265–276.  
Greenhalgh L and Rosenblatt Z (1984) Job insecurity: Toward conceptual clarity. The 
Academy of Management Review 9(3): 438–448.  
Hancock JI, Allen DG, Bosco FA et al. (2013) Meta-analytic review of employee turnover 
as a predictor of firm performance. Journal of Management 39(3): 573–603.  
Hirschman AO (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
ISSP (2013) International Social Survey Programme: Work Orientation III – ISSP 2005. 
GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4350 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11648.  
Kahn LM (2012) Temporary jobs and job search effort in Europe. Labour Economics 19(1): 
113–128.  
Kalleberg A (2000) Nonstandard employment relations: Part-time, temporary and contract 
work. Annual Review of Sociology 26: 341–365. 
Kalleberg A (2003) Flexible firms and labor market segmentation: Effects of workplace 
restructuring on jobs and workers. Work and Occupations 30(2): 154–175.  
Kroneberg C and Kalter F (2012) Rational choice theory and empirical research: 
Methodological and theoretical contributions in Europe. Annual Review of Sociology 38: 
73–92.  
Lazarus RS and Folkman S (1984) Stress, Appraisal, and Coping. New York: Springer.  
Lozza E, Libreri C and Bosio AC (2013) Temporary employment, job insecurity and their 
extraorganizational outcomes. Economic and Industrial Democracy 34(1): 89–105.  
Mood C (2010) Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what 
we can do about it. European Sociological Review 26(1): 67–82.  
Näswall K and De Witte H (2003) Who feels insecure in Europe? Predicting job insecurity 
from background variables. Economic and Industrial Democracy 24(2): 189–215.  
Porter LW, Steers RM, Mowday RT et al. (1974) Organizational commitment, job 
satisfaction, and turnover among psychiatric technicians. Journal of Applied Psychology 
59(5): 603–609.  
54 Study I: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Turnover Intentions 
Rousseau D (1995) Psychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and 
Unwritten Agreements. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Silla I, De Cuyper N, Gracia FJ et al. (2009) Job insecurity and well-being: Moderation by 
employability. Journal of Happiness Studies 10(6): 739–751.  
Silver BJ (2003) Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
Sousa-Poza A and Sousa-Poza AA (2007) The effect of job satisfaction on labor turnover by 
gender: An analysis for Switzerland. The Journal of Socio-Economics 36(6): 895–913.  
Spurk D, Kauffeld S, Meinecke AL et al. (2016) Why do adaptable people feel less insecure? 
Indirect effects of career adaptability on job and career insecurity via two types of 
perceived marketability. Journal of Career Assessment 24(2): 289–306.  
Sverke M and Goslinga S (2003) The consequences of job insecurity for employers and 
unions: Exit, voice and loyalty. Economic and Industrial Democracy 24(2): 241–270.  
Sverke M, Hellgren J and Näswall K (2002) No security: A meta-analysis and review of job 
insecurity and its consequences. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 7(3): 242–
264. 
Wilthagen T and Tros F (2003) Dealing with the ‘flexibility-security-nexus’: Institutions, 
strategies, opportunities and barriers. Working Paper 9. Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam.  
Zeytinoglu IU, Yılmaz G, Keser A et al. (2013) Job satisfaction, flexible employment and 
job security among Turkish service sector workers. Economic and Industrial Democracy 
34(1): 123–144. 
 
  
Study I: The Impact of Job Insecurity on Turnover Intentions 55 
 
Appendix  
 
Appendix A. Descriptive statistics of the variables within the sample. 
 Included in 
the analyses 
Excluded due 
to missing on 
one or more 
variables 
Min. Max. 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD)    
Turnover Intentions 1.98 (1.01) 1.82 (1.00) 1 4 
Job Insecurity 2.37 (1.13) 2.49 (1.17) 1 5 
Employability 2.64 (1.18) 2.57 (1.20) 1 5 
Irreplaceability 2.75 (1.21) 2.76 (1.24) 1 5 
     
Part-time 17.11 19.93   
Female 48.01 48.54   
Education     
no formal education 8.70 12.22   
lowest formal education 10.42  15.10   
above lowest qualification 17.33 19.45   
higher secondary completed 21.91  21.66   
above higher secondary level 20.56  15.44   
university degree completed 21.07 16.13   
Age Groups     
18–29 20.60 21.42   
30–39 26.32  23.29   
40–49 27.71 26.84   
50–65 25.37  28.45   
Job Characteristics     
perception that income is high 2.76 (1.01) 2.61 (1.11) 1 5 
job is interesting 3.81 (0.99) 3.72 (1.04) 1 5 
possibility to work independently 3.75 (1.09) 3.82 (1.09) 1 5 
possibility to help others 3.82 (1.00) 3.76 (1.02) 1 5 
job is useful for society 3.86 (0.97) 3.83 (0.97) 1 5 
     
exhaustion after work 3.34 (0.96) 3.27 (1.00) 1 5 
work is physically hard 2.50 (1.29) 2.63 (1.30) 1 5 
work is stressful 3.16 (1.06) 3.02 (1.09) 1 5 
work is dangerous 2.08 (1.22) 2.04 (1.17) 1 5 
     
Note: Standard deviations in brackets (not for dichotomous variables). 
Source: ISSP 2005; unweighted results; N=19,357 (included in analysis).
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Abstract 
It is often shown that temporary employees generally perceive their job insecurity to be higher 
than permanent employees. However, substantial variations in this perceived job security gap 
exist between countries. This article engages with this knowledge and adds to it by focusing on 
these country variations and asking what role the strength of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) has both on the size of the job security gap and in explaining country differences.  
The developed hypotheses suggest that the two components of EPL —job security provisions, 
indicating the ‘protection gap’ between permanent and temporary employees as well as specific 
regulations on the use of temporary contracts—will increase the job security gap. These 
hypotheses are tested using data from the European Social Survey for 2004 and 2010 and data 
on employment regulations from the OECD. 
Compared to existing studies, this article offers a more detailed look at the operationalisation 
of job security provisions and regulations on temporary employment—proposing an alternative 
measurement which is more closely related to the theoretical arguments.  
By using this more elaborate operationalisation, the multilevel model shows that the gap in 
perceived job security between temporary and permanent employees systematically increases 
with respect to the two components of EPL. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, most European countries, faced with a growing demand for more 
flexibility, introduced so-called ‘partial’ or ‘targeted reforms’ that loosened regulations on the 
use of temporary contracts while still leaving job security provisions for permanent workers 
largely untouched (Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005). These reforms made it easier for 
employers to increase the flexibility of their workforce by using fixed-term contracts. This 
resulted in increasing numbers of temporary employees in Europe, which has created 
‘flexibility at the margin’ (Sala et al., 2012).  
This study evaluates the consequences of these temporary contracts on perceived job 
insecurity and the moderating role of the two different components of employment protection 
legislation (EPL): job security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts. 
Employees with temporary contracts face a higher probability of becoming unemployed 
(e.g., OECD, 2006), even after taking a number of observable (Giesecke and Groß, 2003) and 
unobservable factors into account (Gash and McGinnity, 2007). Consequently, these 
employees report higher subjective job insecurity levels than permanent workers (Anderson 
and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). In this study, subjective job 
insecurity refers to the cognitive evaluation that the current job will be lost involuntarily (for 
more details, see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Dixon et al., 2013). 
This gap in subjective job insecurity is an essential dimension of social inequality since 
its negative effects extend far beyond work into various other domains of life. Employees who 
perceive their job to be insecure report lower job satisfaction (De Witte and Näswell, 2003; 
Sverke et al., 2002); suffer from decreased psychological and physical health (Buffel et al., 
2015; De Witte et al., 2015) as well as lower well-being and life satisfaction (Carr and Chung, 
2014; De Cuyper and De Witte, 2007); they also display differences in life planning, especially 
with respect to delaying long-term commitments, such as having children, getting married, or 
buying a house (Lozza et al., 2013). Since these negative consequences are not caused by 
objective job insecurity—such as temporary employment itself—but by perceived job 
insecurity (Golsch, 2003), knowledge about the perceptions of these fixed-term contracts on 
job insecurity is essential for understanding how strongly temporary employees are 
disadvantaged compared to permanent employees.  
Although numerous studies have found a gap in perceived job insecurity between 
permanent and temporary employees (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; 
Esser and Olsen, 2012), knowledge about differences across countries is sparse (Chung and 
Mau, 2014: 312). Since the implications of temporary employment on the risk of job loss vary 
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drastically across countries due to the strong variations in EPL (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; 
Centeno and Novo, 2012), the effect of temporary employment on perceived job insecurity 
cannot be expected to be constant across national contexts. In this case, the detrimental effect 
of temporary employment on various areas of life would also be expected to be much stronger 
in these countries. 
The present study adds to current knowledge by analysing country differences in the 
size of the effect of temporary versus permanent employment, and by evaluating the role of job 
security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts. 
The following sections develop hypotheses about how these two components of EPL 
influence the gap between temporary and permanent employees with respect to perceived job 
insecurity. The Methods section explains how these two components of EPL are 
operationalised, since this study argues that the standard approach of simply using the additive 
indices provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is 
problematic and the items ‘definition of unfair dismissals’ and the regulations on temporary 
contracts (with respect to the maximum number of successive temporary contract and the 
maximum cumulative duration of temporary employment) are better suited for testing the 
hypotheses. Considerable country related variations are found in the perceived job insecurity 
of permanent and temporary employees. The multilevel model of the present study shows that 
both components of EPL—job security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts— 
increase the gap in perceived job insecurity of temporary and permanent employees. Lastly, the 
implications of these findings are discussed. 
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2. Empirical Findings and Theoretical Considerations 
2.1. Perceived job insecurity: Its Causes and gaps in the literature 
Subjective job insecurity is a multi-dimensional concept (Chung and Mau, 2014: 305; 
for an overview, see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). Many scholars have pointed to the 
importance of distinguishing between the cognitive and affective aspects of job security 
(Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Näswell and De Witte, 2003). The cognitive aspect—the 
perceived probability that the current job will be involuntarily lost—will be concentrated on 
here. This perceived job insecurity is an employee’s subjective evaluation of his/her individual 
resources and the institutional context with respect to the likelihood of losing the current job. 
Factors influencing this assessment can be situated at the individual level, the level of the firm, 
or the country level.  
At the individual level, a temporary (compared to permanent) contract is usually one of 
the factors that increases job insecurity the most (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Green et al., 
2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). Therefore, it is important to understand the 
conditions for which this is the case.  
Previous research has argued that perceived job insecurity stems from a relative lack of 
power (Dixon et al., 2013: 1055). This approach matches with previous findings concerning 
the individual level. Employees who possess marketplace and workplace bargaining power 
(Wright, 2000), e.g. in the form of knowledge and skills that are valuable to the company, 
experience less job insecurity (Green et al., 2000). This finding also can be expressed as a 
simple rational choice argument: as long as a company expects the utility of keeping an 
employee to be higher than dismissing her/him, his/her job will be (and will be perceived to 
be) secure. 
In addition to the individual characteristics of an employee, this rational choice 
calculation will also be influenced by country-level characteristics. In particular, the economic 
situation of a country and its labour legislation can be expected to influence decision making. 
The economic situation will impact the utility of keeping an employee. Consistent with this, a 
high unemployment rate has been found to increase perceived job insecurity (Berglund, 2015; 
Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). On the other hand, EPL 
determines the possibilities and costs of keeping and dismissing employees. Since rules for 
dismissal differ immensely for permanent and temporary contracts, it seems evident that 
employees would be affected differently. However, studies looking in this direction have found 
only weak evidence. We know that a high unemployment rate and strict EPL reduce satisfaction 
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regarding job security only for temporary, not permanent, employees (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 
2009). Studies that have identified significant effects on related questions (Berglund, 2015; 
Chung and van Oorschot, 2011) do not include a random slope for temporary employment in 
the multilevel models, which however leads to a severe underestimation of the confidence 
intervals. The results indicate that the effect of temporary employment on job insecurity is 
stronger in countries with strict EPL (Berglund, 2015) and stronger on employment security in 
countries with strict regulations on permanent employment (Chung and van Oorschot, 2011). 
If the random slope is included, however, (using the same dataset), employment regulations do 
not seem to explain differences in employment security between permanent and temporary 
employees (Chung, 2016). Additionally, these studies have a broader scope, concentrate more 
on the macro level and do not concentrate on EPL. This study looks at the connection more 
closely from a micro level perspective and asks: can EPL explain the effect heterogeneity of 
having a temporary contract? Additionally, it is also important to take a closer look at the 
measurement of EPL when studying this connection. EPL incorporates different dimensions. 
Recent research points to the importance of differentiating between regulations on the use of 
temporary contracts and job security provisions for permanent contracts (e.g., Noelke, 2016). 
Additionally, it is necessary to choose an operationalisation more closely related to the 
theoretical concepts than previous studies have done. In the next two sections, hypotheses are 
developed concerning how job security provisions for permanent contracts and regulations on 
the use of temporary contracts influence the gap between permanent and temporary employees. 
 
2.2. EPL, job security provisions, and the protection gap 
Generally, EPL is often expected to increase job security, since it limits companies’ 
ability to hire and fire at will; however, in most studies, EPL is unrelated to perceived job 
insecurity (Dixon et al., 2013; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012); only one study has 
found that EPL decreases job insecurity (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). However, these 
studies suffer from two shortcomings: first, they do not distinguish between the effects of EPL 
on permanent and temporary employees, and second, they use an index that includes both 
dimensions of EPL—job security provision and regulations on temporary contracts. The 
theoretical arguments, however, usually rely on the effect of job security provisions in 
decreasing job insecurity, and the role of regulations on the use of temporary contracts is 
neglected. Therefore, it is important to look at both dimensions separately. 
Job security provisions reduce the permeability of the barrier between work and 
unemployment (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). However, numerous labour market theories, 
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such as segmentation theory (Althausen and Kalleberg, 1981), differentiate between groups 
within the labour market, which could be affected differently. Typically, temporary contracts 
are seen as an attribute of the secondary labour market (Giesecke and Groß, 2003). The 
consensus among economists is that job security provisions deepen the gap between the 
unemployed and the employed. Additionally, these provisions also should widen the gap 
between temporary and permanent employees. In contrast to temporary contracts, which have 
an expiration date, permanent contracts are open ended. Therefore, if an employer wants to 
dissolve an employment relationship, permanent employees have to be actively dismissed while 
temporary contracts expire if no action is taken.  
For permanent employees, job security provisions should increase perceived job 
security, since they increase dismissal costs (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011; OECD, 2013). The 
more difficult it is to dismiss employees, the less likely it is that they will lose their job because 
it would be complicated and costly for the firm. By increasing dismissal costs, job security 
provisions lower the threshold to which the utility of an employee can decline before she/he is 
dismissed (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). These job security provisions for permanent 
employees can be interpreted as bargaining power on the part of employees. If perceived job 
insecurity stems from a lack of power (Dixon et al., 2013: 1055), job security provisions should 
decrease job insecurity for permanent workers. However, the situation is entirely different for 
temporary employees. Since, by definition, temporary contracts end automatically at a set date 
without any further employer obligations, job security provisions only protect temporary 
employees during the length of their contract. Once their contract ends, dismissal protection no 
longer applies and therefore can offer no protection. In contrast, if employers want flexibility 
on the number of people they employ and reduce their workforce, it is rational and the least 
costly to let the fixed-term employees go, since the expected costs of dismissing permanent 
employees are higher than not renewing the contracts of temporary employees. These 
predictions are based on the simple rational choice considerations of employers. If dismissal 
costs at the end of a temporary contract equal zero, the difference in dismissal costs between 
permanent and temporary employees equals the job security provisions for permanent 
employees. This difference constitutes the ‘protection gap’ between the two groups. Assuming, 
employees foresee these calculations made by the employer—this leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1. The negative effect of temporary employment on perceived job security is 
stronger in countries with substantial differences in the dismissal costs between temporary and 
permanent employees (strong job security provisions). 
 
2.3. Regulations on temporary contracts  
Strict regulations on the use of temporary contracts are designed to prevent employers 
from the excessive use of these contracts that replace permanent jobs with temporary jobs. The 
regulations define which kind of work can be temporary and limit the number of successive 
temporary contracts and the cumulative duration of one employee with one employer. The last 
two aspects of these rules may be problematic for employees holding temporary contracts. If a 
successive temporary contract is not possible, employers face the decision of whether to 
transform the temporary contract into a permanent one or let the employee go. Especially when 
job security provisions are strong, transforming a temporary to a permanent contract increases 
dismissal costs steeply. Empirical evidence suggests that employers often prefer to hire on a 
temporary basis for the same position and replace the current temporary employee with a new 
one if a successive temporary contract is no longer possible (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; 
Centeno and Novo, 2012). Assuming that temporary employees recognise these considerations 
of their employer, either because it has been communicated to them or because they know about 
similar cases, this leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. The negative effect of temporary employment on perceived job security is 
stronger in countries with strict regulations on temporary contracts. 
 
3. Data, Methods, Measurements 
The analyses in the present study are based on individual-level data from Round 2 
(2004) and 5 (2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS), both containing the rotating module 
‘Family, work and well-being’ (ESS, 2010; for documentation of the data see: ESS, 2014). The 
ESS is a cross-national survey including 27 countries in 2010 and 25 countries in 2004.  
These datasets are combined with country-level data. Countries, for which no 
comparable country-level data (for EPL) are available, are excluded from the analysis (for an 
overview see Appendix A3). The sample used here is restricted to employees between 15 and 
67 years, and the target population includes 29,639 employees (2010: 17,370 in 22 countries; 
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2004: 12,269 employees in 17 countries). List-wise deletion is used, so due to missing data on 
the dependent and independent variables, 23,978 cases are available for analysis. 
 
3.1. Outcome variable 
The dependent variable job insecurity is measured by asking whether the statement ‘My 
job is secure’ is not at all, a little, quite, or very true. Of the study’s sample, 14% feel very 
insecure, 21% a little insecure, 34% hardly insecure, and 31% not at all insecure. However, a 
considerable variation exists across countries. Figure 1 shows the proportion of permanent 
employees (solid bars) and the proportion of temporary employees (grey bars) who report that 
their job is very insecure. With only one exception, in all countries and both years, temporary 
employees feel more insecure than their permanent counterparts. However, the differences 
between the two groups vary considerably. The numbers to the right of the grey bars are the 
ratio of how many temporary employees feel insecure compared to their permanent 
counterparts.  
In both 2004 and 2010, the largest ratio is found in Spain, where temporary employees 
are eight to nine times more likely than permanent employees to experience job insecurity. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of perceived job insecurity 
Note: Percentage of people in each country who judge their job to be very insecure. 
Source: Weighted results ESS 2004 (left) and ESS 2010 (right). 
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3.2. Measurement of job security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts 
The country-level data for job security provisions and regulations on temporary 
contracts measure the strictness of legislation in place on January 1, 2004, and 2010 
respectively. This data is provided by the OECD (OECD, 2016; for details on the methodology, 
see OECD, 2013, 2014; Venn, 2009). The OECD provides 21 items, measuring different 
components of EPL that are combined into three additive indices on the strictness of EPL (for 
regular employment, temporary employment, and collective dismissals). These generalisations 
by construct indices have been used in previous studies on related questions (e.g. Berglund, 
2015; Chung, 2016; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011). However, since they do not correspond 
very well to the theoretical argument set out here regarding the ‘protection gap’, the items are 
looked at to operationalise and test the hypotheses (see Appendix A1 for an overview of the 
items and indices).  
 
Job security provisions 
Of the nine items measuring EPL (for regular employment), the best-suited item for 
measuring job security provisions is definition of unfair dismissal, which is measured on a scale 
from 0 (no regulation) to 6 (strict regulation) and describes under which circumstances it is 
possible to dismiss employees. If a dismissal is just, it cannot be overturned by a court and 
therefore most accurately measures the legal protection gap. If worker capability or the 
redundancy of the job are adequate grounds for dismissal, all other factors should carry very 
little weight for dismissal costs. Within the index ‘EPL regular’ however this item only carries 
a very small weight. The other items (which constitute more than 90% of the index) measure 
various aspects of dismissal regulations but not protection against dismissal and are therefore 
disregarded. 
Two items measure the consequences of an unfair dismissal. However, strong 
repercussions following unfair dismissal do not protect employees, if the threshold in court, to 
consider a dismissal unfair, is extremely high; in this case, definition of unfair dismissal 
assumes the value 0.1 Another item—duration of trial period—measures the time when the 
protection gap does not exist but does not measure its size. 
2/3 of the index ‘EPL regular’ consist of ‘procedural inconveniences’ and ‘notice 
periods and severance pay’. Procedural inconveniences, such as notification and consultation 
requirements are inconvenient for the employer but do not protect employees from losing their 
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job if a dismissal is defined as just. Notice periods and severance pay (for just dismissals) 
impose dismissal costs, however, in some countries, temporary employees also are entitled to 
severance pay at the end of their contract, so severance pay does not cause a protection gap 
between permanent and temporary employees. Even though notice periods delay dismissals 
they do not prevent them. Additionally, this indicator assumes its maximum (coded with 6) at 
more than 3.5 months. This should not increase dismissal costs noticeably. 
In the present study sample, almost half the countries are coded with 0, which means 
that regarding the definition of unfair dismissal, worker capability or the redundancy of the job 
are adequate and sufficient reasons for dismissal. In another large group, ‘a transfer and/or 
retraining to adapt the worker to different work must be attempted prior to dismissal’ is coded 
with 4 (see Appendix A2 for the coding scheme; see Appendix A3 for country characteristics). 
 
Regulations on temporary contracts 
The strictness of the regulations on temporary contracts is measured by an additive 
index, which combines two items (out of the 8 items measuring EPL for temporary 
employees)—the maximum number of successive contracts and the maximum cumulative 
duration (for more details, see OECD, 2013; Venn, 2009). The two are ‘strategic substitutes’—
independent strategies for countries to limit the use of temporary contracts of an employee with 
one company2. This independence also shows in the correlation of the two dimensions (-0.22), 
so countries use one of the two strategies. These two items make up only 25 per cent of the 
normally used index ‘EPL temporary’. The other items measure various aspects of temporary 
work regulations that are not related to limitations of temporary contracts with one company. 
One item indicates regulations on what type of work is allowed to be temporary. This regulation 
prevents employers from replacing permanent jobs with temporary jobs and regulates entry into 
temporary employment, but it should not impact employees who hold a temporary contract. 
Other items measure regulations on temporary work agency employment, which is also not 
related to the present argument.  
Within this study’s sample, the strictness of the regulations on temporary contracts 
ranges between 0 and 4. 
As an additional robustness check, the two dimensions of EPL regulations—job security 
provisions and regulations on temporary contracts—are also combined into three employment 
protection types, differentiating between regulated labour markets, partially deregulated 
labour markets and flexible labour markets (see Online Appendix for discussion and results). 
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3.3.  Control Variables 
This study relies on previous research to identify the variables to be included as controls in the 
multilevel model. On the individual level, previous research has found that company-specific 
human capital (Green et al., 2000) (measured by tenure or training period) reduces job 
insecurity, whereas general human capital (measured by years of education or educational 
degree) is unrelated to job security (Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 
2012) as long as specific human capital is controlled for. Previous spells of unemployment 
increase perceived job insecurity (Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Erlinghagen, 2008), which 
indicates that past experiences can sensitise individuals. The results concerning gender, age, 
having children, and part-time employment (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Green, 2000; 
Erlinghagen, 2008) are inconclusive—most likely no effects or only small effects are 
attributable to these characteristics. However, they are still included as controls. So, on the 
individual level, general human capital, specific human capital, age, part-time employment, 
sex, having a child, and unemployment experiences are all included as controls. 
At the company-level, perceived job insecurity has been found to be lower in larger 
companies (Green et al., 2000). Differences also seem to exist across different industries 
(Erlinghagen, 2008). Therefore, company size and industry are included as controls. 
To gain unbiased estimates of the security gap, all macro-level variables that 1) have a causal 
effect on the outcome variable (which is the size of the security gap) and 2) the independent 
variables of interest (job security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts) have to 
be controlled.  
To identify factors that could influence the size of the security gap, theoretical 
arguments are considered. Additionally, factors that have so far been shown to influence 
perceived job insecurity are looked at more closely. At the country-level, previous research has 
found little evidence for strong predictors─ except for the unemployment rate. It is possible that 
permanent and temporary employees might be affected differently as it is more difficult to 
terminate permanent employees, compared to not renewing fixed-term contracts. If an 
imbalance in labour demand and supply exists, temporary employees are especially at risk of 
not having their contract renewed. Therefore, both the main and the interaction effect of the 
unemployment rate (the percentage of the labour force aged 15–74 years who are currently 
unemployed but actively seeking work), provided by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO 2015) are included as controls.  
According to previous studies, factors such as aggregated job stability, GDP growth, 
social security (Erlinghagen, 2008), and unemployment benefits (Esser and Olsen, 2012) are 
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unrelated to perceived job insecurity. Although some indications exist that union density and 
part-time rate decrease perceived job insecurity (Dixon et al., 2013; Esser and Olsen, 2012), 
these results are quite sensitive to the other indicators included in the study. Even if they do not 
influence levels of job insecurity, they may still influence the gap between permanent and 
temporary employees with respect to job insecurity. However, a strong argument for any of 
these or other factors has not been made, or any evidence found. Therefore, they are not 
included as controls.  
The most likely of these factors to influence the perceived security gap is GDP growth. 
It identifies the economic climate and might influence insecurity mainly by affecting 
unemployment. This factor however is already controlled for more directly by including the 
unemployment rate.  
 
3.4. Methods  
Since the data is clustered in countries, a multilevel model is estimated. To maximise 
the number of cases on the macro level, the samples for 2004 and 2010 are pooled, and country-
years are used as the second level. To check for robustness, however, the models are also 
calculated separately for both years (see Online Appendix). 
Although job insecurity is only measured on a four-point answering scale, a linear 
multilevel model is used, since the focus of the study is on interaction effects and ordinal 
models make interaction terms extremely difficult to present and interpret. In contrast to the 
commonly used binary model, this approach does not discard information. To check for 
robustness, results from the linear model were compared with the ordinal results (see Online 
Appendix). The latter pointed in the same direction and led to the same conclusions.  
 
4. Results 
At first, empty models are estimated without any covariates. 13.9 per cent of the total 
variance of job insecurity is due to country-year-level variability, which is a sizeable portion 
(Raudenbush and Sampson, 1999). In Model 1, only the individual and company level controls 
and the main effects of the country level variables─job security provisions, regulations on 
temporary employment and the unemployment rate─are included, replicating findings of 
previous research. Model 2 additionally includes the interaction terms to evaluate which factors 
can explain the variations in the gap in perceived job security between permanent and 
temporary employees. For both models, a random slope is included for the effect of temporary 
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employment, to see whether effect heterogeneity is present and needed explaining, and if so, 
what proportion can be explained by the cross-level-interactions that are introduced. 
 
Table 1. Results of the multilevel analysis 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC)  0.524** (0.048)  0.211 (0.137) 
Country variables     
Job security provisions -0.004 (0.024) -0.037 (0.028) 
Regulations on temporary employment  0.005 (0.051) -0.059 (0.059) 
Unemployment rate  0.023* (0.012)  0.023+ (0.014) 
Cross-level-interactions     
FTC*Job security provisions    0.050* (0.021) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary employment    0.096* (0.045) 
FTC*Unemployment rate    0.001 (0.010) 
     
 individual and company level controls are included 
     
Constant  1.713** (0.163)  1.917** (0.184) 
Variance components     
FTC (Random slope)  0.073 (0.020)  0.057 (0.017) 
Country  0.127 (0.032)  0.120 (0.030) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.057 (0.021) -0.045 (0.020) 
Individual  0.830 (0.008)  0.830 (0.008) 
Explained variances     
Explained variance of random slopea  -   0.227  
R2 (Individual)b  0.107   0.110  
R2 (Country)b  0.229   0.230  
M  39   39  
N  23978   23978  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
All individual and company level controls are included. For complete results see Appendix A5. 
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 
2004 and 2010.  
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR;  
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
  
The Model 1 results (without cross-level interactions) showed that temporary 
employees feel considerably more insecure than permanent employees, which confirmes the 
results of previous research (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and 
Olsen, 2012). The variance of the slope of temporary employment is significant, indicating that 
effect heterogeneity exists that needs to be explained. This model finds that the main effects of 
both components of EPL—job security provisions and regulations of temporary employment—
do not significantly influence perceived job insecurity, which is also in line with previous 
findings (Dixon et al., 2013; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). Also reflecting 
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previous findings (Berglund, 2015; Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 
2012), the unemployment rate significantly increases perceived job insecurity. In Model 2 the 
interaction terms are included. The results show that the gap in the perceived job insecurity of 
temporary and permanent employees significantly increases with job security provisions and 
regulations on temporary contracts. 
Evidently, temporary employees feel more insecure compared to permanent employees 
when job security provisions are strong, possibly because they perceive the difference in 
contractual power between themselves and permanent employees, which confirms Hypothesis 
1. Temporary employees also experience more job insecurity compared to permanent 
employees when regulations on temporary contracts are strict, which confirms Hypothesis 2. 
One possible explanation is that temporary employees anticipate that employers would rather 
dismiss them than make their contract permanent when a successive temporary contract is no 
longer possible. 23 per cent of the variance of the random slope can be explained by the cross-
level-interaction terms. These relationships (and especially their size) can best be shown by 
conditional effect plots (Figure 2). Job security provisions and regulations on the use of 
temporary contracts vary between their empirical minimum and maximum, respectively. The 
solid line indicates the predicted effect of temporary employment on perceived job insecurity, 
and the grey area the 95% confidence interval. 
With respect to the strictness of job security provisions (which varies in the present 
study sample between 0 and 5), the gap increases from 0.42 to 0.67. With respect to the 
regulations on temporary contracts, the gap increases from 0.35 to 0.73. 
These effects are quite strong, considering that the dependent variable is only scaled 
from 1 to 4.  
 
Figure 2. Effect of temporary contracts on perceived job insecurity 
Source: ESS 2004 and ESS 2010, based on estimation from Table 1, Model 2. 
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The outcomes from the model using employment protection regimes, which are used as 
a robustness check (see Online Appendix), confirm the results. The temporary contract penalty 
is largest in regulated labour markets and smallest in flexible labour markets; in partially 
deregulated labour markets the size is in between (see Online Appendix for country 
characteristics, complete results and discussion). 
When looking at the control variables, it is clear that the unemployment rate is not 
related to the job insecurity gap─it increases insecurity for both temporary and permanent 
employees. However, there might be a three-way interaction: the unemployment rate will 
increase the security gap only if job security provisions are strong. Unfortunately, there are not 
enough cases available at the macro level to test this. 
Individual variables confirm the results from previous research. In particular, firm-
specific human capital decreases perceived job insecurity, whereas previous unemployment 
experiences increase it (see Appendix A5 for a complete regression table).  
Multilevel modelling is problematic with a data set including only 39 cases on the macro 
level, if one is interested in cross-level interactions. As a rule of thumb, usually 50 cases are 
required on level 2 if the interest is in interaction effects (Hox, 2010). Here a Restricted 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation is used, which is much more conservative and realistic than 
a Full Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Even though the results are unbiased, the estimates 
can be rather uncertain (Bryan and Jenkins 2016:7). The model pooling the two datasets (using 
39 country-years), however, yields fairly stable results. When estimating the models separately 
for each year, the effects are still found but are very uncertain (see Online Appendix).  
To check for robustness, the DFBETAs are calculated on the country-year level, for 
both interaction effects, by alternately dropping country-years and re-estimating the model (see 
Appendix A6). There are quite a few influential cases. The interaction effect of temporary 
employment and job security provisions varies between 0.043 (without Spain 2010) and 0.059 
(without Belgium 2004). The interaction effect of temporary employment and regulation of 
temporary employment is estimated as between 0.074 (without the Czech Republic 2004) and 
0.112 (without Denmark 2004). Since there is no random sample on the macro-level, this 
constitutes a rough estimation of the credible intervals using a different approach than the 
confidence intervals. 
Additionally, a two-step model is estimated, fitting separate linear regressions on job 
insecurity in each country-year (including the individual and company level controls) and 
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plotting the effects of temporary employment from these 39 OLS-regressions against job 
security provisions and regulation on temporary employment respectively (Figure 3).  
 
  
  
Figure 3. Effect of temporary contracts on perceived job insecurity plotted against both 
dimensions of EPL 
Note: Separate OLS regression were estimated within each country-year including all individual and company-
level controls 
Source: ESS 2004 and ESS 2010, author’s calculations 
 
The graphs can identify influential countries and show the distributions of both the 
independent variables and the effect of temporary contracts in the different countries.  
These diagnostics help to clarify the reliability of the findings. Even though the effects 
are quite robust, the size of the effects should be interpreted with caution. The sample of 
countries is not a random sample, and there are influential observations, which strongly 
influence the estimates. If these countries were excluded, the estimates would change 
noticeably. Even though pooling the two years helps increase the sample size, the confidence 
intervals and also the credible range of the interaction effects (as indicated by the estimates 
when dropping influential outliers) is quite large. Therefore, replication with other data would 
be desirable to further narrow the size of the effect (see Replication Package).  
 
5. Summary, Discussion, and Conclusion 
The results indicate that in relation to perceived job insecurity, temporary employees 
feel more insecure about their job than permanent employees, which is in line with numerous 
previous findings (e.g., Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 
2012). Additionally, the study finds that this perceived job security gap varies strongly between 
countries. In contrast to previous studies that have only found weak or no evidence—either 
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because the model does not include the random slope or because no significant effects can be 
found— the study reveals that the gap between permanent and temporary employees regarding 
perceived job security significantly increases with strong job security provisions and strict 
regulations on temporary contracts. This is probably due to two advances made in this study 
compared to previous research. The operationalisation of job security provisions and 
regulations on temporary contracts, using only the items that are closely related to the 
theoretical arguments, measure the intended concepts more effectively. Additionally, 
increasing the number of cases on the macro level by analysing two datasets (ESS 2004 and 
ESS 2010) yields more exact estimates compared to studies that only use one (usually with 
fewer than 20 cases on the country level). 
This means that the effect of temporary employment is much more pronounced when 
both components of EPL are strong. These results highlight the need to take country differences 
regarding the nature of temporary contracts into account when investigating the effects of these 
contracts on various outcomes (e.g., health, stress, fertility decisions, etc.), since for these 
outcomes the causal chain includes perceived job insecurity.  
To evaluate the implications of this finding, one should keep in mind that the share of 
temporary workers is positively correlated with job security provisions, since these provisions 
increase the incentives to hire on a temporary basis, which, in turn, increases the percentage of 
temporary workers and the size of the ‘buffer stock’ (Polavieja, 2003). Therefore, it can be 
expected that EPL will lead to a higher segregation of the labour market, since both the 
detrimental effects of having a fixed-term contract and the share of employees affected increase 
with job security provisions. 
Additionally, research has shown that temporary contracts are concentrated among 
young people (Gash and McGinnity, 2007), which might have severe consequences. 
Particularly at this stage of both entering the labour market and transitioning into adulthood, a 
significant number of important decisions—like having children, marriage, buying a house—
will be made that will be influential for decades to come. Therefore, careful planning is of 
particular importance at this stage (Hellevik and Settersten, 2013) but job insecurity limits the 
capability to do so freely and effectively.  
However, when looking at the distribution of risks associated with the labour market 
one should keep in mind that job insecurity is only one aspect. If an employee expects to find 
a similar or better job immediately, the perspective of losing a current job is less frightening 
(Berglund, 2015). These expectations are also distributed very unequally; older employees in 
particular anticipate great difficulties in this regard (e.g. Green et al., 2000). For this reason, an 
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equal distribution of job insecurity does not equate to an equal risk distribution concerning 
perceived labour market risks.  
Considering the regulations on temporary contracts (with respect to the cumulative 
duration of temporary contracts and the number of temporary contracts), the findings of the 
present study suggest that temporary employees would benefit from deregulation. However, if 
these regulations were lifted the potential for temporary contracts becoming permanent seems 
even more unlikely, since employers are never forced to make a decision.  
The design of the present study has some limitations, however. Concerning the validity 
of the effect—the study looked at country differences concerning the effects of temporary 
employment—depending on both components of EPL—in a cross-sectional way. Therefore, 
causal inferences are difficult to draw since these models rest on strong assumptions. Future 
research should, therefore, look at perceptions of job insecurity in a longitudinal study. 
Although some efforts have been made in this direction (Lübcke and Erlinghagen, 2014), a 
longitudinal research design presents serious challenges: since EPL is quite stable over time 
(OECD, 2004), there might not be enough variation in the independent variable. Therefore, a 
design that clearly identifies causal effects is quite difficult to operationalise due to the 
limitations of available data.  
 
 
Notes 
(1) Alternatively, it also would make sense to combine these consequences following unfair 
dismissal and the probability of unfair dismissal in a multiplicative index. When using this 
operationalisation, the results were very similar (see Online Appendix). 
(2) To check this assumption, the two items are also separately included in the models. Both 
items influence job insecurity similarly and can, therefore, be combined (see Online 
Appendix). 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A1. Strictness of EPL–items and summary indicator weights 
 
Individual dismissals (regular workers) 
Index  
(Level 2)  
Scale 0-6 
Sub-index 
(Level 3)  
Scale 0-6 
Item  
(Level 4)  
Scale 0-6 
Weights 
Version  
1 & 2  
Weights 
Version  
3 
Individual 
dismissals 
– regular 
workers 
Procedural 
inconveniences 
(1/3) 
1. Notification procedures (1/2) (1/2) 
2. Delay to start a notice (1/2) (1/2) 
Notice and 
severance pay 
for no-fault 
individual 
dismissals 
(1/3) 
3. Notice period after 
9 months (1/7) (1/7) 
4 years (1/7) (1/7) 
20 years (1/7) (1/7) 
4. Severance pay after 
9 months (4/21) (4/21) 
4 years (4/21) (4/21) 
20 years (4/21) (4/21) 
Difficulty of 
dismissal 
(1/3) 
5. Definition of unfair dismissal (1/4) (1/5) 
6. Trial period   (1/4) (1/5) 
7. Compensation   (1/4) (1/5) 
8. Reinstatement   (1/4) (1/5) 
9. Maximum time for claim -- (1/5) 
 
Temporary contracts 
Temporary 
contracts 
Fixed-term 
contracts 
(1/2) 
10. Valid cases for use of fixed-term 
contracts (1/2) (1/2) 
11. Maximum number of successive 
contracts (1/4) (1/4) 
12. Maximum cumulated duration (1/4) (1/4) 
Temporary 
work agency 
employment 
(1/2) 
13. Types of work for which is legal (1/2) (1/3) 
14. Restrictions on number of renewals (1/4) (1/6) 
15. Maximum cumulated duration (1/4) (1/6) 
16. Authorisation and reporting -- (1/6) 
17. Equal treatment   -- (1/6) 
Source: OECD, 2014. 
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Appendix A2. Coding scheme EPL 
  Original unit and short description 
Assignment of numerical strictness 
scores 
Assigned scores 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Definition of 
justified or 
unfair dismissal 
Scale 0-3 
Scale (0-3) × 2 
0 
when  worker  
capability  or  
redundancy  of  the job  
are  adequate  and  
sufficient  ground  for 
dismissal; 
1 
when  social  
considerations,  age  or  
job  tenure must  when  
possible  influence  the  
choice  of which 
worker(s) to dismiss; 
2 
when  a  transfer  
and/or  a  retraining  to  
adapt the worker to 
different work must be 
attempted prior to 
dismissal; 
3 
when worker capability 
cannot be a ground for 
dismissal. 
Maximum  
number  of 
successive FTC 
Number No  limit ≥5  ≥4 ≥3 ≥2 ≥1.5 <1.5 
Maximum   
cumulated 
duration of 
successive FTC 
Months No  limit ≥36 ≥30 ≥24 ≥18 ≥12 <12 
Source: OECD, 2014. 
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Appendix A3. Country characteristics 
Country Job security 
provisionsa 
Regulations on 
temporary 
employmenta 
Unemployment 
rateb 
 (2004) (2010) (2004) (2010) (2004) (2010) 
AT 2  2.5  5.8  
BE 0 0 2 2 8.5 8.3 
BG  -  -  - 
CH  - 0  - 2.5  - 4.5 
CY   -   -   - 
CZ 4 0 0 1.5 8.2 7.3 
DE 4 4 1.5 1.5 10.7 7.1 
DK 0 0 3.5 3.5 5.5 7.5 
EE - 4 - 2.5 - 16.7 
ES 4 4 3 3 11.1 19.9 
FI 4 4 2 2 10.4 8.4 
FR  4  4  8.9 
GB 0 0 0.5 0.5 4.6 7.8 
GR 1 1 3 3 10.5 12.5 
HR  -  -  - 
HU 0 0 2.5 2.5 5.8 11.2 
IE - 0 - 0.5 - 13.9 
IL  0  0 9.3 6.0 
IS 0  0.5  4.0  
LT  -  -  - 
LU -  -  -  
NL 3 3 2 2 4.6 4.5 
NO 5 5 2.5 3 4.3 3.5 
PL 0 0 2 2 19.1 9.6 
PT 5 5 1.5 1.5 6.3 10.8 
RU  5  1  7.3 
SE 4 4 3 1.5 6.7 8.6 
SI - 4 - 1.5 - 7.2 
SK 0 0 1.5 2.5 18.6 14.4 
TR -  -  -  
UA - - - - - - 
Note: - included in the ESS, but EPL not available. 
Source: a based on OECD, 2014; b International Labour Office (ILO), 2015. 
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Appendix A4. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 Mean 
2004 
Mean 
2010 
Min. Max. 
Fixed-term contract 0.136 0.120 0 1 
Education      
ISCED 0-2 0.189 0.121 0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.486 0.477 0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.325 0.402 0 1 
‘easy to replace’ (1-10) 6.141 (2.651) 5.840 (2.683) 0 10 
Training period     
<1day 0.033 0.034 0 1 
2-6 days 0.087 0.087 0 1 
1-4 weeks 0.172 0.160 0 1 
1-3 months 0.228 0.221 0 1 
3 months - 1 year 0.281 0.283 0 1 
1- 2 years 0.118 0.128 0 1 
2 - 5 years 0.064 0.067 0 1 
More than 5 years 0.017 0.020 0 1 
Age     
20-29 0.179 0.164 0 1 
30-39 0.280 0.259 0 1 
40-54 0.409 0.413 0 1 
55-67 0.132 0.164 0 1 
Part-time 0.149 0.164 0 1 
Female 0.482 0.510 0 1 
Child 0.516 0.515 0 1 
Unemployed in last 5 years 0.122 0.111 0 1 
Unemployed more than 12 month 0.093 0.090 0 1 
Firm size     
<10 0.221 0.208 0 1 
10-24 0.209 0.191 0 1 
25-99 0.271 0.267 0 1 
100-499 0.180 0.188 0 1 
>500 0.120 0.146 0 1 
Industry     
1 Agriculture 0.028 0.023 0 1 
2 Manufacturing industry 0.183 0.172 0 1 
3 Construction 0.062 0.060 0 1 
4 Trade 0.115 0.111 0 1 
5 Transport/Infrastructure 0.077 0.115 0 1 
6 Finance 0.036 0.036 0 1 
7 Public administration 0.077 0.073 0 1 
8 Education 0.110 0.105 0 1 
9 Health sector 0.139 0.125 0 1 
10 Service 0.174 0.180 0 1 
Note: Only for cases included in the analysis. Standard deviations in brackets (not for dichotomous 
variables). 
Source: ESS 2004; unweighted results; N=10,029; ESS 2010; unweighted results; N=13,949. 
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Appendix A5. Complete results of the multilevel analysis 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC)  0.524** (0.048)  0.211 (0.137) 
Country variables     
Job security provisions -0.004 (0.024) -0.037 (0.028) 
Regulations on temporary employment  0.005 (0.051) -0.059 (0.059) 
Unemployment rate  0.023* (0.012)  0.023+ (0.014) 
Cross-level-interactions     
FTC*Job security provisions    0.050* (0.021) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary 
employment    0.096* (0.045) 
FTC*Unemployment rate    0.001 (0.010) 
Individual controls     
Education (Ref: ISCED 0-2)  
 ISCED 3-4  0.016 (0.019)  0.016 (0.019) 
 ISCED 5-6 -0.044* (0.021) -0.044* (0.021) 
'easy to replace'  0.030** (0.002)  0.030** (0.002) 
Training period (Ref: < 1 day)  
 2-6 days  0.028 (0.038)  0.029 (0.038) 
 1-4 weeks -0.010 (0.036) -0.010 (0.036) 
 1-3 month -0.024 (0.036) -0.024 (0.036) 
 3 month-1 year -0.094** (0.036) -0.094** (0.036) 
 1-2 years -0.118** (0.038) -0.117** (0.038) 
 2-5 years -0.149** (0.041) -0.148** (0.041) 
 More than 5 years -0.124* (0.055) -0.124* (0.055) 
Age (Ref: 20-29)  
 30-39  0.129** (0.019)  0.129** (0.019) 
 40-54  0.143** (0.019)  0.143** (0.019) 
 55-67  0.043* (0.022)  0.044* (0.022) 
Part-time -0.064** (0.018) -0.065** (0.018) 
Female  0.032* (0.013)  0.032* (0.013) 
Child -0.030* (0.013) -0.030* (0.013) 
Unemployed in last 5 years  0.224** (0.021)  0.223** (0.021) 
Unemployed more than 12 month  0.098** (0.022)  0.098** (0.022) 
Company and industry controls     
Firm size (Ref: >10)  
 10-24  0.031+ (0.019)  0.031+ (0.019) 
 25-99  0.020 (0.018)  0.020 (0.018) 
 100-499  0.000 (0.020)  0.000 (0.020) 
 >500 -0.021 (0.022) -0.020 (0.022) 
Industry (Ref: 10 Service)  
 1 Agriculture -0.033 (0.041) -0.033 (0.041) 
 2 Manufacturing industry  0.096** (0.021)  0.096** (0.021) 
 3 Construction  0.046 (0.029)  0.046 (0.029) 
 4 Trade  0.030 (0.023)  0.030 (0.023) 
 5 Transport/Infrastructure  0.000 (0.024) -0.000 (0.024) 
 6 Finance  0.044 (0.035)  0.044 (0.035) 
 7 Public administration -0.256** (0.026) -0.255** (0.026) 
 8 Education -0.266** (0.024) -0.265** (0.024) 
 9 Health sector -0.217** (0.022) -0.217** (0.022) 
Constant  1.713** (0.163)  1.917** (0.184) 
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Variance components     
FTC (Random slope)  0.073 (0.020)  0.057 (0.017) 
Country  0.127 (0.032)  0.120 (0.030) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.057 (0.021) -0.045 (0.020) 
Individual  0.830 (0.008)  0.830 (0.008) 
Explained variances     
Explained variance of random slopea  -   0.227  
R2 (Individual)b  0.107   0.110  
R2 (Country)b  0.229   0.230  
M  39   39  
N  23978   23978  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source. Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 
2004 and 2010.  
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR;  
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
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Appendix A6. Outlier analysis of the cross-level interaction effects 
 
bFTC*Job security 
provisions 
bFTC*Regulation on 
temporary employment 
DFBETAFTC*Job security 
provisions 
DFBETAFTC*Regulation 
on temporary employment 
all 
countries 0.050 0.096   
AT 2004 0.050 0.100 0.029 0.080 
BE 2004 0.059 0.094 0.396 0.044 
BE 2010 0.056 0.094 0.281 0.037 
CH 2010 0.048 0.099 0.112 0.061 
CZ 2004 0.055 0.074 0.243 0.482 
CZ 2010 0.049 0.095 0.042 0.012 
DE 2004 0.049 0.097 0.047 0.025 
DE 2010 0.051 0.095 0.028 0.014 
DK 2004 0.045 0.112 0.254 0.344 
DK 2010 0.048 0.102 0.099 0.132 
EE 2010 0.055 0.097 0.200 0.024 
ES 2004 0.046 0.086 0.197 0.218 
ES 2010 0.043 0.088 0.346 0.169 
FI 2004 0.045 0.098 0.256 0.034 
FI 2010 0.048 0.096 0.094 0.004 
FR 2010 0.050 0.094 0.000 0.042 
GB 2004 0.052 0.101 0.083 0.102 
GB 2010 0.053 0.105 0.110 0.182 
GR 2004 0.050 0.100 0.031 0.077 
GR 2010 0.049 0.101 0.053 0.105 
HU 2010 0.051 0.095 0.047 0.031 
IE 2010 0.052 0.103 0.080 0.152 
IL 2010 0.053 0.108 0.133 0.244 
IS 2004 0.050 0.095 0.029 0.016 
NL 2004 0.051 0.097 0.043 0.019 
NL 2010 0.051 0.097 0.041 0.020 
NO 2004 0.051 0.096 0.026 0.004 
NO 2010 0.050 0.096 0.001 0.004 
PL 2004 0.050 0.096 0.006 0.002 
PL 2010 0.048 0.097 0.101 0.015 
PT 2004 0.045 0.101 0.232 0.105 
PT 2010 0.057 0.090 0.304 0.142 
RU 2010 0.057 0.084 0.322 0.267 
SE 2004 0.048 0.089 0.101 0.165 
SE 2010 0.046 0.102 0.206 0.136 
SI 2010 0.053 0.092 0.131 0.092 
SK 2004 0.045 0.085 0.235 0.253 
SK 2010 0.046 0.100 0.191 0.101 
TR 2004 0.053 0.093 0.115 0.065 
Note: DFBETA=(b1-b2)/s.e.(b2), where b1 is the original b (Table1, Model2) and b2 is the b without the listed 
country. Critical values above 1/√n (0.16) are bold. 
Source: ESS 2010, ESS 2004, own calculations. 
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1. Robustness Checks on the Measurement of Employment Protection 
Legislation 
The first part of the Online Appendix inspects the measurement of employment protection 
legislation (EPL). Even though the study argues that the items used are a good method to 
measure EPL, at least two other ways are also plausible—1) assigning the countries to 
categories of EPL types and 2) using an index for measuring job security provisions that also 
considers the consequences of unfair dismissal alongside the definition of unfair dismissal. 
These alternatives are discussed and the results displayed as robustness checks. Both alternative 
operationalization confirm the results of the main study. 
In addition, it is shown that the two items within the index ‘regulations on the use of 
temporary contracts’ used in the study similarly influence job insecurity and can be combined 
into an index. 
 
1.1. Regulated labour markets/partial deregulation/flexible labour markets: Using 
categorized measure of both dimensions of EPL 
The following is an institutional way to think about cross-country variations. Based on both 
dimensions of EPL—job security provisions and regulations on temporary employment—
countries can fall into one of three categories. They can have either a) a regulated labour market 
along both dimensions which means strong job security provisions and strong regulations for 
temporary employment. They can have b) a regulated core workforce of permanent employees 
protected by strong job security provisions combined with a deregulated peripheral workforce 
made possible by weak regulations for temporary employment (‘partial deregulation’), or they 
can have c) a flexible labour market in both dimensions, which means weak security provisions 
and weak regulations for temporary employment.  
If the hypotheses put forward in section 2.2 and 2.3 in the main article are correct, one 
would expect to see larger temporary contract penalties in both regulated labour markets (a) 
and partially deregulated labour markets (b) relative to flexible labour markets (c), due to 
differences in job security provisions for permanent employees. In addition, there would be 
stronger temporary contract penalties in regulated labour markets (a) compared to partially 
deregulated labour markets (b) due to limitations on the maximum number and duration of 
successive temporary contracts with one company. 
In order to check these assumptions, the countries are assigned to one of these three 
EPL categories, on the basis of their values on job security provisions and regulations for 
temporary employment. Table 1 (Online Appendix) shows the country characteristics. 
88 Study II (Online Appendix): Cross-National Variations in the Security Gap 
Table 1 (Online Appendix). Categorization of countries into employment protection 
types 
 Strong job security 
provisions (narrow definition 
of fair dismissal)a 
Weak job security provisions 
(wide definition of fair 
dismissal)a 
Strong regulations 
on temporary 
employmentb 
a) Regulated labour markets 
 
ES (2004 & 2010)  
FR (2004 & 2010)  
NO (2010) 
SE (2004)  
c1) Flexible labour markets 
 
DK (2004 & 2010) 
GR (2004 & 2010)  
LU (2010)  
Weak regulations 
on temporary 
employmentb 
b) Partially deregulated 
labour markets 
 
CZ (2004) 
DE (2004 & 2010)  
EE (2010)  
FI (2004 & 2010)  
NO(2004) 
PT (2004 & 2010)  
RU (2010)  
SE (2010)  
SI (2010) 
c2) Flexible labour markets 
 
AT (2004 & 2010) 
BE (2004 & 2010) 
CH (2010) 
CZ (2010) 
GB (2004 & 2010) 
HU (2004 & 2010) 
IE (2010)  
IL (2010) 
IS (2004 & 2010) 
NL (2004 & 2010) 
PL (2004 & 2010) 
SK (2004 & 2010) 
TR (2004 & 2010) 
Note: Categorization based on the OECD indicators ‘definition of unfair dismissal’ and ‘maximum number of 
successive contracts’/‘Maximum cumulated duration’. 
a weak job security provisions (0 to 3.5); strong job security provisions (4 to 5) 
b weak regulations on temporary employment (0 to 2.5); strong regulations on temporary employment (3 to 4) 
 
Empirically there are countries that have weak employment protection for permanent 
employees and, nevertheless, strict regulations on the use of temporary contracts, even though 
this combination seems somewhat counterintuitive. However, if employment protection for 
permanent jobs is low (and therefore the core is deregulated), there are no clear lines between 
core and periphery. Thus, it should make no difference whether the regulations on temporary 
employment are strict or weak. Independent of whether the regulations on temporary 
employment are weak or strong, if job security provisions are weak, both cases can be 
categorized as flexible labour markets.  
Considering these aspects, an additional model is estimated where c1 and c2 are 
included separately to check the previous assumption that the two can be combined.  
Table 2 shows the estimates from the multilevel models, where both types of flexible 
labour markets are included separately (Model 1.1 and 2.1), and the ones where both types of 
flexible labour markets are combined (Model 1.2. and Model 2.2 
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Table 2 (Online Appendix). Models using employment protection types 
 
Flexible 
labour 
markets 
detailed (c1 
and c2 
 
   Flexible 
labour 
markets 
combined 
(c) 
   
 Model 1.1  Model 2.1  Model 1.2  Model 2.2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.524** (0.048) 0.953** (0.144) 0.524** (0.048) 0.954** (0.142) 
Country variables         
Employment protection  regimes 
(Ref.: a. Regulated labour 
markets) 
b. Partial deregulation -0.022 (0.161) 0.228 (0.183) -0.021 (0.159) 0.228 (0.181) 
c1. Flexible labour markets 0.072 (0.204) 0.427+ (0.231)     
c2. Flexible labour markets 0.005 (0.153) 0.365* (0.174)     
c. Flexible labour markets     0.017 (0.148) 0.376* (0.168) 
Unemployment rate 0.024* (0.012) 0.025+ (0.013) 0.024* (0.012) 0.025+ (0.013) 
Cross-level-interactions         
Employment protection  regimes: 
(Ref.: a. Regulated labour 
markets) 
b. Partial 
Deregulation*FTC   -0.369** (0.128)   -0.369** (0.126) 
c. Flexible labour 
markets*FTC       -0.539** (0.118) 
c1. Flexible labour 
markets*FTC   -0.534** (0.165)     
c2. Flexible labour 
markets*FTC   -0.539** (0.122)     
FTC*Unemployment rate   -0.002 (0.009)   -0.002 (0.009) 
         
90 Study II (Online Appendix): Cross-National Variations in the Security Gap 
 individual and company level controls are included 
         
Constant 1.709** (0.187) 1.419** (0.208) 1.709** (0.185) 1.420** (0.205) 
Variance components         
FTC (Random slope) 0.020 (0.046) 0.015 (0.073) 0.020 (0.044) 0.014 (0.014) 
Country-year 0.034 (0.116) 0.029 (0.125) 0.033 (0.113) 0.027 (0.027) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) 0.023 (-0.038) 0.016 (-0.056) 0.023 (-0.037) 0.015 (0.015) 
Individual 0.008 (0.83) 0.008 (0.83) 0.008 (0.83) 0.008 (0.008) 
Explained variances         
Explained variance of random 
slopea   0.373    0.396  
R2 (Individual)b 0.109  0.112  0.111  0.115  
R2 (Country-year)b 0.241  0.237  0.260  0.256  
M 39  39  39  39  
N 23978  23978  23978  23978  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
All individual and company level controls are included. Complete results upon request. 
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 2004 and 2010.  
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR;  
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
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The results (Table 2, Model 2.1) confirm the previous assumption: No difference can be 
found in the size of the effect of the two types of flexible labour markets (c1 and c2) on the security 
gap. The effects are almost identical (-0.534** and -0.539**), indicating that if job security 
provisions are weak, regulations on temporary employment do not make a difference. Therefore, 
they can be both classified as ‘flexible labour markets’ and coded into one category.  
When looking at the results from the model with only three employment protection types 
(Model 2.2), the previously developed hypotheses can be confirmed: The temporary contract 
penalty is largest in regulated labour markets (a), which is the reference category and smallest in 
deregulated labour markets (c). The size of the temporary contract penalty in partially deregulated 
labour markets (b) is smaller than in regulated labour markets (p<0.05) and larger than in (c) 
flexible labour markets (p<0.1; equivalent to p<0.05 in the one-tailed test). 
 
1.2. Check on the measurement of job security provisions: Including an index instead of 
single item measurement 
When looking at the items for measuring the ‘protection gap,’ it is argued that the item ‘definition 
of unfair dismissal’ is the best for measuring this gap. However, the OECD also provides items 
that measure the repercussions following an unfair dismissal should it be declared unfair in court. 
The items measuring the consequences of unfair dismissal are ‘compensation following unfair 
dismissal’ and ‘possibility of reinstatement’. 
These items could also be combined in a multiplicative index measuring the difficulty of a 
court finding a dismissal to be unfair times the repercussions following an unfair dismissal. Here 
the square root is used, so as with the items and indices provided by the OECD, the index also 
ranges between 0 and 6. 
The index is thus calculated as follows: 
 
Index job security provisions = 
ඥ𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙 × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙 = 
ඨ𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙 ×
(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
2
  
 
Within this sample, the index for job security provisions ranges between 0 and 5. When 
using the index, two more cases on the macro level (GR 2004 and GR 2010) are lost due to missing 
information on the consequences of an unfair dismissal.  
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Since the results were similar, it was decided to report the easier measurement (also with 
more cases), but in addition, including the results of the index in the Online Appendix. 
 
Table 3. Model including the index for job security provisions 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.533** (0.050) 0.173 (0.147) 
Country variables     
Job security provisions (index) 0.035 (0.028) -0.005 (0.034) 
Regulations on temporary 
employment 
-0.004 (0.051) -0.086 (0.061) 
Unemployment rate 0.025* (0.012) 0.022 (0.014) 
Cross-level-interactions     
FTC*Job security provisions 
(index) 
  0.056* (0.026) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary 
employment 
  0.115* (0.047) 
FTC*Unemployment rate   0.004 (0.011) 
     
 individual and company level controls are included 
     
Constant 1.614** (0.169) 1.869** (0.196) 
Variance components     
FTC (Random slope) 0.078 (0.021) 0.060 (0.018) 
Country-year 0.134 (0.035) 0.125 (0.031) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.065 (0.023) -0.052 (0.019) 
Individual 0.823 (0.008) 0.823 (0.008) 
Explained variances     
Explained variance of random 
slopea   0.227  
R2 (Individual)b 0.100  0.103  
R2 (Country-year)b 0.182  0.179  
M 37  37  
N 23,196  23,196  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
All individual and company level controls are included. Complete results upon request. 
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 
2004 and 2010.  
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR;  
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
 
The results are similar to those that are found in the main article when only the item 
‘definition of unfair dismissal’ is used. The alternative measurement for job security provisions 
also significantly increases the gap between permanent and temporary employees. The results for 
‘regulations on the use of temporary contracts’ on the job security gap are also fairly robust, and 
similar to the results reported in the main article. 
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1.3. Check on measurement of regulation on temporary employment (both items from the 
index included separately) 
For the measurement of ‘regulations on the use of temporary contracts’, an additive index is used 
which combines two items: limitations on 1) the ‘maximum number of successive fixed-term 
contracts (FTC)’ and 2) on the ‘maximum cumulated duration of successive FTC’. It is argued 
here that the two items are ‘strategic substitutes’, meaning two different ways for countries to limit 
the excessive use of temporary contracts, which is why these items can be combined even though 
the correlation is negative (-0.22). This assumption, however, can and should be checked. If the 
argument is correct, the two items should show the same effect on the gap between permanent and 
temporary contracts. Therefore, both items were included separately in this model. 
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Table 4 (Online Appendix). Models with both items of regulations on temporary 
employment 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.524** (0.048) 0.206 (0.136) 
Country variables     
Job security provisions -0.002 (0.023) -0.038 (0.028) 
Regulations on temporary 
employment (Item 1: Number) 
-0.017 (0.028) -0.041 (0.034) 
Regulations on temporary 
employment (Item 2: Duration) 
0.052 (0.037) -0.005 (0.045) 
Unemployment rate 0.024* (0.011) 0.023+ (0.014) 
Cross-level-interactions     
FTC*Job security provisions   0.050* (0.021) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary 
employment (Item 1: Number) 
  0.033 (0.026) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary 
employment (Item 2: Duration) 
  0.077* (0.033) 
FTC*Unemployment rate   0.002 (0.010) 
     
 individual and company level controls are included 
     
Constant 1.684** (0.160) 1.911** (0.185) 
Variance components     
FTC (Random slope) 0.073 (0.02) 0.056 (0.017) 
Country-year 0.130 (0.034) 0.121 (0.03) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.062 (0.022) -0.049 (0.018) 
Individual 0.830 (0.008) 0.830 (0.008) 
Explained variances     
Explained variance of random 
slopea   0.237  
R2 (Individual)b 0.107  0.110  
R2 (Country-year)b 0.225  0.224  
M 39  39  
N 23978  23978  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
All individual and company level controls are included. Complete results upon request. 
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 
2004 and 2010.  
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR;  
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
 
Both limitations on the ‘maximum number of successive FTC’ (Item 1: Number) as well as 
‘maximum cumulated duration of successive FTC’ (Item 2: Duration) increase the gap between 
temporary and permanent employees (Table 4, Model 2). The effect of Item 1 is not significant, 
possibly because the measurement is not exact enough and the number of cases is too low, but 
since both effects go in the same direction, combining the two into an index seems justified.  
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2. Additional Robustness Checks 
The additional robustness checks relate to the choice of the linear model (instead of the ordinal 
one), the pooling of the two datasets (ESS 2004 and ESS 2010) and the choice of macro-level 
control. 
 
2.1. Ordinal model 
Since the dependent variable is ordinal, there are reasons, why an ordinal model could be the 
obvious choice. Even though this model might be more appropriate for the scaling of the dependent 
variable (1-4), there are also two good reasons against it. First, it uses up more degrees of freedom, 
which is a disadvantage considering only 39 cases exist on the country level. Usually, 50 cases 
would be desirable for linear models and even more for ordinal or logistic models. 
Second, effects are more difficult to present and interpret. Therefore, they were only used 
as a robustness check. The effects go in the same direction and are also significant. 
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Table 5 (Online Appendix). Ordinal model 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 1.038** (0.096) 0.311 (0.259) 
Country variables     
Job security provisions -0.007 (0.049) -0.074 (0.054) 
Regulations on temporary 
employment 
0.029 (0.106) -0.132 (0.115) 
Unemployment rate 0.047* (0.023) 0.042 (0.027) 
Cross-level-interactions     
FTC*Job security provisions   0.096* (0.040) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary 
employment 
  0.228** (0.085) 
FTC*Unemployment rate   0.007 (0.020) 
     
 individual and company level controls are included 
     
Constant (cut1) 0.037 (0.342) -0.465 (0.361) 
Constant (cut2) 1.719** (0.342) 1.217** (0.361) 
Constant (cut3) 3.118** (0.342) 2.616** (0.361) 
Variance components     
FTC (Random slope) 0.291** (0.078) 0.192** (0.057) 
Country-year (cons) 0.503** (0.125) 0.454** (0.105) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.243** (0.086) -0.170** (0.063) 
M 39  39  
N 23978  23978  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
All individual and company level controls are included. Complete results upon request. 
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 
2004 and 2010.  
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR;  
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
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2.2. ESS 2004 and ESS 2010 (separate) 
For the main results, the data from the ESS 2004 and 2010 are pooled and country-years used as 
the macro level. There might be reasons to suspect that there is a difference between 2004 and 
2010. Pooling the datasets might be incorrect if the estimated effects are very different within the 
two datasets. This can be checked by estimating the models separately in each case. Doing this 
also illustrates what happens when you are interested in interaction effects, but have only around 
20 cases on the macro level. 
The models are analogous to the main results in Table 1 (main paper). Model 1 only 
includes the main effects of the country level variables─job security provisions, regulations on 
temporary employment and the unemployment rate. Model 2 additionally includes the cross-level-
interaction terms to evaluate which factors can explain the variations in the gap in perceived job 
security between permanent and temporary employees. Both models include the random slope for 
temporary employment. 
In all models, the individual and country level controls mentioned in the main paper are 
included. 
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Table 6 (Online Appendix). Model with ESS 2004 and ESS 2010 separately 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.559** (0.084) 0.172 (0.254) 0.493** (0.055) 0.199 (0.161) 
Country variables         
Job security provisions 0.062** (0.023) 0.008 (0.037) -0.039 (0.037) -0.064 (0.041) 
Regulations on temporary 
employment 
0.016 (0.047) -0.080 (0.075) 0.019 (0.081) -0.031 (0.090) 
Unemployment rate 0.034** (0.010) 0.038* (0.017) 0.020 (0.020) 0.012 (0.022) 
Cross-level-interactions         
FTC*Job security provisions   0.075+ (0.039)   0.033 (0.025) 
FTC*Regulations on temporary 
employment 
  0.133+ (0.078)   0.066 (0.055) 
FTC*Unemployment rate   -0.004 (0.018)   0.010 (0.013) 
         
 individual and company level controls are included 
         
Constant 1.406** (0.177) 1.678** (0.247) 1.824** (0.250) 2.046** (0.276) 
Variance components         
FTC (Random slope) 0.106 (0.042) 0.079 (0.037) 0.051 (0.020) 0.045 (0.020) 
Country 0.096 (0.039) 0.082 (0.033) 0.163 (0.056) 0.160 (0.054) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.086 (0.037) -0.067 (0.031) -0.047 (0.027) -0.042 (0.026) 
Individual 0.823 (0.012) 0.823 (0.012) 0.834 (0.010) 0.834 (0.010) 
Explained variances         
Explained variance of random 
slopea   0.251    0.127  
R2 (Individual)b 0.133  0.138  0.088  0.089  
R2 (Country)b 0.363  0.366  0.147  0.144  
M 17  17  22  22  
N 10029  10029  13949  13949  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. All individual and company level controls are included. Complete results upon request. 
a Reduction in variance = (var(FTC)M1- var(FTC)M1)/ var(FTC)M1 
b R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350-354), also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99-105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (Restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 2004 and 2010. 2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, 
NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR; 2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK. 
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The results go in the same direction as the main results (where both datasets were 
pooled)—the models indicate that job security provisions increase the gap between temporary 
and permanent employees, as do regulations on temporary employment. Since the effects go in 
the same direction, pooling seems justified and the main model is correctly specified. 
However, compared to the pooled results the estimates were very uncertain and failed 
to reach significance using a standard two-tailed test (p>0.05). For 2004 the results were only 
significant at p<0.1, which is equivalent to p<0.05 when a one-tailed test is used. It can be 
argued that one-sided testing is justified since the hypotheses in this study are directed. 
However, in 2010 the results for job security provisions were only significant at p<0.2, which 
is equivalent to p<0.1 in a one-sided test, while for regulations on temporary employment, the 
coefficient fails to reach significance. The results for 2010 are more exact if the additional 
control variable ‘financial difficulty of the company’ is included. Consequently, the effect of 
regulations on temporary employment is a bit stronger (0.089) and significant at p<0.1, which 
equals p<0.05 in a one-sided test (see replication package). Additionally, the explained variance 
of the random slope increases considerably (0.25). However, it is not recommendable to include 
different controls in both years; therefore, the study refrains from doing this since the objective 
is only to check whether pooling is justified.   
These models also clarify the problems with interaction effects in small samples—even 
though they are found, the confidence intervals are very large. Therefore, it is obviously 
preferable to try to increase the sample on the macro level, which will lead to more stable 
results. 
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3. Content of the Replication Package 
A replication package is available upon request from the author including the macro-
level-data and the Stata-do-files necessary to replicate the analysis. 
 
Content 
 
master_4.7.17.do 
01_Recode_append_4.7.17.do 
02_Recode_macro_variables_merge_4.7.17.do 
03_Analysis_job_insecurity_4.7.17.do 
 
ESS2e03_4.dta  
(not included; please download here: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/) 
ESS5e03_2.dta  
(not included; please download here: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/) 
 
Makroind_clean_long.dta 
please cite original source: 
OECD (2016). Employment Protection Database. Annual time series data. 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/EPL-timeseries.xlsx 
International Labour Office (ILO) 2015: Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 2015. 
http://ilo.org/legacy/english/global-reports/kilm2015/kilm09.xlsx 
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Operationalization of Employment Protection Legislation and 
Implications for Substantive Results: Example of Perceived Job 
Insecurity and Temporary Employment Risk6 
 
  
                                                 
6 Balz, A. and Pforr, K: Operationalization of Employment Protection Legislation and Implications for 
Substantive Results: Example of Perceived Job Insecurity and Temporary Employment Risk. Unpublished 
Manuscript. 
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Abstract 
This study shows that the OECD index that measures the employment protection legislation of 
regular employees (EPR) is deficient with respect to a theoretical point of view (content 
validity) and to its predicted effects (criterion validity) and that this choice of operationalization 
has important implications for substantive results. We suggest a new EPR-Index that measures 
permanent employees’ protection against dismissal, which implements a theory-driven choice 
of items, normalization rules, and aggregation procedure. Subsequently, we empirically 
compare this new index with the OECD index by testing relationships with outcome variables 
indicated in the literature. First, we used a multi-level model to predict the perceived job 
insecurity of temporary and permanent employees that depends on the level of EPR with cross-
national data from the European Social Survey, the European Working Condition Survey, and 
the European Quality of Life Survey. Second, we examine the effect of EPR on the temporary 
employment risk of new hires using data from the European Labour Force Survey. Whereas 
the predicted results based on the OECD-EPR-Index significantly contradict the hypotheses in 
the literature, the predicted results using the new EPR-Index confirm the hypotheses in the 
literature. The new EPR-Index also reveals the expected effects of related variables that are 
concealed when using the OECD-EPR-Index. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite a large body of research, the effects of employment protection legislation of 
regular employees (EPR) are still highly debated. Although some studies have found an 
increasing effect of EPR on overall unemployment (Holt and Hendrickson 2017; Lazear 1990), 
others have not found this effect (Addison and Grosso 1996; Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso 
2000; OECD 2004; Nickell 1997; Blanchard and Portugal 2001; for an overview, see Addison 
and Teixeira 2003). Also, the negative of effects of EPR on labor-market outsiders is 
inconsistent. While most studies have found that EPR increased youth unemployment rates 
(Breen 2005; Esping‐Andersen 2000; Heckman and Pagés-Serra 2000; OECD 2004, 2006; 
Boeri and van Ours 2013), a thorough review and replication of previous findings has suggested 
that these results are unstable and may be an artifact (Noelke 2016). 
Whereas most of the scientific discussion about better estimates of the causal effects 
of EPR has focused on better research designs and analytical methods (e.g., Checchi and 
Leonardi 2016; Noelke 2016), the operationalisation of the theoretical concept of EPR, which 
is the foundation of any empirical analyses, has been largely ignored. As we show in the present 
study, the empirical findings depend decisively on the choice of measurement of EPR, and the 
OECD-index—the most often used indicator for EPR—has multiple problems. General 
agreement exists that a valid measurement is of central importance to obtaining valid findings. 
The demand for validated instruments (Mustillo, Lizardo, and McVeigh 2018: 1282) cannot be 
met if such a validated instrument does not exist, which is precisely the case with respect to 
EPR. At this point, the only relevant cross-country measurement for the construct EPR is the 
“synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary 
contracts” (OECD 2013) provided by the OECD for which only minimal theoretical 
documentation is available (Allard 2005; OECD 2014; Venn 2009) and validation studies are 
non-existent. Therefore, the research gap that our study closes is the development and 
validation of an index to measure EPR. 
The OECD EPR-Index is used in most comparative research. Most recent studies (e.g., 
Baranowska and Gebel 2010; Gebel and Giesecke 2011, 2016; Noelke 2016) include it directly 
to measure “employment protection for regular employees.” This operationalization is state of 
the art at this point (Checchi and Leonardi 2016:532). Other studies use the OECD EPR-Index 
in combination with the other two sub-indices of the OECD—regulations on temporary 
employment and protection against collective dismissals—either by using the OECD Overall 
Index1 that calculates a weighted average between the EPR sub-index and the two other sub-
indices (e.g., Breen 2005; Gangl 2003, 2008; Lange, Gesthuizen, and Wolbers 2014) or by 
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calculating the mathematical differences between the sub-indices (Barbieri and Cutuli 2016) or 
the ratio (Biegert 2017). However, all these variations are based on the EPR sub-index, which 
is very problematic, as we will show in this paper, since it suffers from several shortcomings. 
The minimal documentation on the development of the OECD Index and its sub-
indices (e.g., Allard 2005; Venn 2009) has significant gaps with respect to the theoretical 
foundation of the index, and the documentation also lacks validation studies. Although the sub-
index OECD-EPR-Index includes a wide range of items related to the employment protection 
legislation of regular employees, it poorly reflects the theoretical construct protection against 
dismissal because two central steps in the index construction—1) the normalization strategy 
applied to the individual items and 2) the rule of aggregation—are not theoretically grounded. 
The empirical normalization strategy used by the OECD-EPR-Index implies that all items 
included differentiate over the entire range of the theoretical construct; however, this is not the 
case, since items which differentiate only on one end of the theoretical construct are artificially 
stretched and mask those items that differentiate strongly. In addition, the additive aggregation 
rule chosen for the OECD-EPR-Index assumes a perfect compensation between the various 
dimensions, which the theoretical construct does not allow. If, for example, a country does not 
impose any restrictions on the grounds for dismissal, and the dismissal of permanent employees 
is legally permitted for almost any reason—the consequences (i.e. penalties) of an unfair 
dismissal are irrelevant, since they will never occur. Due to the problems with the normalization 
rule and the aggregation, the measurement of the OECD-EPR-Index deviates substantially from 
the theoretical construct of protection against dismissal.  
The present study is structured as follows. Based on the rules for formative index 
construction, we develop a theory-driven EPR-Index (New) to measure the latent construct 
protection against dismissal. Starting with a theoretical model, we have identified the relevant 
sub-dimensions that determine protection against dismissal. To measure these sub-dimensions, 
we identified the corresponding items and normalised them using theory to ensure that the range 
of the new instrument corresponds to the range of the theoretical dimension. In the last step, 
we discuss the theoretical compensation rules between the sub-dimensions, and derive the 
resulting rule of aggregation to construct the EPR-Index (New). The empirical section 
illustrates the substantial effects of the operationalization of EPR on the results by comparing 
the results of this theory-driven EPR-Index (New) and the traditional OECD-EPR-Index. For 
this comparison, we use the predicted causal relationships from the literature that are linked 
directly to protection against dismissal in the causal chain. This comparison also serves as a 
test of the criterion validity of the two EPR-Indices. The results of the comparison show that 
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the results differ to a substantial degree and that the results from the New EPR-Index 
correspond better to the predictions of the theory. We conclude our study with a summary of 
our results and implications for future research. 
 
2. Operationalization of Employment Protection Legislation for Regular 
Employees (EPR) 
Our study focusses on the measurement of the Employment Protection Legislation for 
Regular Employees (EPR)2. The only existing measurement for cross-country comparisons for 
EPR is the sub-index “Employment protection legislation: regular employees” by the OECD 
(OECD-EPR-Index). To maintain consistent terminology, we define EPR as the underlying 
theoretical construct of employment protection legislation of regular employees. 
A wide consensus exists as to what the OECD-EPR-Index is supposed to measure: the 
protection of permanent employees against dismissal (e.g., Barbieri and Cutuli 2016:503), 
which is evident in the use of the OECD-EPR-Index in scientific research (e.g., Baranowska 
and Gebel 2010; Gebel and Giesecke 2011, 2016; Noelke 2016). However, so far, only a brief 
description of the development of the index exists (Allard 2005; Venn 2009), and a detailed 
discussion and assessment of its validity is missing. Although one study criticized the validity 
of the index, it did not offer a solution (Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes 2000). 
The two types of index construction are reflexive index formation (effect indicators) 
and formative index formation (causal indicators) (Edwards 2011). With respect to indicators 
at the country level, the formative index construction logic almost always is used, which 
assumes that the sub-dimensions and their measurement are the cause of the latent construct to 
be measured (Bollen and Lennox 1991:306). Therefore, a correlation of the items with the latent 
construct is expected, but the correlation between items can be zero (Latcheva and Davidov 
2014:750). In contrast, with respect to reflexive indicators, high correlations between the items 
are expected, and also can be empirically tested by a factor analysis (Latcheva and Davidov 
2014:750). With respect to the OECD-EPR-Index, the correlation among items is low (see 
Appendix A1), which follows the condition for a formative index. The correlation structure 
alone, however, says nothing about the quality of the measurement, which must be determined 
on the basis of theory. To ensure that the index corresponds to the underlying theoretical 
construct, four steps are necessary to construct the formative index (see OECD 2008:21–22). 
The steps are as follows: 1) The latent construct must be defined, and the latent sub-dimensions 
that determine it must be identified; 2) with respect to these sub-dimensions, observable 
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indicators must be selected; 3) these indicators must be normalised; and 4) to construct the 
actual index, the aggregation-rule must be specified to combine the normalized items. In the 
following sub-sections, we show that the OECD-EPR-Index has deficiencies in all four steps: 
the theoretical construct and the sub-dimensions are not derived from theory; some items have 
no equivalent in the theoretical construct; and both the normalisation rule and the aggregation 
rule violate assumptions about the theoretical construct. In this section we discuss these 
problems and develop an alternative EPR-Index. 
 
2.1. Definition of the latent construct EPR and derivation of the sub-dimensions 
A consensus exists in the literature that the OECD-EPR-Index measures the protection 
of permanent employees against dismissal (e.g., Baranowska and Gebel 2010; Gebel and 
Giesecke 2011, 2016; Noelke 2016). To determine the sub-dimensions of this latent EPR 
construct, we used a theoretical model to understand the dismissal process. 
 
Figure 1. Dismissal procedure. 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Figure 1 is a model of the dismissal process. If a company wants to dismiss an 
employee (Column 1), notice must be given. This notice can be valid in form or not (e.g., a 
verbal notice instead of a written notice as required). Therefore, the first factor is the difficulty 
of a formally correct notice. If the notice is valid in form, the next issue is whether the reason 
for dismissal is legally valid or not (Column 2), so the second decisive factor is the difficulty 
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of a fair dismissal. In either case, the employee can take legal action against the dismissal 
(Column 3). Therefore, the difficulty of an appeal is the third decisive factor. We assume that 
in the event of a challenge in court, the courts will rule according to the law3. At the end of the 
dismissal process, the outcomes or consequences are listed (Column 4). Costs for employers 
always correspond to the benefits for an employee and vice versa.  
This dismissal procedure model implies that a formative EPR-indicator should include 
the following sub-dimensions: the difficulty of a formally correct notice, the difficulty of a fair 
dismissal, the difficulty of challenging a dismissal in court, and the consequences of a fair or 
unfair dismissal. To operationalize these sub-dimensions, one must determine the measurable 
factors that determine those difficulties. 
 
2.2.  Operationalization of the sub-dimensions of EPR 
To operationalize these sub-dimensions, we use the legal situation as the starting point. 
Since this approach also was the OECD strategy, we can use the existing OECD coding, which 
offers two advantages: first, the OECD coding of country laws into items has been proven to 
be reliable (Noelke 2016:Online-Appendix 22f), and second, this strategy enables us to 
construct our index with existing data.  
The first dimension (Column 1) is the “difficulty of a formally correct notice.” The 
OECD offers two items that influence this dimension: “notification procedures” and “delay to 
start a notice”4. The OECD understands these items as “procedural inconveniences.” Also, these 
two items capture the form that a valid notice of termination must take and how long employers 
must wait before notice of termination can be issued in a valid form. If these restrictions on the 
form of a notice of termination are not complied with, the notice is invalid. The “difficulty of 
fair dismissal” (Column 2: Reason) can be measured by the item “definition of unfair 
dismissal,” which indicates the grounds on which dismissal is legally permissible. Column 3 
refers to how difficult it is for employees to challenge a wrongful termination in court (Column 
3: Difficulty of an appeal). With respect to the difficulty of challenging a wrongful termination 
in court, coding is not available within the EPR framework of the OECD, since this difficulty 
cannot be derived directly from the law. During the development of the OECD-indicators, a 
discussion was held as to whether some aspects of the legal system such as “burden of proof,” 
“contested dismissal cases per 1,000 workers,” or “average time for a decision in labour cases” 
should be included (Venn 2009:46–47). However, the role of courts was not included in the 
EPR-OECD-Index which has been criticized afterwards (Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes 2000:67-
70). Nevertheless, since we want to account for the protection that a legal system provides 
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employees, we have chosen “collective bargaining coverage”5 as a proxy. In other contexts, the 
degree of organization of trade unions has been used as a proxy for their influence in society, 
which also can serve as a proxy for the difficulty to challenge an employee’s unfair dismissal 
in court. Thus, if employees have access to union support, legal advice or even legal support 
from union lawyers usually is available. Ensuring that employees are aware of their rights and 
helping them to enforce these rights reduces the difficulty to contest an unfair dismissal in 
court. The data on the coverage rate of trade unions also is provided by the OECD (2013). 
Column 4 “Consequences” distinguishes between the consequences of “fair” and “unfair” 
dismissals. “Notice period” and “severance pay” can be regarded as the consequences of a fair 
dismissal, and the two suitable items for the consequences of an unfair dismissal are 
“compensation following an unfair dismissal” and the “possibility of reinstatement following 
an unfair dismissal.”  
 
2.3. Normalization of items 
Next, we normalize the items we derived from the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 
1. In general, normalization means transformation to a common scale. Most normalization 
procedures are based on the empirical distribution of the items: e.g., Index of Social Progress 
(Estes 1997),and Index of Social Health (ISH) (Miringoff, Miringoff, and Opdycke 1999)). In 
rare cases, a theory-driven normalization strategy is chosen: e.g. “Level of Living Index” 
(Drewnowski 1974) and the “Human Development Index (HDI)” (Sen 1999). An important 
aspect of a theory-driven normalization are the “critical points of the indicator,” i.e., the 
survival level and saturation point (Drewnowski 1974). Below the minimum or the survival 
level, a further deterioration is not to be expected, whereas above the saturation point a further 
increase is not to be expected. The difficulty, however, with respect to such standardization is 
that usually objective criteria or unanimous expert opinions are not available (Drewnowski 
1974:22). Whereas empirical standardization usually can be described in one sentence, 
theoretical standardization requires a comprehensive theoretical explanation (e.g., Drewnowski 
1974:52–68). However, such an approach is particularly important if the empirical distribution 
clusters at one end of the latent sub-dimension as is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Theory-driven vs empirical normalization  
Source: Own representation. 
 
With respect to the upper item, the empirical distribution is restricted to the lower 
theoretical end of the sub-dimension, whereas the lower item is distributed over the entire range 
of the sub-dimension. The right side of Figure 2 shows the results of the two normalization 
strategies. Whereas the theory-driven normalization considers the distribution on the latent sub-
dimension, the empirical normalization assumes that the empirical maximum equals the 
theoretical maximum. Therefore, if an empirical normalization is chosen, the resulting 
measurement misleadingly suggests a high variance or discrimination over the entire sub-
dimension, although the measurement does not reflect the range across the construct. If the two 
items are aggregated, the variance of the upper item is artificially inflated relative to the lower 
item. Although a theory-based normalization is not empirically verifiable and can only be 
measured by the strength of the argumentation behind it, this approach improves the 
correspondence of the measurement with the underlying latent sub-dimension. 
For each sub-dimension, the theoretical minimum and maximum must be defined on 
the basis of these general rules, and the coding adapted accordingly. The coding of each item 
for the EPR-Index (New) is explained below and summarized in Table 1. The column 
theoretical dimension shows the proposed theoretical normalization on the basis of the defined 
theoretical minima and maxima. 
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Theoretical 
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Table 1. EPR-Index (New): original coding scheme and theoretical normalization 
Item, original unit, and short description 
of the assignment of numerical strictness 
scorese 
Theoretical dimension and theoretical 
rangeg 
Item 1: Notification Procedures  
0 [an oral statement is enough] 
2 [a written statement of the reasons for 
dismissal must be supplied to the 
employee] 
4 [a third party (such as works council or 
the competent labour authority) must be 
notified] 
6 [the employer cannot proceed to 
dismissal without authorisation from a 
third party] 
 
Column 1: Difficulty of a formally correct 
notice of termination 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≈ Min  Irrelevant 
Item 2: Delay involved before notice can 
starta  
0 [≤ 2 days], 1 [< 10 days], 2 [< 18 days], 
3 [< 26 days], 4 [< 35 days], 5 [< 45 
days], 6 [≥ 45 days] 
 
Column 1: Difficulty of a formally correct 
notice of termination 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≈ Min  Irrelevant 
Item 5: Definition of justified or unfair 
dismissal  
0 [when worker capability or redundancy 
of the job are adequate and sufficient 
ground for dismissal],  
2 [when social considerations, age or job 
tenure must when possible influence the 
choice of which worker(s) to dismiss],  
4 [when a transfer and/or a retraining to 
adapt the worker to different work must 
be attempted prior to dismissal],  
6 [when worker capability cannot be a 
ground for dismissal] 
 
Column 2: Difficulty of fair dismissal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≡ Max  
Item 9: Maximum time to make a claim of 
unfair dismissald  
0 [Before dismissal takes effect], 1[≤ 1 
month], 2[≤ 3 months], 3[≤ 6 months], 
4[≤ 9 months], 5[≤ 12 months], 6[> 12 
months] 
 
Column 3: Difficulty of an appeal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≈ Min  Irrelevant  
Additional Itemf: Collective bargaining 
coverage (in percentage) 
0 [0], …, 6 [100] 
 
Column 3: Difficulty of an appeal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≡ Max 
Item 3: Length of the notice period at... 
...9 months tenure 
Column 4: Consequences of a fair dismissal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≈ Min  Irrelevant 
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0 [0 months], 1 [≤ 0.4 months], 2 [≤ 0.8 
months] 3 [≤ 1.2 months], 4 [< 1.6 
months], 5 [< 2 months], 6 [≥ 2 months] 
...4 years tenure  
0 [0 months], 1 [≤ 0.75 months], 2 [≤ 1.25 
months], 3 [< 2 months], 4 [< 2.5 
months]5 [< 3.5 months], 6 [≥ 3.5 
months] 
...20 years tenure  
0 [< 1 months], 1 [≤ 2.75 months], 2 [< 5 
months], 3 [< 7 months], 4 [< 9 months], 
5 [< 11 months], 6 [≥ 11 months] 
 
Item 4: Severance pay at... 
...9 months tenure (in months pay) 
0 [0], 1 [≤ 0.5], 2 [≤ 1], 3 [≤ 1.75], 4 [≤ 
2.5], 5 [< 3], 6 [≥ 3] 
...4 years tenure (in months pay) 
0 [0], 1 [≤ 0.5], 2 [≤ 1], 3 [≤ 2], 4 [≤ 3], 5 
[< 4], 6 [≥ 4] 
...20 years tenure (in months pay) 
0 [0], 1 [≤ 3], 2 [≤ 6], 3 [≤ 10], 4 [≤ 12], 5 
[≤ 18], 6 [> 18] 
 
Column 4: Consequences of a fair dismissal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≈ Min  Irrelevant  
Item 7: Compensation following unfair 
dismissalc 
(in months pay) 
0[≤ 3], 1[≤ 8], 2[≤ 12], 3[≤ 18], 4[≤ 24], 
5[≤ 30], 6[> 30] 
 
Column 4: Consequences of an unfair 
dismissal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≡ Max 
Item 8: Possibility of reinstatement following 
unfair dismissal  
0 [no right or practice of reinstatement], 
2[reinstatement rarely or sometimes made 
available], 
4 [reinstatement fairly often made 
available], 
6 [reinstatement (almost) always made 
available] 
 
Column 4: Consequences of an unfair 
dismissal 
0 ≡ Min, 6 ≡ Max 
Note: a Estimated time includes, where relevant, the following assumptions: 6 days are counted in case of 
required warning procedure, 1 day when dismissal can be notified orally, or the notice can be directly handed to 
the employee, 2 days when a letter needs to be sent by mail and 3 days when this must be a registered letter. 
b Period within which, regular contracts are not fully covered by employment protection provisions, and unfair 
dismissal claims can usually not be made.  
c Typical compensation at 20 years of tenure, including back pay and other compensation (e.g. for future lost 
earnings in lieu of reinstatement or psychological injury), but excluding ordinary severance pay.  
d Maximum time period after dismissal notification up to which an unfair dismissal claim can be made.  
e Source: OECD 2014. 
f Not included in the OECD-EPR. Source: OECD 2013 retrieved from 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CBC. 
g Source: authors consideration 
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Column 1: Difficulty of formally correct notice of termination 
The measurement of the theoretical construct difficulty of formally correct dismissal 
notice of termination indicates the difficulty to give a formal notice of dismissal on a continuum 
from very easy to extremely difficult. The zero point represents very easy. The saturation 
threshold is reached when the legally required form of dismissal is so difficult to comply with 
that it represents a major obstacle for the employer. We consider the requirement of the consent 
of an employee-friendly third party—that has a high tendency of refusal of consent—to be a 
major obstacle for an employer to comply with the requirements of a formal notice of dismissal. 
If an employer can comply with the process relatively easily, the zero-point is reached. Looking 
at the original coding, it is clear that the empirical distribution only differentiates at the lower 
end of the scale. Code 0 means that an oral dismissal is sufficient, code 2 means that a written 
dismissal is necessary, code 4 means that a third party must be notified, and code 6 means that 
a third party must agree. Unfortunately, the coding of consent does not distinguish between 
employee-friendly and employer-friendly parties. However, in the 800 country years currently 
available, only Portugal in 1985–1989 and Venezuela in 2014 take the value 6. Thus 
considering that almost without exception, employers must only notify a third party, it can be 
assumed that this is not an obstacle to dismissal, which is the reason we do not consider this 
item. In terms of mapping the empirical dimension to the theoretical dimension, the theoretical 
minimum is the empirical minimum (zero), and the empirical maximum is close to the 
theoretical minimum. 
The second item delay involved before notice can start would be an obstacle if it 
delayed the process to the degree that the dismissal would not be cost-effective. In this case, a 
theory-based normalization can be based on the average tenure. The value 6 represents a delay 
of 45 days, which the employer has to wait to give formally correct notice of termination. This 
is not an obstacle, since this period is negligibly short in relation to the average length of service 
and therefore similar to the theoretical minimum. Therefore, the measurement of difficulty in 
giving formal notice is not included as an indicator, i.e., we assume that the required form of 
notice does not play a role in the protection of employees against dismissal. 
 
Column 2: Difficulty in finding a legally permissible ground for dismissal 
The sub-dimension difficulty in finding a legally permissible ground for dismissal is 
captured using the item definition of unfair dismissal, which quantifies the reasons for dismissal 
that can be given, so the dismissal will not be overturned in court. The zero-point means that 
notice can be given for lack of performance, and the saturation point is reached if notice can 
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only be given if an employee cannot fill any other position in the company, even after extensive 
retraining. This corresponds to the theoretical sub-dimension, i.e., this indicator is included in 
the index without recoding, i.e., from 0 to 6. 
 
Column 3: Difficulty of appealing a dismissal in court 
The OECD does not provide coding for the sub-dimension difficulty of an appeal, 
which should measure the difficulty of employees to challenge a formally incorrect or legally 
inadmissible notice in court. The desirability of measuring this dimension also was mentioned 
in the development of the OECD indicator (Venn 2009:27–37). “Burden of proof” or “contested 
dismissal cases per 1,000 workers” was discussed as a measurement (Venn 2009:46–47), but 
this data not provided by the OECD, and common data sources do not provide this information. 
Therefore, we use “coverage rate in %” as a proxy. In the minimum, which is also the survival 
level, 0% of employees have union protection, whereas in the maximum, i.e., the saturation 
threshold, 100% have protection. We rescale these values to 0 to 6. 
 
Column 4: Consequences of fair dismissal  
The sub-dimension consequences of fair dismissals is measured with severance pay 
and notice period. The saturation point is reached when the notice period is so long that the 
termination becomes unprofitable. A reference point is a comparison with tenure. The scale 
value 6 (maximum) means that if an employee has been with a company for 4 years, the notice 
period is more than 3.5 months. Although this delays the termination, it does not prevent it 
(which might be the case, for example, with a notice period of 10 years). Again, the empirical 
maximum is close to the theoretical minimum, i.e., so we do not include the notice period in 
our index. 
The saturation point for severance pay is reached when the compensation payments 
are sufficiently high to make a dismissal uneconomical for an employer. This would be the 
case, for example, if severance pay corresponded to several annual salaries. The maximum code 
for 4 years’ service is 4 months’ salary, 20 years is 18 months, i.e., less than 10% of previous 
earnings. Again, the empirical maximum is close to the theoretical minimum, so we do not 
include this item.  
 
Column 4: Consequences of unfair dismissal 
The sub-dimension consequences of unfair dismissal consists of two items: practice 
of reinstatement and compensation following unfair dismissal (excluding severance pay). The 
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measurement of practice of reinstatement corresponds exactly to the theoretical sub-dimension: 
reinstatement is offered almost never or never in the minimum, and always or almost always in 
the maximum, so we can include this item in the index without rescaling. The minimum of 
compensation following unfair dismissal is easy to determine: 0 or less than 3 months’ salary 
is clearly a good survival level. The maximum seems rather arbitrary, but the OECD coding 
sets the threshold at greater than 2.5 annual salaries. In the absence of better alternatives, we 
follow this coding.  
These findings reveal the second major problem with the OECD-EPR-Index. The 
majority of the included items differentiate only at the lower end of the theoretical dimension. 
However, since all items in the OECD-EPR-Index are empirically normalized, the variance of 
a few items that differentiate across the entire theoretical dimension is deflated by the 
artificially stretched items. Given these problems, the proposed indicators only include the 
dimensions difficulty of fair dismissal, difficulty of an appeal and consequences of unfair 
dismissal. The next step is to aggregate these dimensions. 
 
2.4. Aggregation 
The aggregation rules of the dimensions determine which substitution or 
compensation rules are assumed between the sub-dimensions (e.g., OECD 2008:33; Noll 2002; 
Scheuch and Zehnpfenning 1989:171). Therefore, an operationalization must clarify and 
discuss assumptions about substitution rules (Goertz 2006:46). Substitutability occurs when a 
decrease in one sub-dimension is offset by an increase in another sub-dimension.  
 
Aggregation rules and underlying substitutability assumptions 
The standard method for constructing indices, both in textbooks and in practice, is the 
additive aggregation rule (Goertz 2006:42), which is used, for example, in the Level of Living 
Index, the HDI, the Index of Social Progress, and the Index of Social Health. By using the 
arithmetic mean, full compensation of the dimensions is assumed (Goertz 2006) which poses a 
problem if the theory does not support linear compensation, i.e., if the effect of one sub-
dimension depends on the height of another sub-dimension, or if certain conditions are defined 
as necessary prerequisites. If the aggregation rule violates the theoretical assumptions, the 
resulting index does not correspond to the theoretical construct. The underlying compensation 
assumptions of different aggregation rules are shown in Figure 3. The graphs show two sub-
dimensions and the resulting index on the vertical axis when using different aggregation rules. 
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Figure 3. Compensation for different aggregation rules 
Note: For Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3, see also Goertz 2006:43, own presentation  
 
If the theoretical model does not suggest compensation, the minimum aggregation rule 
is necessary6. In practice, however, the minimum aggregation rule is rarely used. A compromise 
between the arithmetic mean7, which assumes full compensation, and the minimum, which 
completely excludes compensation, is the geometric mean (Goertz 2006:138). Such 
multiplicative indices8 reflect that the effect of one factor depends on the level of another factor. 
In practice, these indices also are rarely used. One exception is the Joint Democracy index 
(Lemke and Reed 2001). In contrast to the arithmetic mean, the choice of the zero-point is 
central for the geometric mean. Zero on a sub-dimension of a multiplicative index is the point 
at which compensation is not possible. If a scale without a zero-point is used (e.g., Lemke and 
Reed 2001), compensation is possible at any point. A multiplicative index with zero represents 
a special case with characteristics of both the minimum and geometric mean. 
 
Application to the EPR-Index 
To determine the correct aggregation rule for sub-dimensions and corresponding 
items, assumptions must be made explicit concerning the substitutability between sub-
dimensions. The OECD-EPR-Index uses the arithmetic mean, but the model of the dismissal 
process (Figure 1) illustrates that sub-dimensions are interdependent. A sub-dimension has a 
stronger effect on the latent construct, depending on the level of the other sub-dimensions. 
Additionally, compensation between the sub-dimensions is not possible at the zero-point of 
each dimension.  
With respect to EPR, when a fair dismissal is legally possible for any reason, or if an 
unfair dismissal has no consequences or cannot be brought to court, protection against 
dismissal, regardless of the other dimensions, does not exist. Therefore, the overall indicator 
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should equal zero if one of the three dimensions equals zero. If, on the other hand, unfair 
dismissals always are overturned in court, the legislation concerning reasons for fair dismissals 
becomes very important, which implies a multiplicative combination of the dimensions (i.e., 
formation of the geometric mean) with previously defined zero-points. However, this 
substitution logic is violated by the aggregation rule of the OECD-EPR-Index, which 
constitutes the third major problem that the EPR-Index (New) addresses. 
When constructing the EPR-Index (New), we use the geometric mean. Within the sub-
dimensions, we assume that the items are perfect substitutes, which means that to measure the 
consequences of unfair dismissal, we use the arithmetic mean of items 7 and 8. This approach 
results in the following equation for the proposed indicator: 
 
 
3. Empirical Tests: Validity and Substantive Implications 
The differences between the construction of the OECD-EPR-Index and our theory-
driven EPR-Index (New) affect the distribution of the index itself and the empirical conclusions 
concerning the effects of the latent construct EPR. First, this section provides some descriptive 
results and examines the structure of the EPR-Index (New) by comparing it to the OECD-EPR-
Index. Second, we test whether the predicted effects in the literature can be confirmed when 
using the OECD-EPR-Index or the EPR-Index (New).9 
The empirical analysis fulfils two purposes: (1) it demonstrates how research findings 
about EPR depend substantially on the choice of operationalization, and (2) it show that our 
proposed EPR- Index (New) better matches the literature hypotheses, and therefore, has a 
higher criterion validity. With formative indices, it is not possible to test the assumptions 
underlying an index construction solely by analyzing the distribution and correlation of items. 
Therefore, we apply an indirect test that uses the effect of the index on a dependent variable 
that, according to the literature, is influenced by the latent construct (criterion validity). 
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3.1. Analytical approach and selection of the examples 
To test criterion validity, it is necessary to analyze causal relationships, and so the 
research design should minimize any interfering factors that could damage the validity of the 
results.  
The two criteria that are central to avoiding bias in the estimated causal effects are: 1) 
a close link between the latent construct and the effect in the causal chain and 2) a research 
design suitable for discovering causal connections. Thus, a fixed-effects approach would be an 
ideal research design. However, since both operationalizations of employment protection show 
minimal intra-country variation over time (see Appendix A2), country fixed-effect models 
cannot be used for the empirical tests. Therefore, empirical tests are restricted to cross-country 
comparisons, with all the associated causality problems including potentially omitting variables 
at the country level. To minimize causality problems, we investigate only those effects that are 
linked directly to the construct EPR, and control for all confounding variables. 
We use two empirical questions to test the construct validity of the measurement: 1) 
How does protection against dismissal affect perceived job insecurity? and 2) How does 
protection against dismissal affect hiring strategies across countries? 
In both cases, a direct connection between the two variables exists in the causal chain, 
which means that the effect is directly caused by EPR and not mediated by another variable. 
First, if permanent employees are well protected against dismissal, in cross-country 
comparisons they should feel more secure overall, and the difference in perceived security 
between permanent and temporary employees should increase. Second, for new hires, the risk 
of a temporary versus permanent contract is influenced directly by the level of protection 
against dismissal. Moreover, we have selected the second question because it can be answered 
with the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), the most frequently used dataset for studies 
on employment protection (e.g., Baranowska and Gebel 2010; Biegert 2017; Gebel and 
Giesecke 2011, 2016; Noelke 2016). 
 
3.2.Descriptive results: Comparison of proposed EPR-Index (New) vs OECD-EPR-Index 
First, we look at the difference between our proposed EPR-Index (New) and the 
OECD-EPR-Index. If the differences in normalization and aggregation discussed in the 
previous section do not lead to differences in the final indices, there is no risk that previous 
findings are impacted considerably by the choice of indicator. 
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The distributions of the multiplicative EPR-Index (New) with theoretical 
normalization, and the additive OECD-EPR-Index with empirical normalization are shown in 
Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of EPR-Index (New) and OECD-EPR-Index 
Source: OECD 2013, own presentation 
 
The EPR-Index (New) on the left is bi-modally distributed, whereas the OECD-EPR-
Index on the right is unimodal and approximately normally distributed. Consequently, the 
descriptive findings of the proposed distributions of the latent construct between countries 
differ considerably. The multiplicative EPR-Index (New) on the left indicates a polarization of 
the underlying theoretical dimension, which would be masked if the additive OECD-EPR-
Index is used. The mean of the multiplicative EPR-Index (New) is 2 with a standard deviation 
of 1.8. The OECD-EPR-Index has a mean of 2.3 with a standard deviation of 0.7. A scatter plot 
between the additive OECD-EPR-Index and the multiplicative EPR-Index (New) (Figure 5) 
shows that most countries are located close to the diagonal, which means that the results of 
both EPR-Indices are similar in these cases. The correlation is 0.67. 
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Figure 5. Correlations of new EPR- Index (New) against OECD-EPR-Index.  
Source: OECD 2013, own representation. 
 
However, the differences between the two indices are significant: With respect to the 
EPR-Index (New), almost half the countries are given the value 0. In all cases, this is because 
dismissal is permitted for all reasons. In contrast, these countries have values above 0 in the 
OECD-EPR-Index.  
Since we have shown that our proposed theory-driven EPR-Index (New) and the 
OECD-EPR-Index are constructed differently and have different distributions, we also expect 
differences in the estimated causal effects when using the two indices.  
 
3.3.  Example 1: EPR and the effect on subjective job security 
To understand the effects of the two indices on substantive results and to test the 
validity of these indices, we examine the effect of EPR on subjective job security.  
 
Theory and hypotheses 
EPR protects permanent employees against dismissal. The empirical test is based on 
the assumption that this protection also would be reflected in the perceived job security of 
permanent employees (for a detailed discussion, see Balz, 2017), which leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
0
2
4
6
EP
R
-In
de
x 
(O
EC
D
)
0 2 4 6
EPR-Index (New)
120 Study III: Operationalization of EPR and Implications for Substantive Results 
Hypothesis 1.1: Stricter EPR increases the subjective job security of permanent employees. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Stricter EPR decreases the subjective job security of temporary employees. 
 
Consequently: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Stricter EPR increases the difference in subjective job security between 
permanent and temporary employees. 
 
Although the hypotheses that are put forward in the literature are the same (Balz 2017; 
Berglund 2015; Chung and van Oorschot 2011; Chung 2016; Clark and Postel-Vinay 2009), 
the empirical evidence is mixed. Studies that use the OECD-EPR-Index find the expected 
effects described in the literature only if they fail to include a random slope, despite an 
interaction effect (cf. Bryan and Jenkins 2016). When the models are specified correctly, which 
means including a random slope (Chung 2016), the expected effects are no longer significant.  
 
Data and methods 
For the empirical test, we use the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2004 
and 2010; European Working Condition Survey (EWCS) 2005, 2010, and 2015; and European 
Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) 2007, 2012, and 2016. Based on these three data sets, we 
estimate a linear multilevel regression model on subjective job security. The dependent variable 
"subjective job security" is scaled from 1 to 4 in the ESS, and 1 to 5 in the EWCS and the 
EQLS. The first level in the multilevel model is employees aged 20–67. The second level is 
country years. 
At the country level, we control for regulations of temporary contracts and the 
unemployment rate. At the individual level, the included control variables differ slightly across 
the datasets. Depending on the variables available, we control for company size, industry 
sector, working hours, general and company-specific human capital, gender, and age. For 
summary statistics for the variables included in the models, see Appendix A3. 
 
Results 
Figure 6 shows the results for the multi-level models—the predicted levels of perceived 
job insecurity for permanent and temporary employees, depending on EPR. The line with the 
dark grey confidence interval indicates permanent employees; light grey corresponds to 
temporary employees. Additionally, the estimated coefficients are shown, i.e., the predicted 
effect of EPR on the subjective job security of permanent employees and the predicted 
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difference of the effect of EPR for permanent and temporary employees. For the complete 
results including control variables, see Appendix A4. 
 
EPR-Index (New) OECD-EPR-Index 
 
ESS 2004, 2010 (N=21836; M=32) 
 
 
EWCS 2005, 2010, 2015 (N=39510, 
M=57) 
 
 
EQLS 2007, 2012, 2016 (N=26339; M=55) 
 
 
Figure 6. Predicted effects of EPR on job security.  
Note: Predicted values of job insecurity of permanent and temporary employees, dependent on EPR estimated 
from the random slope multilevel models. 
 
With the theory-driven EPR-Index (New), we mostly find the expected effects. 
Protection against dismissal increases the perceived job security of permanent employees 
(EWCS and EQLS). For all three data sets, the effect of protection against dismissal is stronger 
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for permanent employees than temporary employees. This interaction effect is significantly 
positive for all three data sets. In contrast, when using the OECD-EPR-Index, the empirical 
findings contradict the theoretical expectations. For all three datasets, we find that protection 
against dismissal measured with the OECD-EPR-Index reduces the perceived job security of 
permanent employees, and even significantly for the ESS dataset. Therefore, the OECD-EPR-
Index does not capture the different effects of employment protection on temporary and 
permanent employees. When the OECD operationalization is used, the interaction effect is not 
significant in any of the three data sets.  
However, the effect sizes of the two EPR indices are not comparable. Since the variance 
of the OECD-EPR-Index is smaller, the unstandardized regression coefficients tend to be 
larger. And, since the hypotheses only make statements about the direction of effects and not 
their sizes, an absolute interpretation of effect sizes is not necessary. Additionally, the 
differences in variance result from the different construction of the indices. When using the 
theory-based normalization and aggregation rules, which were implemented with the EPR-
Index (New), the minima and maxima correspond to the theoretical equivalents. With the 
empirical approach, which is used in the EPR-OECD-Index, the distribution of the indicator is 
a result of the distribution of the items. Therefore, the effects are not comparable. 
The results from this empirical test demonstrate that the findings of the two 
operationalizations differ considerably. Since the empirical findings correspond better to the 
predictions about the effect of the latent construct, and since no the findings contradict the 
theory when using our theory-driven EPR-Index, it has higher criterion validity. Therefore, in 
the first empirically example, our theory-based approach demonstrates significant advantages 
compared to an empirically-based approach. 
 
3.4. Example 2: EPR and the temporary employment risk of new hires 
The second part of the empirical analysis does not allow a simple replication of 
previous research. First, many of the effects studied in the literature are not directly caused by 
the latent construct protection against dismissal (e.g., youth unemployment rate, fixed-term 
employment rate for young people) but transmitted through other variables. It is not possible 
to control all the relevant confounding variables (e.g., the education system) and therefore these 
questions are not suitable as a test of criterion validity. Moreover, since the low variation of 
EPR across time rules out fixed-effect models that could control for many confounding 
variables, a close link in the causal chain is crucial. Therefore, in the second part of the analysis, 
we use the literature on the labor market participation of young adults; however, rather than 
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examining the unemployment rate or fixed-term employment rate, we examine the fixed-term 
employment risks of labour market outsiders. 
 
Previous findings, theory, and hypotheses 
The literature generally assumes that strict EPR has a negative impact on the labour 
market opportunities of young people (e.g., Breen 2005; Gebel and Giesecke 2016; Noelke 
2016), since it increases unemployment risk (e.g., Breen 2005; Esping‐Andersen 2000; 
Heckman and Pagés-Serra 2000; OECD 2004, 2006) and temporary employment risk of labor 
market entrants risks (Gebel and Giesecke 2016; Lange, Gesthuizen, and Wolbers 2014). 
However, the findings are ambiguous. Although most empirical findings have suggested that 
EPR increases youth unemployment (e.g. Breen 2005; Esping‐Andersen 2000; Heckman and 
Pagés-Serra 2000; OECD 2004, 2006), a thorough review and replication of previous findings 
have found that these results are unstable and may be an artifact (Noelke 2016). 
Nevertheless, some theoretical expectations are consistent. According to the literature 
(e.g., Gebel and Giesecke 2016:488), the effect of EPR or protection against dismissal on the 
youth unemployment and temporary employment rates is caused by the hiring strategies of 
companies. Thus, to reduce the influence of uncontrolled variables at the country level, we used 
the effect on hiring behavior to examine the construct validity of the two indices. By examining 
the hypothesis derivation of Gebel and Giesecke (2016:488), we identified hypotheses to use 
for the criterion validity test. According to Gebel and Giesecke (2016), high protection against 
dismissal leads to lower hiring and dismissal rates, and increases incentives to use fixed-term 
contracts. Thus, stricter EPR or job security provisions should not reduce the number of new 
hires in general, but rather the number of permanent hires. This expectation applies to both 
entrants to the labor market and labor market outsiders (the unemployed), which leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Stricter EPR increases the risk for labor market new hires to receive a 
temporary (versus permanent) contract. 
 
An advantage of this hypothesis is that it implicitly controls for current hiring rates in 
each country by comparing temporary to permanent contracts. 
 
Data and methods 
The analysis sample was restricted to new contracts for employees aged 18–68. New 
contracts are defined as all new employment contracts of employees who were not employed 
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in the previous year and were not on parental leave, i.e., were unemployed or still in the 
education system. The dependent variable is binary coded (temporary vs permanent contracts). 
We excluded fixed-term apprenticeship contracts from the sample. We used a linear multilevel 
model with new contracts as level 1 and country-years as level 2. We control for the duration 
of the trial period, unemployment rate, regulations on the use of temporary contracts, and years 
at the country level; and for age, gender, and level of education at the individual level. We use 
304 country-years for our analysis.  
Figure 7 shows the temporary employment rate for new hires across countries. Each dot 
represents one country-year. The mean temporary employment rate for new hires is 44%, with 
a standard deviation of 20, the minimum is 10%, and the maximum is 89%. Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Spain have particularly high values (greater than 80%), whereas Austria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have low values (less than 20%). 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of fixed-term contracts for new hires 
Source: EU-LFS. Own calculations; unweighted results. 
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Multivariate Results 
The results of the multilevel regression presented in Table 2 show the effects of EPR 
and the duration of the trial period on temporary employment risk for new contracts. See 
Appendix A5 for a complete regression table including all control variables. 
 
Table 2. Effect of EPR on temporary employment risk of new hires (EU-LFS) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OECD-
EPR-
Index 
 EPR-
Index 
(New) 
 OECD-
EPR-
Index 
(z-stnd.) 
 EPR-
Index 
(New) 
(z-stnd.) 
 
OECD-EPR-
Index 
0.111** (0.012)       
EPR-Index 
(New) 
  0.032** (0.005)     
EPR-OECD-
Index (z-
standardized) 
    0.064** (0.007)   
EPR-Index 
(New) (z-
standardized) 
      0.057** (0.009) 
Duration of trial 
period (short) 
0.026 (0.020) 0.074** (0.020) 0.026 (0.020) 0.074** (0.020) 
Regulations on 
the use of 
temporary 
contracts 
0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.025** (0.002) 0.022** (0.002) 0.025** (0.002) 0.022** (0.002) 
Variance 
components 
 
        
 Individual 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 
 Country 0.020 (0.002) 0.023 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 0.023 (0.002) 
Explained 
variance 
        
 Individual 0.081  0.069  0.081  0.069  
 Country 0.485  0.410  0.485  0.410  
M 304  304  304  304  
N 1242199  1242199  1242199  1242199  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1994:350–354, 1999:99–105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept model; Restricted Maximum Likelihood). 
 
Both operationalizations of employment protection for regular employees support the 
hypothesis that the temporary employment risk of new hires increases with stronger protection 
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against dismissal. At first glance, this means that the theory-based EPR-Index (New) has no 
apparent advantage. The effect size when using the OECD-EPR-Index is even larger. However, 
as explained previously, the difference in the coefficients follows from the distribution 
differences between the two indices. If both EPR-Indices are z-standardized, the effects are 
similarly large (0.064 and 0.057; see Appendix 5). If the two EPR-Indices are standardized 
based ontheir empirical distribution, the estimated effect shows how much the temporary 
employment risk increases if the respective EPR-Index rises by 1 standard deviation on the 
empirical distribution. This standardization should not be confused with the empirical 
normalization discussed previously. With z-standardization of the Index, the coefficient of the 
valid index is adjusted to the empirical distribution, whereas an empirical standardization of 
items leads to an invalid index. 
The key difference between the two models is, that in the model using the theory-based 
EPR-Index (New) a shorter legal trial period also significantly increases the temporary 
employment risk of new hires. This effect reflects the expectations in the literature (e.g. Gebel 
and Giesecke 2011), where fixed-term employment is expected to be used as an extended 
probationary period or screening device (Korpi and Levin 2001). The incentive to use fixed-
term contracts as a prolonged trial period should increase if the legal trial period is short. This 
effect cannot be found by the model using the OECD-EPR-Index because the trial period-effect 
is partly confounded with the EPR-effect, since the item is part of the OECD-EPR-Index. 
Therefore, even though the OECD-EPR-Index also found the expected effects of 
temporary employment risk for new hires, the advantage of the theory-based EPR-Index (New) 
is nevertheless evident. Only when using the EPR-Index (New) we can validly estimate the 
effects of the related concepts, since these effects are hidden when using the OECD-EPR-Index. 
Thus, the analysis with the EU-LFS has shown that effects discussed in the literature so 
far may have been strongly influenced by the chosen operationalisation of EPR. Moreover, the 
results using the theory-driven EPR-Index (New) better align with the expectations in the 
literature, and therefore has a higher criterion validity. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Employment protection legislation of regular employees (EPR) is a key variable in 
labour market research (e.g., unemployment: Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso 2000; Addison 
and Teixeira 2003; Nickell 1997; Lazear 1990; youth unemployment: Breen 2005; Esping‐
Andersen 2000; Heckman and Pagés-Serra 2000; OECD 2004, 2006). In this study, we 1) argue 
that the standard OECD-operationalization violates several theoretical assumptions, 2) develop 
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an alternative EPR-index that solves these problems, 3) demonstrate with empirical analyses, 
that findings are crucially different when using the theory-driven EPR-Index (New), and 4) 
showed that the alternative EPR-Index (New) has higher criterion validity, since it better 
corresponds to the predictions of theory. 
So far, almost without exception, comparative research has used the OECD-EPR-
Index for operationalizing employment protection for regular employees; however, this index 
has never been discussed and validated in detail. We close this gap by constructing and testing 
an alternative theory-driven EPR-Index. Starting with the latent theoretical construct of EPR, 
we develop an alternative measurement in accordance with the principles of index construction. 
Based on a broad empirical foundation using four cross-country datasets—ESS, EQLS, EWCS, 
and EU-LFS—we show that our theory-driven EPR-Index (New) does not only generate 
significantly different results than the OECD-EPR-Index, but also that it has a higher criterion 
validity. This conclusion refers to both the estimated effects of dismissal protection itself and 
to the effects of related constructs. For both the effects of EPR on perceived job security and 
on temporary employment risk for new hires, we find the effects predicted in the literature. In 
contrast, the results from the OECD-EPR-Index contradict the hypotheses in the literature. 
Most noteworthy is the finding that strict job security provisions measured with the OECD-
EPR-Index reduce perceived job security for permanent employees, which contradicts 
theoretical expectations, and which is the opposite of the EPR-Index (New) findings. Moreover, 
the literature suggests that temporary contracts are used as extensions of probation periods 
(Gebel and Giesecke 2011; Korpi and Levin 2001). Therefore, in countries with a short 
probation period, the temporary employment risk for new hires should be higher. This effect 
has not been empirically verified so far, but it can be found with the theory-based EPR-Index 
(New), but not with the OECD-EPR-Index. Consequently, a valid measurement is crucial not 
only for producing unbiased estimates of the effects of EPR, but also for valid estimates of 
related constructs. 
Besides the substantive implications for comparative labor market research, the 
second contribution of our study is methodological. Even though the call for a theory-driven 
index construction has existed for a long time in the index construction literature (e.g., Blalock 
1983; Noll 2002), it has almost never been implemented consistently. The main problems with 
index construction revolve around normalization and aggregation. Particularly, theory-driven 
normalization is rarely applied, perhaps because it has been neglected in methodology 
textbooks. This study is a showcase example for a successful implementation of theory-driven 
index construction. 
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Our proposed EPR-Index (New) is based on a number of assumptions that can be 
refined and debated. For the normalization assumptions, it would be desirable to identify the 
saturation and survival levels with respect to items more precisely. The saturation levels are 
especially difficult to determine exactly, so refining and empirically testing the proposed 
threshold could improve the measurement. A starting point for this improvement could be the 
saturation level of severance payments as a consequence of unfair dismissal where a different 
level might better reflect the underlying theoretical sub-dimension. This concern also shows 
the difficulty of theory-driven normalization (cf. Drewnowski 1974:22) and that this 
normalization is only unambiguous when an external criterion or a consensus among experts 
exists, which usually is not the case. However, theory-driven normalization always is closer to 
the theoretical construct than empirical normalization. Another point of possible improvement 
could be the proxy chosen for the difficulty to challenge a dismissal in court. A detailed analysis 
of the procedural regulations of a country, the rules on court costs, and the degree to which 
legal expense insurances are spread might lead to better measurement. The advantage of our 
approach, however, is that all the coded indicators we use are readily available. 
Considering that almost all previous research has been based on the EPR-index of the 
OECD, a replication of key research findings is imperative for a fact-based policy-debate about 
employment protection legislation. Moreover, in the social sciences, all indicators should be 
constructed with more theory-driven reflection in the normalization and aggregation steps. 
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Notes 
1. Published under the name overall strictness of protection against dismissals in the June 1999 
Employment Outlook (OECD 2004). The theoretical construct EPL includes a variety of 
regulations that can be separated into three independent theoretical sub-dimensions: 1) 
protection of regular workers against individual dismissal, 2) specific requirements for 
collective dismissals, and 3) regulations on temporary employment (OECD 2014:1). 
2. In the literature, this also is called job security provisions (e.g., Balz 2017; Noelke 2016), 
regulation of permanent work (Baranowska and Gebel 2010), employment protection for 
regular workers (Barbieri and Cutuli 2016:503), employment protection of regular contracts 
(Gebel and Giesecke 2011), or employment protection for regular jobs/of permanent 
contracts/of permanent work contracts (Gebel and Giesecke 2016). However, commonly 
and a bit confusingly the term EPL is also often used as a synonym for protection of regular 
employees against dismissal, which also is reflected in the name of the original EPL-Index 
of the OECD, which included all three dimensions and was published under the name overall 
strictness of protection against dismissals.  
3. This means we do not account for possible grey areas or a bias in favor of employees or 
employers in the legal system of countries. 
4. Delay to start a notice: Estimated time includes, where relevant, the following assumptions: 
6 days are counted in case of required warning procedure, 1 day when dismissal can be 
notified orally or the notice can be directly handed to the employee, 2 days when a letter 
needs to be sent by mail and 3 days when this must be a registered letter. 
5. Collective bargaining coverage rate corresponds to the ratio of employees covered by 
collective agreements divided by all wage earners with a right to bargaining (see OECD.Stat 
at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CBC; and J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base, 
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam at 
http://www.uva-aias.net/en/ictwss/). 
6. In economics, this is known as the Leontief production function, which indicates perfect 
complements. The marginal rate of substitution is equal to ∞. 
7. In economics, this is known as perfect substitutes with a constant marginal rate of substitution 
and parallel indifference curves. 
8. In economics, this is known as the Cobb-Douglas Production function. The marginal rate of 
substitution is decreasing. 
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9. Since the proxy “collective bargaining coverage” to measure “difficulty of an appeal” was 
unfortunately not as closely connected to the theoretical construct as we ideally hoped, we 
also ran the analyses with the multiplicative index without considering the legal system as a 
robustness check. The results using only the difficulty of fair dismissal and consequences of 
unfair dismissal were quite similar to the conclusions when we included collective 
bargaining coverage. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A1. Correlation structure of the EPR-Items coded by the OECD 
 
Item  
1 
Item  
2 
Item  
3a 
Item  
3b 
Item  
3c 
Item  
4a 
Item  
4b 
Item  
4c 
Item  
5 
Item  
6 
Item  
7 
Item  
8 
Item 1 1.00            
Item 2 0.50 1.00           
Item 3a 0.14 0.30 1.00          
Item 3b 0.18 0.32 0.76 1.00         
Item 3c 0.06 0.24 0.47 0.51 1.00        
Item 4a 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.09 -0.26 1.00       
Item 4b 0.20 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.46 0.61 1.00      
Item 4c 0.31 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.34 0.48 0.90 1.00     
Item 5 0.38 0.26 0.01 -0.14 -0.13 0.30 0.14 0.05 1.00    
Item 6 0.01 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.31 0.30 0.29 0.14 0.19 1.00   
Item 7 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.53 -0.02 1.00  
Item 8 0.15 0.10 0.09 -0.22 -0.33 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.13 -0.07 1.00 
 
Source: OECD 2013, own representation. 
Note: N=767 observations. Item 9 is not included, since it would decrease the number of cases by 521 due to 
missing values. 
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Appendix A2. Change of EPR within countries over time 
 
Source: OECD 2013, own representation. 
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Appendix A3a. Descriptive statistics ESS 2004, 2010 
 Mean  Min Max 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.124  0 1 
Education     
ISCED 1-2 0.160  0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.475  0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.365  0 1 
”easy to replace” 5.931  (2.657) 0 10 
Learning Period     
<2 days 0.032    
2-6 days 0.085  0 1 
1-4 weeks 0.164  0 1 
1-3 month 0.224  0 1 
3 month-1 year 0.287  0 1 
1-2 years 0.125  0 1 
2-5 years 0.065  0 1 
More than 5 years 0.018  0 1 
Age     
18-29 0.171  0 1 
30-39 0.264  0 1 
40-54 0.409  0 1 
55-67 0.156  0 1 
Part-time 0.169  0 1 
Female 0.494  0 1 
Child 0.498    
Unemployed in last 5 years 0.112  0 1 
Unemployed more than 12 month 0.088  0 1 
Company Size     
<10 0.215  0 1 
10-24 0.193  0 1 
25-99 0.267  0 1 
100-499 0.188  0 1 
>500 0.137  0 1 
Industry     
1 Agriculture 0.023  0 1 
2 Manufacturing Industry 0.176  0 1 
3 Construction 0.062  0 1 
4 Trade 0.112  0 1 
5 Transport/ Infrastructure 0.092  0 1 
6 Finance 0.037  0 1 
7 Public Administration 0.078  0 1 
8 Education 0.105  0 1 
9 Health sector 0.142  0 1 
10 Service 0.175  0 1 
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Appendix A3b. Descriptive statistics EWCS 2005, 2010, 2015 
 Mean  Min Max 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.113  0 1 
Education     
ISCED 1-2 0.183  0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.463  0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.353  0 1 
Age     
18-29 0.167  0 1 
30-39 0.266  0 1 
40-54 0.411  0 1 
55-67 0.155  0 1 
Part-time 0.151  0 1 
Female 0.513  0 1 
Company size     
<10 0.245  0 1 
10-49 0.330  0 1 
50-100 0.129  0 1 
100-499 0.184  0 1 
>500 0.113  0 1 
Industry     
1. A-B Agriculture, hunting, forestry, 
fishing 
0.014  0 1 
2. C-D Mining, quarrying, 
manufacturing 
0.154  0 1 
3. E Electricity, gas, and water supply 0.014  0 1 
4. F Construction 0.053  0 1 
5. G Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
0.139  0 1 
6. H Hotels and restaurants 0.033  0 1 
7. I Transport, storage, and 
communication 
0.069  0 1 
8. J Financial intermediation 0.040  0 1 
9. K Real estate activities 0.092  0 1 
10. L Public administration and defense 0.082  0 1 
11. M-N-O-P-Q Other services 0.309  0 1 
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Appendix A3c. Descriptive statistics EQLS 2007, 2012, 2016 
 Mean  Min Max 
Fixed-Term-Contract (FTC) 0.124  0 1 
Education     
ISCED 1-2 0.194  0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.460  0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.346  0 1 
Age     
18-29 0.150  0 1 
30-39 0.270  0 1 
40-54 0.426  0 1 
55-67 0.154  0 1 
Part-time 0.138  0 1 
Female 0.519  0 1 
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Appendix A4a. Effect of EPR on Job Security (ESS 2004, 2010) 
 (1)  (2)  
 Index (New)  OECD 
Index 
 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) -0.173 (0.142) -0.249 (0.223) 
EPR (New) -0.006 (0.028)   
x FTC -0.060* (0.024)   
EPR (OECD)   -0.169* (0.066) 
x FTC   -0.015 (0.069) 
Reg. on temp. employment 
(Number and Duration) 
0.103+ (0.055) 0.102* (0.050) 
x FTC  -0.075 (0.047) -0.088+ (0.052) 
Unemployment rate -0.001 (0.013) -0.001 (0.011) 
x FTC -0.015 (0.011) -0.013 (0.012) 
Education (Ref: ISCED 1-2)     
ISCED 3-4 -0.005 (0.020) -0.006 (0.020) 
ISCED 5-6 0.033 (0.021) 0.032 (0.021) 
“easy to replace” -0.029** (0.002) -0.029** (0.002) 
Learning period (Ref: <2days)     
2-6 days -0.016 (0.040) -0.016 (0.040) 
1-4 weeks 0.019 (0.038) 0.019 (0.038) 
1-3 month 0.028 (0.037) 0.028 (0.037) 
3 month-1 year 0.104** (0.037) 0.104** (0.037) 
1-2 years 0.126** (0.040) 0.125** (0.040) 
2-5 years 0.154** (0.043) 0.153** (0.043) 
More than 5 years 0.136* (0.058) 0.136* (0.058) 
Age (Ref.:18-29)     
30-39 -0.130** (0.020) -0.130** (0.020) 
40-54 -0.160** (0.019) -0.160** (0.019) 
55-67 -0.059** (0.022) -0.059** (0.022) 
Part-time 0.061** (0.018) 0.059** (0.018) 
Female -0.012 (0.014) -0.011 (0.014) 
Child 0.029* (0.013) 0.030* (0.013) 
Unemployed in last 5 years -0.255** (0.022) -0.256** (0.022) 
Unemployed more than 12 
month 
-0.094** (0.023) -0.094** (0.023) 
Company size (Ref.:<10)     
10-24 -0.028 (0.019) -0.028 (0.019) 
25-99 -0.016 (0.018) -0.016 (0.018) 
100-499 0.002 (0.020) 0.002 (0.020) 
>500 0.024 (0.023) 0.024 (0.023) 
Industry (Ref.: service)     
1 Agriculture 0.079+ (0.044) 0.079+ (0.044) 
2 Manufacturing Industry -0.089** (0.022) -0.089** (0.022) 
3 Construction -0.042 (0.029) -0.042 (0.029) 
4 Trade -0.013 (0.024) -0.013 (0.024) 
5 Transport/ Infrastructure 0.030 (0.025) 0.030 (0.025) 
6 Finance -0.027 (0.035) -0.028 (0.035) 
7 Public Administration 0.280** (0.027) 0.281** (0.027) 
8 Education 0.296** (0.025) 0.296** (0.025) 
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9 Health sector 0.230** (0.023) 0.230** (0.023) 
Constant 2.938** (0.175) 3.323** (0.218) 
Variance components      
Random Slope (FTC) 0.050 (0.017) 0.064 (0.020) 
Country 0.085 (0.023) 0.069 (0.019) 
Individual 0.811 (0.008) 0.811 (0.008) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.030 (0.015) -0.031 (0.015) 
Explained variance      
Random slope (FTC) 0.268  0.070  
R2 (Individual)a 0.109  0.124  
R2 (Country)a 0.199  0.368  
M 32  32  
N 21,836  21,836  
 
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. a R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1994: 350–354); see also Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99–105)  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
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Appendix A4b. Effect of EPR on job security (EWCS 2005, 2010, 2015) 
 (1)  (2)  
 Index (New)  OECD 
Index 
 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) -0.259 (0.163) -0.126 (0.248) 
EPR (New) 0.041+ (0.022)   
x FTC -0.090** (0.026)   
EPR (OECD)   -0.115+ (0.064) 
x FTC   -0.113 (0.082) 
Regulation temp. 
employment 
0.084+ (0.045) 0.108* (0.045) 
x FTC -0.165** (0.053) -0.188** (0.058) 
Unemployment rate -0.034** (0.009) -0.034** (0.009) 
x FTC -0.013 (0.011) -0.013 (0.012) 
Education 
ISCED 3-4 
0.071** (0.017) 0.070** (0.017) 
ISCED 5-6 0.170** (0.018) 0.168** (0.018) 
Age (Ref.:18-29) 
30-39 
0.000 (0.018) 0.000 (0.018) 
40-54 0.010 (0.017) 0.010 (0.017) 
55-67 0.121** (0.021) 0.121** (0.021) 
Part-time -0.014 (0.017) -0.015 (0.017) 
Female 0.004 (0.013) 0.005 (0.013) 
Company size (Ref.: <10)     
10-49 0.078** (0.015) 0.078** (0.015) 
50-100 0.090** (0.020) 0.090** (0.020) 
100-499 0.096** (0.018) 0.095** (0.018) 
>500 0.142** (0.021) 0.141** (0.021) 
Industry (Ref.:10. L Public 
administration and 
defense) 
1. A-B Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, fishing 
-0.278** (0.052) -0.278** (0.052) 
2. C-D Mining, quarrying, 
manufacturing 
-0.471** (0.025) -0.470** (0.025) 
3. E Electricity, gas, and 
water supply 
-0.240** (0.051) -0.240** (0.051) 
4. F Construction -0.437** (0.032) -0.437** (0.032) 
5. G Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
-0.382** (0.026) -0.382** (0.026) 
6. H Hotels and 
restaurants 
-0.367** (0.037) -0.367** (0.037) 
7. I Transport, storage, 
and communication 
-0.383** (0.029) -0.383** (0.029) 
8. J Financial 
intermediation 
-0.295** (0.035) -0.294** (0.035) 
9. K Real estate activities -0.356** (0.027) -0.356** (0.027) 
11. M-N-O-P-Q Other 
services 
-0.083** (0.023) -0.083** (0.023) 
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Constant 4.160** (0.144) 4.455** (0.197) 
Variance components      
Random Slope (FTC) 0.097 (0.024) 0.119 (0.028) 
Country 0.085 (0.017) 0.085 (0.017) 
Individual 1.217 (0.009) 1.217 (0.009) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.043 (0.015) -0.062 (0.018) 
Explained variance      
Random slope 0.359  0.212  
R2 (Individual)a 0.129  0.131  
R2 (Country)a 0.446  0.474  
M 57  57  
N 38426  38426  
 
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. a R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1994: 350–354); see also Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99–105)  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
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Appendix A4c. Effect of EPR on job security (EQLS 2007, 2012, 2016) 
 (1)  (2)  
 Index (New) 
 
 OECD 
Index 
 
Fixed-Term-Contract (FTC) -0.370** (0.109) -0.190 (0.188) 
EPR (New) 0.079** (0.022)   
x FTC -0.088** (0.018)   
EPR (OECD)   -0.072 (0.077) 
x FTC   -0.121+ (0.066) 
Reg. temp. employment 
(Number & duration) 
-0.046 (0.045) -0.012 (0.051) 
x FTC -0.127** (0.037) -0.144** (0.044) 
Unemployment rate -0.030** (0.009) -0.027** (0.010) 
x FTC 0.005 (0.007) 0.001 (0.009) 
Education     
ISCED 3-4 0.073** (0.018) 0.072** (0.018) 
ISCED 5-6 0.227** (0.018) 0.225** (0.018) 
Age     
30-39 -0.014 (0.020) -0.013 (0.020) 
40-54 0.004 (0.019) 0.004 (0.019) 
55-67 0.095** (0.023) 0.095** (0.023) 
Part-time 0.003 (0.019) 0.003 (0.019) 
Female -0.006 (0.013) -0.006 (0.013) 
Constant 4.297** (0.138) 4.514** (0.221) 
Variance components      
Random Slope (FTC) 0.039 (0.012) 0.061 (0.016) 
Country 0.084 (0.017) 0.104 (0.021) 
Individual 0.974 (0.009) 0.974 (0.009) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.021 (0.011) -0.049 (0.015) 
Explained variance      
Random slope 0.536  0.267  
R2 (Individual)a 0.106  0.094  
R2 (Country)a 0.381  0.288  
M 55  55  
N 26339  26339  
 
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses.  
a R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350–354); see also Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99–105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
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Appendix A5. Effect of EPR on temporary employment risk of new hires (EU-LFS) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 OECD-
EPR-
Index 
 EPR-
Index 
(New) 
 OECD-
EPR-
Index 
(z-stnd.) 
 EPR-
Index 
(New) 
(z-stnd.) 
 
OECD-EPR-
Index 
0.111** (0.012)       
EPR-Index 
(New) 
  0.032** (0.005)     
OECD-EPR-
Index (z-stnd.) 
    0.064** (0.007)   
EPR-Index 
(New) (z-stnd.) 
      0.057** (0.009) 
Duration of trial 
period (short) 
0.026 (0.020) 0.074** (0.020) 0.026 (0.020) 0.074** (0.020) 
Regulations on 
the use of 
temporary 
contracts 
0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.025** (0.002) 0.022** (0.002) 0.025** (0.002) 0.022** (0.002) 
Age (Ref.:<20)         
20-29 -0.024** (0.001) -0.024** (0.001) -0.024** (0.001) -0.024** (0.001) 
30-39 -0.081** (0.002) -0.081** (0.002) -0.081** (0.002) -0.081** (0.002) 
40-49 -0.063** (0.002) -0.063** (0.002) -0.063** (0.002) -0.063** (0.002) 
50-59 -0.058** (0.002) -0.058** (0.002) -0.058** (0.002) -0.058** (0.002) 
60-69 0.013** (0.002) 0.013** (0.002) 0.013** (0.002) 0.013** (0.002) 
>70 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 
Education (Ref. 
low) 
        
middle -0.018** (0.001) -0.018** (0.001) -0.018** (0.001) -0.018** (0.001) 
high -0.014** (0.001) -0.014** (0.001) -0.014** (0.001) -0.014** (0.001) 
Female -0.010** (0.001) -0.010** (0.001) -0.010** (0.001) -0.010** (0.001) 
Variance 
components 
        
 Individual 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 
 Country 0.020 (0.002) 0.023 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 0.023 (0.002) 
Explained 
variance 
        
 Individual 0.081  0.069  0.081  0.069  
 Country 0.485  0.410  0.485  0.410  
M 304  304  304  304  
N 1242199  1242199  1242199  1242199  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1994: 350–354, 1999: 99–105).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept model (restricted maximum likelihood).
  
